¹ A comprehensive model of transnational relationships involving governments and corporations in Canada and the United States is presented elsewhere in this volume by Isaiah A. Litvak and Christopher J. Maule.

² Canada, Force, Gray Task, Foreign DirectInvestment in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972), pp. 17–18;Google Scholar also referred to as the Gray report.

³ A systematic treatment of these cases can be found in my “Governments of Developed Countries as Hosts toMultinational Enterprise: The Canadian, British, and French Policy Experience” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1973), pp.91–116.

⁴ Elsewhere in this volume Joseph S. Nye examines cases of interstate conflict involving the governments of Canada and the United States. His boundary conditions of incompatibilityof objectives and an initially unfulfilled intergovernmental requestgive rise to a somewhat different universe of cases, even where multinational enterprise is involved. His magazine tax, auto pact, and Arctic pollution zone cases are essentially similar to the Time-Reader's Digest, auto pact, and Humble Oil cases discussed here. However, his treatment of a series of interactions as a singleconflict if the same major objectives were pursued throughout results in two cases, extraterritorial control of corporations and US balance-of-payments guidelines, that in this essay are treated as issueareas, each comprising several distinct cases.

⁵ Thus initiation of conflict corresponds more closely to Nye's first government action than to his first interstate request (see his table 6).

⁶ The indices used here are based upon coding categories developed by Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane. The level of attention is coded as 1 if the highest known substantive decision-making action occurred at the bureaucratic level, and as 2 if such action was at the cabinet or prime ministerial level. The extent of action by multinational enterprise in its relations with the Canadian government is coded from 0 to 5 according to the number of different actions undertaken, including (a) procedural discussions, (b) discussions involving known threats of positive or negative sanctions, (c) enlisting domestic support, (d) enlisting foreign support, and (e) carrying out threats or promises. The extent of action by the Canadian government in its relations with multinational enterprise is similarly coded from 0 to 5 according to the number of different actions undertaken, including (a) private discussions, (b) generation of public support (tactical politicization), (c) new legislation or regulations, (d) border policy action (prevention or restriction of corporate entry), and (e) internal policy action (expropriation or requirements for corporate behavior). The extent of action by the Canadian and United States governments in interstate relations are each coded from 0 to 5 according to the number of different actions undertaken, including (a) private discusions, (b) publicized discussions to generate political support (tactical politicization), (c) known attempts to link settlement of the case to another issue, (d) explict international agreement, (e) formal diplomatic protest, and (f) diplomatic rupture. The five resulting code values are added to produce the index of intensity of conflict. The intensity scale is separated into low (1–6), moderate (7–9), high (10–12), and very high (13–22).

⁷ Here again Nye's definitions elsewhere in this volume differ from mine. He focuses not on satisfaction with the outcome but on whether the outcome is closer to one or the other government's initial objectives.

⁸ Brewster, Kingman Jr.,Antitrust and American Business Abroad (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 49.Google Scholar

⁹ Brewster, Kingman Jr.,Law and United States Business in Canada (Montreal: Canadian- American Committee, 1960), pp. 16–17.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 18 December 1957, p. 2514, and 11 July 1958, p. 2142. See also Brewster, Law and Business, pp. 24–26; and Litvak, Isaiah A., Maule, Christopher J., and Robinson, R. D., Dual Loyalty: Canadian- U.S. Business Arrangements (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 24, 42–43.Google Scholar

¹² Brewster, Law and Business, p.25.

¹³ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 23 January 1959.

¹⁴ Brewster, Law and Business, pp. 25–26.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 17–18, 21–22. See also Behrman, J. N., National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 118.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Brewster, Law and Business, pp. 19–20.

¹⁷ Litvak, Maule, and Robinson.

¹⁸ See the essay in this volume by Gerald Wright and Maureen Appel Molot. See also Godfrey, David and Watkins, Melvin, eds., Gordon to Watkins to You (Toronto: New Press, 1970), p. 51.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Newman, Peter C., The Distemper of Our Times (Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 1968), pp. 225–26Google Scholar. See also Gordon, Walter L., A Choice for Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 1966), p. 97.Google Scholar

²⁰ Behrman, p. 113. See also Levin, Malcolm and Sylvester, Christine, Foreign Ownership (Don Mills, Ont.: Paperjacks, General Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 85–86.Google Scholar

²¹ Levin and Sylvester, p. 86.

²² Van Cise, Jerrold G., “Antitrust Guides to Foreign Acquisitions”, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1972, p. 83Google Scholar.

²³ Litvak, Maule, and Robinson, pp. 121–22.

²⁴ Newman, pp. 419–22, 517–18.

²⁵ See the essay in this volume by Wright and Molot. See also Godfrey and Watkins, pp. 54–57; Behrman, pp. 90–91; and Gray report, p. 286.

²⁶ I am indebted to Joseph S. Nye for my initial understanding of this case.

²⁷ Canada, Library of Parliament, Research Branch, “Laws and Regulations Preventing Undue United States Influence on Canadian Financial Institutions, Transportation, Communications, and Energy Industries”, Ottawa, 2 March 1970. p. 8.

²⁸ Levin and Sylvester, pp. 9–18. The regulations can be found in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 19 March 1970, pp. 5250–51.

²⁹ Gazette (Montreal), 16 June 1972, p. 25.

³⁰ Levin and Sylvester, pp. 22–24.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 76–77.

³² Ibid., p. 77.

³³ In his article in this volume, Nye argues that outcomes tended tobe closer to the objectives of the government that initiated the interstate request, but that this did not hold in such cases as those involving export controls. Remember that the criterion of initiation use corresponds more closely to Nye's first government action than to his first interstate request (see footnote 5 above).

³⁴ One very high, two moderate, and one low.

³⁵ Baldwin, David, “The Myths of the Special Relationship”, in Clark-son, Stephen, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy For Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 14.Google Scholar

³⁶ Brewster, Law and Business, p. 27.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 26.

³⁸ I am indebted to Charles Stedman on this point.

³⁹ Globe and Mail (Toronto), 6 March 1974, pp. 1–2.

⁴⁰ Levitt, Kari, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970), p. 13.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Gray report, p. 478.

⁴² See footnote 6 above.

⁴³ Elsewhere in this volume Nye discusses linkages in interstate conflict.

⁴⁴ Gray report, pp. 285–90.

⁴⁵ Newman, appendix K, pp. 517–18. See also Levitt, p. 6.

⁴⁶ Gordon, p. 97. See also A. F. W. Plumptreand Pauline Jewett in Clarkson. pp. 47, 52.

⁴⁷ A. E. Safarian in Clarkson, p. 51.