¹ Cf. Fakhry, Majid, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroës and Aquinas (London, 1958), 9–20Google Scholar; Holloway, M. R., Occasionalism, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, X (1967), col. 624–25Google Scholar; Gilson, E., History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), 184–85Google Scholar.

² Wolfson, Harry A., Nicolaus of Autrecourt and Ghazali's Argument against Causality, Speculum XLIV (1969), 234–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Maimonides, , Guide of the Perplexed, translated with introduction and notes by Pines, S. (Chicago, 1963), P. I, ch. 73Google Scholar.

⁴ Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Book III, ch. 69.

⁵ Raymond Martin, O. P., Pugio Fidei adversus Mauros et Judaeos (Lipsiae et Francofurti, 1687), Pt. I, chs. 6–12, pp. 213–28.

⁶ Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut (Arabic text), Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, III, ed. Bouyges, M. (Beyrouth, 1930)Google Scholar; Arabic text translated into English by Simon Van den Bergh, 2 Vols. (London, 1954); the early sixteenth-century Latin translation of the Hebrew translation from the Arabic: Averroes' Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin Version of Calo Calonymos, ed. with intro. by Zedler, B. H. (Milwaukee, 1961)Google Scholar.

⁷ Al-Ghazali, , Tahafut al-Falasifah (Arabic text), in Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, II, ed. Bouyges, M. (Beyrouth, 1927)Google Scholar; English translation by Kamali, S. A., Al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifah, Pakistan Philosophical Congress (Lahore, 1958)Google Scholar.

⁸ Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II, 5; II, 10 in Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946–61), Vol. II, pp. 100, 107. The development of this distinction in Anselm has been examined at length by the author in a forthcoming article: Necessity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God, to appear in the Proceedings of the International Anselm Congress (Bad Wimpfen, Germany, 13–16 September, 1970) in 1973.

⁹ The sources for the Mutakallimun teaching on atomism and occasionalism are of four types: (i) those antagonistic to the Mutakallimun (possibly more of a caricature than a description), such as Ibn Hazm's Kitab al-Fkal, Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle, or Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed; (2) those that were produced by Asharite orthodoxy after Al-Ghazali (which do not necessarily reflect the teaching of Asharite Mutakallims before 1150), such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's Kitab al-Arab'in, Sasusi's Maqaddimat, and Laqani's Jawharat al-Tawhid; (3) the “histories” of doctrine (which describe atomism and occasionalism but do not always indicate the position of the author), such as al-Ashari's Maqalat and al-Baghdadi's Kitab al-Farq bayn al-firaq and Kitab usul al-din; and (4) works of the early Asharites, such as al-Baqillani's Kitab al-Tamhid. Of these the most frequently cited are Guide of the Perplexed and Maqalat, the former unsympathetic and the latter a secondhand account of pre-Asharite atomism. The teaching of al-Ashari himself, as described by Al-Juwayni or Ibn Asakir, does not appear so extreme. What is needed is a rereading of al-Ashari and al-Baqillani, without Aristotelian and Thomist presuppositions, and with a more sophisticated appreciation for the terminology of such discussions.

The major studies of Islamic occasionalism are: MacDonald, D. B., Continuous Recreation and Atomic Time in Muslim Scholastic Theology, Isis IX (1927), 326–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pines, S., Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre (Berlin, 1936)Google Scholar; Gardet, L. and Anawati, M.-M., Introduction à la théologie musulmane (Paris, 1948)Google Scholar; and Fakhry, M., Islamic Occasionalism (London, 1958)Google Scholar. See also Wolfson, H. A., The Controversy over Causality within the Kalam, in Mélanges Alexandre Koyré, Vol. II: L'aventure de l'esprit (Paris, 1964), 602–18Google Scholar; Marmtjra, M. E., Ghazali and Demonstrative Science, Journal of the History of Philosophy III (1965), 183–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wolfson, H. A., Judah Halevi on Causality and Miracles, in Meyer Waxman Jubilee Volume (1966), 137–53Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, II, 73, Sixth Premise (Pines transl., 201–02): “What led them to this opinion [that an accident does not last during two units of time] is that it is not to be said that there is a nature in any respect whatever and that the nature of one particular body may require that this and the accident be attached to that body. Quite the contrary, they wish to say that God, may He be exalted, created the accidents in question now, without the intermediary of nature — without any other thing…. In accordance with this premise, they assert that when we, as we think, dye a garment red, it is not we who are by any means the dyers; God rather creates the color in question in the garment when the latter is in juxtaposition with the red dye, which we consider to have gone over to the garment. They say that this is not the case, but that God has instituted [de potenlia ordinata] a habit according to which, for example, black color does not appear except when a garment is juxtaposed with indigo. However, this blackness, which God creates when an object about to turn black is juxtaposed with blackness, does not last, but disappears instantly, and another blackness is created…. In conformity with this assumption, they have drawn the corollary that the things we know now are not identical with the contents of the knowledge known by us yesterday…. They assert that when a man moves a pen, it is not the man who moves it; for the motion occurring in the pen is an accident created by God in the pen. Similarly the motion of the hand, which we think of as moving the pen, is an accident created by God in the moving hand. Only, God has instituted the habit that the motion of the hand is concomitant with the motion of the pen, without the hand exercising in any respect an influence on, or being causative in regard to, the motion of the pen…. According to them, there is no body at all endowed with the power of action. On the other hand, the ultimate agent is God; and it is He who, in view of the fact that He has instituted such a habit [sine qua non causality, d.p.o.], has created the blackness in the body that is the garment when the latter was juxtaposed with indigo. To sum it up: it should not be said in any respect that this is the cause of that. This is the opinion of the Mutakallimun.”

¹¹ Tahafut al-Falasifah, Probl. XVII (Kamali translation, 185): “In our view, the connection between what are believed to be the cause and the effect is not necessary…. They are connected as the result of the Decree of God [ordinata], which preceded their existence. If one follows the other, it is because He has created them in that fashion, not because the connection in itself is necessary and indissoluble. He has the power [absoluta] to create the satisfaction of hunger without eating, or death without the severance of the head, or even the survival of life when the head has been cut off…. We admit the possibility of a contact between the two [cotton and fire] which will not result in burning, as also we admit the possibility of the transformation of cotton into ashes without coming into contact with fire. And they reject this possibility.” Cf. the sections of al-Ghazali quoted by Averroes in Tahafut al-Tahajut, Pt. II, disc. 1 (Van den Bergh, I, 316). The italics and the bracketed additions are my own.

¹² Kamali transl., 186: “The only argument is from the observation of the fact of burning at the time of contact with fire. But observation shows that one is with the other, not that it is by it and has no other cause than it.” Cf. Van den Bergh transl., I, 317.

¹³ The term sine qua non should not be confused with accidental causality, as was done by Thomas (Comm. in IV Lib. Sententiarum, IV, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qu. 1, and Summa theologiae, P. III, q. 62, a. 1). An accidental cause of a building, to repeat Thomas' example, would be the color of the builder, which has nothing to do with the building. A causa sine qua non is a cause whose presence results in the effect and whose absence prevents the effect. The latter is usually associated in medieval thought with a type of causality that operates on the basis of a pact or ordination rather than on some inherent virtue in the cause itself.

¹⁴ Cf. footnote 12. Kamali transl., 186: “We say that it is God who — through the intermediacy of angels, or directly — is the agent of the creation of blackness in cotton, of the disintegration of its parts, and of their transformation into a smouldering heap or ashes.” Cf. Van den Bergh transl., I, 316–17.

¹⁵ Kamali transl., 190–91: “We agree that fire is so created that when it finds two pieces of cotton which are similar, it will burn both of them, as it cannot discriminate between two similar things. At the same time, however, we can believe that when a certain prophet was thrown into the fire, he was not burnt — either because the attributes of fire had changed, or because the attributes of the prophet's person had changed. Thus there might have originated — from God, or from the angels — a new attribute in the fire which confined its heat to itself, so that the heat was not communicated to the prophet. Hence, although the fire retained its heat, its form and its reality, still the effect of its heat did not pass onwards.Or there might have originated a new attribute in the prophet's body which enabled it to resist the influence of fire, although it had not ceased to be composed of flesh and bones.

“We see that one who covers himself with asbestos sits down in a blazing furnace, and remains unaffected by it. He who has not observed such a thing will disbelieve it. Therefore, our opponents' disbelief in God's power to invest fire or a person's body with a certain attribute which will prevent it from burning, is like disbelief on the part of a man who has not observed asbestos and its effect. Things to which God's power extends include mysterious and wonderful facts. We have not observed all those mysteries and wonders. How, then, can it be proper on our part to deny their possibility, or positively to assert their impossibility?” Cf. Van den Bergh transl., I, 326–27.

¹⁶ Kamali transl., 189.

¹⁷ Ibid., 189–90: “If you could prove that in regard to things which ‘can exist’ there cannot be created for man a knowledge that they ‘do not exist’ then these absurdities would be inescapable. We have no doubt in regard to the situations described by you. For God has created for us the knowledge that He would not do these things, although they are possible. We never asserted that they are necessary. … It is only when something possible is repeated over and over again (so as to form the Norm), that its pursuance of a uniform course in accordance with the Norm in the past is indelibly impressed upon our minds…. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent us from believing that: (a) something may be possible, and may be one of those things to which God's power extends; (b) in spite of its being possible, it might have been known as a rule in the past that God would not do it; and (c) God may create for us a knowledge that He would not do it in this particular instance.” Cf. Van den Bergh transl., I, 324. Ibid., 327: “And the best method according to both you and us is to relate these things [miracles] to God, either immediately or through the intermediation of the angels. But at the time these occurrences become real, the attention of the prophet turns to such facts, and the order of the good determines its appearance to ensure the duration of the order of religion, and this gives a preponderance to the side of existence. The fact in itself is possible, and the principle in God is His magnanimity; but such a fact only emanates from Him when necessity gives a preponderance to its existence and the good determines it, and the good only determines it when a prophet needs it to establish his prophetic office for the promulgation of the good.” The italics and the bracketed additions are my own. Cf. Kamali transl., 191–92.

¹⁸ Van den Bergh transl., I, 324: “They [the prophets] know the possibility of an event, but know that it will not happen. And if God interrupts the habitual course by causing this unusual event to happen, this knowledge of the habitual is at the time of the interruption removed from their hearts and He no longer creates it.” Cf. Kamali transl., 190.

¹⁹ The best study of Ockham's understanding of demonstratio is by Webering, Damascene, Theory of Demonstration according to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, 1953)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Ockham, Sent. I, dist. 1, q. 6 (Opera Philosophica et Theologica; Opera Theologica), I (St. Bonaventure, 1967), 497: “Dico quod necessarium simpliciter non potest dependere a non necessario. Sed isto modo nulla creatura est necessaria, nec aliquis effectus sic necessario dependet a quacumque causa. Non est tamen inconveniens aliquem effectum necessario elici ab aliqua causa….”

²¹ Summa Totius Logicae III, II, ch. 41: “Per praedicta potest faciliter sciri, quomodo terminatur quaestio quid est. Dupliciter enim potest terminari, scilicet per experientiam et intuitivam notitiam. Sicut si aliquis videret terram interponi inter solem et lunam; aliter potest terminari a posteriori per effectum per demonstrationem; quia sicut astrologus sciens quod luna illuminatur a sole nisi sit aliquid opacum medium, concludit, quod terra interponitur inter solem et lunam et quod ilia interpositio est causa, ita est de multis aliis principiis, quod dupliciter notificari possunt.” Sent. I, Prol., q. 4 (St. Bonaventure ed., I, 154–55): “Unde demonstratio dicitur particularis vel quia praedicatum non concluditur de omnibus contentis sub subiecto, sicut si demonstraretur quod aliqua figura habet tres angulos etc.; vel quia, quantum est ex forma conclusionis, non concluditur praedicatum pro semper inesse sed pro aliquo tempore determinato. Et communiter tales demonstrationes, si sint ex simpliciter necessariis, sunt hypotheticae, condictionales vel temporales, non categoricae. Verbi gratia, per nullam demonstrationem concluditur quod luna est eclipsabilis, quia ista non potest sciri nisi per experientiam, sicut non potest sciri nisi per experientiam quod luna est illuminabilis a sole. Sed postquam ista est scita per experientiam, demonstratur quod tali tempore vel tali eclipsabitur, sic arguendo: quandocumque terra interponitur inter solem et lunam tune luna eclipsatur; sed quandocumque sol est in tali situ et luna in tali tune terra interponitur inter solem et lunam; ergo tune luna eclipsatur. Et isto modo fit demonstratio per causam extrinsecam.”

²² Ockham, Quodlibeta VI, q. 12: “Si productio activa sit alia res, aut ergo est prior natura ipso effectu producto, aut simul natura, vel posterior natura. Non primo modo, quia relatio, si sit alia res essentialiter, dependet tam a fundamento quam a termino, et per consequens neutro est prius natura. Effectus autem productus est terminus productionis activae. Ergo non est prior natura termino. Praeterea correlationes sunt simul natura cuiusmodi sunt effectus respectus et causa. Sed respectus effectus non est prior natura ipso effectu. Ergo nee respectus causae ad effectum est prior natura effectu. Et eodem modo probatur quod respectus causae ad effectum non est simul natura cum effectu, nee est posterior natura ipso effectu, quia tune prior natura esset effectus in rerum natura quam produceretur. Et sic effectus in primo instanti naturae in quo secundum modum loquendi aliorum esset effectus, non esset productus, et certum est quod nihil producitur de novo postquam est. Ergo numquam effectus produceretur de novo, quod est absurdum.” Sent. I, dist. 1, q. 3 (St. Bonaventure ed., I, 416–17): “Ad primum istorum respondeo quod quamvis respectu eiusdem effectus possint esse plures causae, hoc tamen non est ponendum sine necessitate, puta: nisi per experientiam possit convinci, ita scilicet quod ipso posito, alio destructo, sequitur ille effectus, vel quod ipso non posito, quocumque alio posito, non sequitur effectus. Exemplum primi: probatur quod ignis est causa caloris, quia ipso igne posito — omnibus aliis amotis — sequitur calor in calefactibili approximato; eodem modo probatur de sole quod est causa caloris, quia igne amoto et sole approximato sequitur calefactio. Exemplum secundi: probatur quod obiectum est causa intellectionis intuitivae, quia omnibus aliis positis, ipso solo amoto, non sequitur notitia intuitiva; ergo obiectum est causa notitiae intuitivae. Et tenet tale argumentum per talem propositionem quod ‘quaecumque res absoluta requiritur in esse reali ad esse alicuius, est causa illius in aliquo genere causae.’ Primum argumentum tenet per istam propositionem ‘omne illud quo posito sequitur aliud, est causa illius.’ Aliter aliquid esse causam alterius potest probari sine tali experientia per rationem. Et isto modo probatur quod voluntas est causa effectiva actus sui, quia omnis potentia libera quae non potest necessitari est causa effectiva sui actus. Et forte ista ratio sola est convincens voluntatem esse causam effectivam alicuius actus sui.” (418): “Ad secundum dico quod ex tali ordine semper contingit inferre causalitatem in priori respectu posterioris, maxime si prius potest esse sine posteriori et non e converso, naturaliter etiam.”

²³ Ockham, Quodlibeta IV, q. 2: “… actio talis agentis sine variatione agentis vel passi vel alicuius concurrentis ad actionem numquam variatur sed semper uniformiter sequitur actio.” Cf. Quodl. I, 17 and Sent. I, d. 1, q. 6 for similar statements.

²⁴ Ockham, Sent. I, d. 45, D: “Quod autem hoc sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa immediata alterius videtur esse manifestum. Quia si non, perit omnis via ad cognoscendum aliquid esse causam alterius immediatam. Nam si ex hoc quod hoc posito sequitur effectus et hoc non posito non ponitur effectus non sequitur illud esse causam illius effectus, nullo modo potest cognosci quod ignis est causa immediata caloris in ligno, quia potest dici quod est aliqua alia causa illius caloris, quae tamen non agit nisi in potentia ignis.” Cf. quotations in footnote 19.

²⁵ Ockham, Sent. IV, q. 1, G-H: “Ideo ad quaestionem primo praemittam unam distinctionem propter dicta sanctorum et auctorum, quod cum causa sit illud ad cuius esse sequitur aliud, dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo quando ex natura rei ad praesentiam et esse unius sequitur naturaliter esse alterius. Alio modo quando ad esse et praesentiam unius non ex natura rei sed sequitur aliud ex sola voluntate divina aliquid instituentis, et isto modo dicimus quod actus meritorius dicitur causa praemii ex sola voluntate divina et causa sine qua non dicitur secundo modo causa. Primo dico quod sacramenta non sunt causa gratiae. Circa quod probandum primo ostendam quod sacramenta per virtutem naturalem non causant gratiam nee aliquid praevium instrumentaliter gratiae. Secundo quod nee per virtutem eis collatam…. Secundo dico quod sacramenta sunt causa gratiae, quia Deus sic instituit quod non conferatur gratia nisi positis sacramentis et Sacramento posito conferatur; et ideo causa sine qua non.”

²⁶ Ibid.: “Deus sic instituit.”

²⁷ Ibid.: “Unde in naturalibus non est dare aliquam causam sine qua non nee mediatam nec immediatam respectu alicuius effectus, sed in voluntariis bene potest esse talis causa.” Ockham made the same point in an earlier passage, where he compared natural causality with sacramental causality, Sent. II, q. 4 & 5: “Ad aliud dico quod licet Deus agat mediantibus causis secundis vel propinquius cum eis, non tamen dicitur Deus mediate agere, nee causae secundae frustra, cum sit agens voluntarium non necessarium, et si esset agens necessarium adhuc ageret immediate…. Deus enim est tale agens quod potest esse causa totalis effectus sine quocumque alio; quia tamen Deus sic res administrat ut eas motus proprios habere sinat secundum Augustinum, ideo non vult totum solus producere sed coagit cum causis secundis tamquam causa partialis licet sit principalior. Ita quod ipse est causa immediata omnium quando agit cum causis secundis, sicut quando agit sine illis. Nee propter hoc superfluunt causae secundae, quia Deus non agit in qualibet actione secundum totam potentiam suam. Et ex hoc sequitur quod non potest demonstrari quod aliquis effectus producitur a causa secunda, quia licet semper ad approximationem ignis ad combustibile sequatur combustio; cum hoc tamen potest stare quod ignis non sit eius causa, quia Deus potuit ordinasse quod semper ad praesentiam ignis passo approximate ipse solus causaret combustionem, sicut ordinavit cum ecclesia quod ad prolationem certorum verborum causetur gratia in anima.” See also note 25.

²⁸ Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, III, ch. 66–67.

²⁹ E.g., cf. Moody, E. A., Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Statutes of 1339 and 1340, Franciscan Studies VII (1947), 113–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moody, E. A., Ockham and Aegidius of Rome, Franciscan Studies IX (1949), 417–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schepers, H., Holkot contra dicta Crathorn, Philosophisches Jahrbuch LXXVII (1970), 320–54Google Scholar; LXXIX (1972), 106–36.

³⁰ The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956), 182–83.