¹ Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962; reprinted, Oxford, 1964Google Scholar).

² See esp. Ryan, Alan, “Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie,” Political Studies 13 (1965), 219–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berlin, Sir Isaiah, “Hobbes, Locke and Professor Macpherson,” The Political Quarterly 35 (1964), 464–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Seliger, Martin, The Liberal Politics of John Locke (New York and Washington, 1969Google Scholar).

³ But cf. Chapman, John W., “Natural Rights and Justice in Liberalism,” in Raphael, D. D., ed., Political Theory and the Rights of Man (London, 1967), 27–42.Google Scholar

⁴ Cf. Broadbent, J. E., “The Importance of Class in the Political Theory of John Stuart Mill,” this Journal I, no 3 (1968), 287.Google Scholar

⁵ Macpherson, C. B., “The Deceptive Task of Political Theory,” The Cambridge Journal 7 (1954), 563.Google Scholar

⁶ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 76.

⁷ Ibid., 82.

⁸ Ibid., 83.

⁹ Ibid., 263.

¹⁰ Ibid., 81–2.

¹¹ Macpherson, C. B., “Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology,” in Spitz, David, ed., Political Theory and Social Change (New York, 1967), 218–19.Google Scholar

¹² Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 76.

¹³ Ibid., 82. One is forced to wonder about the point of Macpherson's reference to “formal calculi.” For (a) an actual argument is involved; (b) it is a case of independently recognizing the distinction between moral utterances and factual statements; and (c) the calculus of propositions can be viewed as composed of laws of logic which may function as rules of inference governing particular arguments. It may be that he is cryptically saying that this particular rule of derivation cannot be found in such a calculus.

¹⁴ C. B. Macpherson, “The Social Bearing of Locke's Political Theory,” reprinted in C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, eds., Locke (London, n.d.), 263.

¹⁵ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 5.

¹⁶ Ibid., 14.

¹⁷ Ibid., 82.

¹⁸ Cf. Frankena, W. K., “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind, NS, 48 (1948), 467–77.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 14.

²⁰ Ibid., 85.

²¹ Cf. Barry, Brian, “Warrender and his Critics,” Philosophy, 43 (1968), 135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² Berlin, “Hobbes, Locke and Professor Macpherson,” 456–8.

²³ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 48. My italics.

²⁴ Ibid., 87.

²⁵ I do not wish to deny that Macpherson, as social historian, does pay attention to the facts, particularly with respect to the distribution of economic classes, but they are not the sorts of facts relevant to these assumptions. Was the Puritan in his relations with his friends, his family, or his co-religionists, guided by the same atttudes or rules as he was in his market relations? In the market place itself were his relations always prudential?

²⁶ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 75.

²⁷ One begins to have doubts about Macpherson's own interpretation of moral obligation in view of his comment that a conflict between short-term and long-term interest indicates the presence of a moral obligation. (See Possessive Individualism, 292.) A good dose of Bishop Butler is wanted here!

²⁸ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 75.

²⁹ Ibid., 74—5. It is significant that in giving these quotations Macpherson omits reference to the observed inequalities brought about through civil law.

³⁰ Ibid., 75.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Cf. Searle, John R., “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’,” Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), 43–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ Cf. Seliger, John Locke, 173, n. 90.

³⁴ See above, p. 527.

³⁵ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 265.

³⁶ Ibid., 263.

³⁷ Macpherson, “Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology,” 209.

³⁸ Macpherson, C. B., The Real World of Democracy (Oxford, 1966), 54Google Scholar and cf. “Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology,” 218–9. The intelligibility of choosing an essence for man is open to question. For what a man is essentially must be obtained not through an act of choice but, if anything, through an act of discovery.

³⁹ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 263.

⁴⁰ “The Maximization of Democracy,” in Laslett, P. and Runciman, W. G., eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, third series (Oxford, 1967), 85.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, 266.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 275; cf. also 13, 71, 73.

⁴⁴ Macpherson, “Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology,” 210, 213, 214, 218. A further complication arises. For, in this view, the concept of man as an infinite consumer cannot be taken as accurately “reflecting” the economic relations of a market society but must be taken as operative ideal required to set these relations in operation – a familiar Marxist quandary.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 218.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 218–19. Macpherson's italics and parentheses.

⁴⁷ Macpherson, Real World, 19; cf. Macpherson's judgment in “The Deceptive Task”: that in order to have democracy “human nature must be changed by ‘the people’ under a new sort of leadership, taking things in their own hand,” 567.

⁴⁸ Cf. below on this page.

⁴⁹ Macpherson, Real World, 56, and cf. Possessive Individualism, 56, esp. n. 1.

⁵⁰ Macpherson, Real World, 38. For Macpherson “the truly human activities” are “laughing, playing, loving, learning, creating, arranging our lives in ways that give us aesthetic and emotional satisfaction” and in which work loses its compulsive character. I suspect that even if we were to engage in these activities they would be found flat. If we attend to human experience, rather than to man's essence, it would seem that laughter divorced from tears, love without hate, playing without frustration, and creating minus disappointment, would scarcely yield satisfactory aesthetic and emotional lives. There is no doubt that we occasionally find not only joy but liberation in work, and that too often work serves only as an unwelcome and necessary means to valued satisfactions. But the difficult question here is to envisage how release from the bondage of labour would lead to the universal participation in creative, non-compulsive work. No one would wish to deny that economic obstacles have played havoc with men's lives, not so much in limiting their pursuit of happiness as in preventing men from discovering life's possibilities – including its risks, defeats and tragedies. However, it is fatuously optimistic to assume that their removal would lead to paradise, or that the paradise would be worth having.

⁵¹ Macpherson, “The Maximization of Democracy,” 89. Although I borrow this phrase from Macpherson, I have removed its original circularity. The circularity arises from his failure to distinguish between having a given power and exercising it. See below pp. 539–40.

⁵² Cf. Macpherson, Real World, 47, where he claims that equality of opportunity as “an equal right to a fully human life for all who will exert themselves” is denied in a market society. However, there is no indication that what is denied is the opportunity to acquire skills or powers to those potentially capable of acquiring them. Instead, the criticism is made in terms of powers which the persons affected already have.

⁵³ Macpherson, “The Maximization of Democracy,” 89.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 90.

⁵⁵ Macpherson, Real World, 43. Macpherson's italics.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ The contrast is Macpherson's. See ibid.

⁵⁹ Of course, if his powers are left fallow through disuse he may in time cease to have them.

⁶⁰ See Macpherson, “Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology,” esp. 219–20.