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Referendum Voting: Attitudes and Behaviour in the 1992 Constitutional Referendum*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Lawrence LeDuc  and
Jon H. Pammett
Lawrence LeDuc
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
Jon H. Pammett
Affiliation:
Carleton University
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Abstract

Referendums are rare events in most parliamentary democracies, and when they do occur they present an analytical puzzle. Are they such unusual events that they fall outside of the theoretical frameworks familiar to students of elections? Or, even though they enter political life infrequently, can they be understood as something not entirely foreign to our thinking about electoral politics? Here, we argue that voting in referendums such as the constitutional referendum of October 26, 1992 is driven by many of the same factors that are present in elections—parties, leaders, issues, a campaign timetable, the interplay between long- and short-term forces and the dynamic of the campaign itself. In spite of their unique features, referendums can be understood in terms of models of voting behaviour familiar to students of elections in Canada and elsewhere. But, devoid of some of the long-term partisan and social anchors which play a role in elections, their outcome is even more dependent on the short-term elements of the campaign. As such, referendums are subject to greater volatility and uncertainty than that typically found in ordinary parliamentary elections.

Résumé

La tenue d'un référendum est un événement rare dans la plupart des systèmes parlementaires démocratiques, et lorsqu'un tel cas survient, il représente un casse-tête analytique. Le caractère inhabituel de la tenue d'un référendum fait-il en sorte que son analyse se situe à l'extérieur des cadres théoriques familiers aux études électorales? Bien qu'un référendum soit un èvènement politique sporadique, l'analyse peutelle s'effectuer en termes pas entièrement étrangers à notre connaissance de la politique? Nous soutenons ici la thèse voulant qu'une vote référendaire, comme celui du référendum constitutionnel tenu le 26 octobre 1992, répond à une pluralité de facteurs que l'on retrouve lors d'une élection—partis, chefs, questions, ordre du jour de la campagne, de mêrne que les forces pesant à court et à long terme, sans oublier la dynamique de la campagne. Malgré son caractère particulier, il est possible de comprendre un référendum selon les modeles de comportement électoral qui sont familiers aux analyses électorates au Canada et ailleurs. Cependant, l'absence d'identification partisane à long terme et de certaines structures sociales qui jouent un rôle lors d'une élection, fait en sorte que la résultat d'un référendum dépend encore plus des forces à court terme résultant de la campagne. Ainsi, un référendum est plus susceptible d'être affecté par la volatilité et l'inceititude qu'une èlection parlementaire ordinaire.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 3 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1996

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References

1 See, among other sources, LeDuc, Lawrence, “Voting for Free Trade?,” in Fox, Paul and White, Graham, eds., Politics: Canada (7th ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1991), 350–366Google Scholar; Forbes, H. D., “Absent Mandate '88?: Parties and Voters in Canada,” Journal of Canadian Studies 25 (1990), 255–269CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clarke, Harold D., Jenson, Jane, LeDuc, Lawrence and pammett, Jon H., Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections (Toronto: Gage, 1991)Google Scholar; and Johnston, Richard, Blais, André, Brady, Henry E. and Crête, Jean, Letting the People Decide (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

2 See, for example, Butler, David and Ranney, Austin, eds., Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978)Google Scholar; Ranney, Austin, ed., The Referendum Device (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981)Google Scholar; and Rourke, John T. et al., Direct Democracy and International Politics: Deciding International Issues through Referendums (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).Google Scholar

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15 Maglesby, Direct Legislation, 163. See also Lupia, Arthur, “Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information,” American Political Science Review 86 (1992), 390–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 This survey was organized by Harold D. Clarke, Allan Frizzell, Allan Kornberg, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett. A national sample of 1,115 respondents were interviewed by telephone during the final week of the referendum campaign or immediately after the referendum. Interviewing was carried out by the Carleton University Survey Centre under the direction of Allan Frizzell. Funding of this project came from the National Science Foundation, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Carleton University, the University of Toronto and Elections Canada. None of these individuals or organizations other than the authors are responsible for the analysis and conclusions presented here.

17 But see Cairns, Alan and Williams, Douglas, eds., Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles from the Charter to Meech Lake (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991)Google Scholar; Vipond, Robert, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991)Google Scholar; or Russell, Peter H., Constitutional Odyssey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992)Google Scholar, among the many sources on this subject. On the issue of Quebec sovereignty, see Blais, André and Nadeau, Richard, “To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist: Quebeckers' Perennial Dilemma,” Canadian Public Policy 28 (1992), 89–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar; or Dion, Stgphane, “Explaining Quebec Nationalism,” in Weaver, R. Kent, ed., The Collapse of Canada? (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), 77–121.Google Scholar

18 Including, of course, the extensive public hearings conducted by bodies such as the Spicer Commission, the Beaudoin-Dobbie committee and the series of conferences involving “selected” representatives of the public, to mention only a few of the high–profile constitutional events which took place throughout this period.

19 The Quebec legislation was much more restrictive, providing for an umbrella committee for each side and imposing an equivalent spending ceiling on each committee.

20 Reid, Angus, for example, as reported in the Toronto Star, 09 2, 1992.Google Scholar

21 “Trudeau Speaks Out,” Maclean's, 09 18, 1992, 22–26.Google Scholar

22 For example, the study released by the Royal Bank on September 26,1992, which predicted dire economic consequences resulting from continued constitutional uncertainty. See “Banking on Unity,” Maclean's, 10 5, 1992, 42–44.Google Scholar

23 ComQuest Research Group, as reported in the Globe and Mail, 10 3, 1992.Google Scholar See also the day-by-day tracking of the referendum wave of the National Election Study, which shows the YES share plummeting to about 40 per cent by October 6 (Johnston, Richard et al., “The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” in Watts, R. and Brown, D., eds., Canada: The State of the Federation [Kingston: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993], 20).Google Scholar

24 Clarke et al., Absent Mandate, 69–86. See also Frizzell, Allan, Pammett, Jon H. and Westell, Anthony, The Canadian General Election of 1988 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989)Google Scholar, and Johnston, et al., Letting the People Decide, 141–167.Google Scholar

25 D'Arcy, Richard and Laver, Michael, “Referendum Dynamics and the Irish Divorce Amendment,” Public Opinion Quarterly 54 (1990), 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 In the 1988 federal election for example, 33 per cent of a national sample indicated that they had made up their minds at the beginning of the campaign, while 23 per cent remained undecided until the final week (Clarke, et al., Absent Mandate, 110)Google Scholar.

27 Johnston et al. detect a slight movement toward the YES side during the final week n i Quebec, but little or no movement in this direction in the rest of the country (”The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” 20).

28 Which of course raises the question of whether any agreement that might have been accepted in Quebec could have found sufficient support in other parts of the country. See Johnston, Richard, “An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum,” PS 26 (1993), 43–48.Google Scholar

29 With approximately one per cent of the votes cast being spoiled or otherwise invalid ballots.

30 In the Carleton study, 63 per cent of francophones in Quebec voted NO, while 79 per cent of francophones outside Quebec supported the YES side.

31 Our data are similar to those reported by Johnston et al. on these items except for the senate proposal. The question employed in their survey included three options—the status quo, the Charlottetown proposal or abolition of the Senate—while our question presented a simple dichotomy, thereby rendering the items not strictly comparable. Although their data likewise show that there was greater support for the proposal than for the status quo, it also indicates that a plurality of Canadians would have preferred outright abolition of the Senate (”The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” 23).

32 Five per cent indicated ambivalence about this provision, while 7 per cent held no opinion.

33 Johnston, et al., “The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” 30–33.Google Scholar

34 Because of the small number of cases, a separate analysis is not reported here for the Atlantic provinces.

35 A regression analysis using factor scores derived from the factors shown in Tables 2 and 3 produced similar patterns to that shown in Table 9 using the individual variables and does not improve upon the explained variance.

36 For the thermometer scores, we subtract the neutral point of 50° from the mean sample value. The sheaf coefficient for Mulroney is therefore obtained as follows: –.004 * (32 – 50 ) = .07.

For dummy variables such as those based on the substantive provisions of the Accord or group benefits, we employ the proportion of the sample expressing agreement/disagreement respectively. Distinct society, for example, is calculated as .21 * .43 = .09.

These values are therefore intended to give an aggregate estimate rather than a probability value for a hypothetical individual voter.

37 Compare, for example, the effects of issue and leader variables and the total explained variance for flexible partisans in the 1984 or 1988 federal elections (Clarke, et al., Absent Mandate, 111–114).Google Scholar