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6. The origin of the current spate of nonunilateral quotas lies in American textile trade policy during the 1950s. By 1962 the United States had become the driving force behind the Short and Long Term Arrangements to multilaterally regulate international trade in cotton textiles. All of this occurred prior to the onset of America's hegemonic decline in the mid-1960s. For an overview of the rise of international closure prior to the onset of hegemonic decline, see Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, pp. 43–94Google Scholar; and Yoffie, David, Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)Google Scholar. For detail on the limits of international closure since the hegemonic decline of the United States, see Strange, Susan, “Protectionism and World Politics,” International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), p. 242CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 192–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1987, 107th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 813Google Scholar. Faced with the apparent paradox of declining hegemony and continued openness, several scholars have begun to question the argument that the United States no longer retains its hegemonic status. For two illustrations of this approach, see Bruce Russett, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?” International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), pp. 207–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Strange, Susan, “Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 337–54Google Scholar.

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9. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, and “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables”, in Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes, pp. 1–22, 355–68Google Scholar.

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12. Krasner, Stephen D., “United States Commercial Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness,” in Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 47–66Google Scholar. For the application of this argument to raw materials policy, see Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U. S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 10–20, 55–61Google Scholar. For a detailed critique of Krasner's argument, see Ruggie, J. C.“,Book Review: Defending the National Interest, ”; American Political Science Review 74 (1980), pp. 297–99Google Scholar.

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14. Krasner, , Defending the National Interest, pp. 28–29Google Scholar. For review of interest group analysis, see Greenstone, J. David, “Group Theories,” in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W., eds., Micropolitical Theory: Handbook of Political Science, vol. 2 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 243–318Google Scholar. The sources of interest group strength are also an issue of debate. See Lowi, Theodore J., “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics 16 (1964), pp. 678–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Truman, David B., The Governmental Process: Public Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1962)Google Scholar; Bauer, Raymond A. et al. , American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York: Atherton Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Schaxttschneider, E. E., Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York: Prentice Hall, 1935)Google Scholar; and Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

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16. For the nature of changing relations between the legislative and executive branches in Japan, see Muramatsu, Michio and Krauss, Ellis, “Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan,” American Political Science Review 78 (03 1984), pp. 126–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Smith, Charles, “Who's in Charge Here? Increasingly It's the Party”, Far Eastern Economic Review,11 06 1987, pp. 87–88Google Scholar. For overlapping ministry jurisdiction in Japanese trade policy, see Johnson, Chalmers, “MITI and Japanese International Economic Policy,” in Scalapino, Robert A., ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 229–53Google Scholar; Ozaki, Robert S., The Control of Imports and Foreign Capital in Japan (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 144–55Google Scholar; Kawakami, Hiroshi, “Foreign Trade Regulations,” in Kitagawa, Zentaro, ed., Doing Business in Japan, vol. 6 (New York: Mathew Bender, 1984), chap. 3Google Scholar; Schmiegelow, Michele, “The Reform of Japan's Foreign Exchange and Control Law: A Case of Qualitative Economic Policy,” in Schmiegelow, Michele, ed., Japan's Response to Crisis and Change in the World Economy, Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), pp. 1–27Google Scholar; and Fukui, Haruhiro, “The GATT Toyko Round: The Bureaucratic Politics of Multilateral Diplomacy,” in Blaker, Michael, ed., The Politics of Trade: US and Japanese Policymaking for the GATT Negotiations (New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute, 1978)Google Scholar.

17. For detail on Japanese automobile policy, see Magaziner, Ira C. and Hout, Thomas M., Japanese Industrial Policy, Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 15 (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1980), pp. 67–79Google Scholar. On textile adjustment policy, see Ike, Brian, “The Japanese Textile Industry: Structural Adjustment and Government Policy,” Asian Survey 20 (05 1980), pp. 532–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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19. I set cutoff points for moderate and high levels of trade dependence (trade as a percentage of GNP) at 15% and 30% respectively. For the strengths and weaknesses of using such a measurement of trade dependence, see Rosecrance, Richard N. and Stein, Arthur, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality,” World Politics 26 (10 1973), pp. 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. Lake has argued that under a “multilateral supportership”, supporters such as the United States are constrained from invoking protectionist measures “by the fear of retaliation”. “Beneath the Commerce of Nations”, p. 165. I discuss this economic constraint in greater detail in the following case studies.

21. A rank order of different levels of strategic constraint can be derived from state policymaker concerns with war, spheres of influence, and alliance politics. Cutoff points for moderate and high levels of strategic constraints are the alienation of intermediate-level allies and loss of support from strategic allies, respectively. For state policymaker strategic concerns, see Jones, R. J. Barry, Conflict and Control in the World Economy: Contemporary Economic Realism and Neo-Mercantilism (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press International, 1986), p. 115Google Scholar; and Spanier, John, Games Nations Play, 6th ed. (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), pp. 155–59Google Scholar.

22. Industrial alliance strength integrates all three characteristics. Levels of organization are based on whether alliance members are simply subsectoral associations, subsectoral associations linked in formal federations, or federations composed of producer associations that span more than one subsector. Inclusiveness measures the proportion of industry employment and production that is actually represented by alliance members. Interest convergence is based on a comparison of alliance member demands by type of protectionist policy. I treat labor unions as outside supporters (or opponents) of industrial alliances. As advocates for the economic health of the industry, producer associations directly represent capital and indirectly represent labor on international trade. Although organized labor may support the demands of the industrial alliance, unions have had limited influence on trade policy issues in the absence of support from producer associations.

23. Helen Milner accurately notes that the distinction between weak states (the United States) and strong states (France) on the continuum of “points of access to trade policy structures” is not that extensive. Milner's strong societal focus, however, fails to take the additional step of addressing the nature of the access that these points provide. Milner, Helen, “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 652–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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25. Friman, H. Richard, “Industrial Alliances, the State, and the New Protectionism: Textile Protection in the United States, Japan, and West Germany”, Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1987Google Scholar.

26. On the use of process-tracing for comparative case study analysis, see Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

27. I define the textile industry as encompassing the following subsectors: manmade fiber production, natural and manmade fiber processing into yarns and cloth, and apparel.

28. See Katzenstein, , “Conclusion”, pp. 306–23Google Scholar.

29. I exclude Congress from state policymaker status for several reasons. I. M. Destler has argued that in 1934, “Congress legislated itself out of the business of making product specific trade law”. Until the late 1960s, congressional committees also acted as a check on the institutional pressure that could be invoked by protectionist forces against the president. Destler, , American Trade Politics, pp. 25–29Google Scholar, 59–60. Robert Pastor has also argued that Congress has played more of a role in sending signals—bills, resolutions, speeches, and hearings—to the executive than in formulating policy on trade issues. See Pastor, Robert, “The Cry and Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy ”, in Schick, Allen, ed., Making Economic Policy in Congress (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983), pp. 158–95Google Scholar.

30. Lake, , ”Beneath the Commerce of Nations”, pp. 151–54Google Scholar; Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, pp. 43–76Google Scholar; and Finlayson, and Zacher, , “The GATT”, p. 284Google Scholar.

31. Krasner, , Defending the National Interest, p. 57Google Scholar; and Katzenstein, , Small States, p. 23Google Scholar.

32. This argument is derived from Lake's discussion of “the price of compliance”. Lake, , “Beneath the Commerce of Nations”, pp. 154–55Google Scholar.

33. Krasner, , “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy”, p. 55Google Scholar; Bauer, , American Business and Public Policy, p. 29Google Scholar; and Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, pp. 46–47Google Scholar.

34. Beckett, Grace, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 14 (note 4)Google Scholar; Pastor, Robert A., Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 330Google Scholar. The CRI was replaced by the Special Trade Representative in 1962. For detail on the Special Trade Representative, see Destler, , American Trade Politics, pp. 87–109, 353Google Scholar.

35. Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, pp. 44, 46–47Google Scholar. On industry conditions see Aggarwal, Vinod K. with Stephan Haggard, “The Politics of Protection in the U. S. Textile and Apparel Industries,” in Zysman, John and Tyson, Laura, eds., American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 254–59Google Scholar. Industry perceptions of the reciprocal gains from foreign trade were mixed. In cotton cloth, the main area of import competition, exports as a percentage of production never surpassed 5.6 percent during the 1950s. Hunsberger, Warren S., Japan and the United States in World Trade (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964), p. 298Google Scholar. Among producers of noncellulosic manmade fibers (the dominant force in the Man-Made Fibers Producers Association), exports surpassed imports by a factor of five until 1959. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Problems of the Domestic Textile Industry, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 425–97Google Scholar.

36. Of the major producer associations, only the ACMI and the National Association of Wool Manufacturers participated, each in a separate hearing. While the former was concernedprimarily with moderating the rate of tariff decreases, the latter had waged a campaign since 1950 for countervailing duties on semimanufactured products from Latin America and for exemption of wool products from tariff reductions. The ACMI was joined by minor associations representing velveteen producers and textile finishers, and a representative from the New England Governors and New England Textile Committee. The latter also appeared with the wool manufacturers at the wool product hearing. A number of apparel associations (four separate outerwear associations) also participated but, for the most part, not in the wool hearings. Of the five labor unions in the United States textile industry, only one participated in the hearings. Lynch, John, Toward an Orderly Market: An Intensive Study of Japan's Voluntary Quota on Cotton Textile Exports (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1968), p. 81Google Scholar; U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Problems of the Domestic Textile Industry, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958 (hereafter cited as Pastore Hearings 1958), pp. 1738–39Google Scholar; and U. S. Congress, Senate, Trade Agreements Extension, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955 (hereafter cited as TAE 1955), p. 1695Google Scholar.

37. In testimony before the House and Senate, the four major mill-product associations (spinning and weaving) were split between advocating total versus partial rejection of H. R. while apparel participants were divided over the broader issue of trading with Japan. The four mill-product associations were the National Federation of Textiles, ACMI, the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers (in 1956 this association became the Northern Textile Association), and NAWM. The apparel associations appearing before the House consisted of the Underwear Institute and National Knitted Outerwear Association. In testimony before the Senate these associations were joined by the National Association of Blouse Manufacturers. TAE 1955, pp. 855–60, 1548–54, 1561–73, 1636–37, 1653–57, 1695–96; and U. S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, , Trade Agreements Extension, Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 1, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955 (hereafter cited as HTAE 1955), pp. 1612–29Google Scholar, 1637, 1707, 1753, 1892.

38. To trace the linkages between the amendments and industry demands, see Lynch, , Toward an Orderly Market, p. 75, 85Google Scholar; HTAE1955, pp. 1612–29, 1637; TAE 1955, pp. 1548–54, 1561–73; Hunsberger, , Japan and the United States in World Trade, pp. 305–7Google Scholar; and “Reciprocal Trade Amendments”, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955, pp. 294, 296.

39. This paragraph draws heavily from Lynch, , Toward an Orderly Market, pp. 75–76, 92–93, 100Google Scholar; and “Reciprocal Trade Amendments”, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955, p. 300.

40. The ACMI's stance was rather ironic. The April 1955 decision to call for quantitative restrictions was based on dealings with Japan prior to World War II. In 1937, the United States and Japan accepted interindustry negotiated quantitative restrictions as a means to resolve a textile trade dispute between the two countries. This earlier concession was seen by ACMI officials as indicative of a willingness by the Japanese to agree to some form of quantitative restraint. In August 1955, the Japanese acted as they had in 1937. This time, however, the American industry was not satisfied with the Japanese response. Lynch, , Toward an Orderly Market, pp.75–76, 92–96, 101, 104Google Scholar.

41. Yoffie, , Power and Protectionism, pp. 46–47Google Scholar; and Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, p. 50Google Scholar.

42. The ACMI petition requested an American quota set at 150 percent of 1953 and 1954 import levels (equivalent to a 25 percent reduction in import levels). Section 22 empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to recommend to the president that he institute quantitative limits or fees on imported goods (either entering or leaving warehouses) where such goods disrupt programs under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture. The president retains the final decision on whether to comply with the Department of Agriculture's recommendation. Lynch, , Toward an Orderly Market, p. 105Google Scholar; Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, p. 50Google Scholar; and Pastore Hearings 1958, pp. 1259–61. For detail on the escape clause petitions, see Hunsberger, , Japan and the United States in World Trade, pp. 270, 311–13, 318Google Scholar; and Pastore Hearings 1958, pp. 1259–61.

43. Lynch, , Toward an Orderly Market, p. 87Google Scholar; and U. S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, , Organization for Trade Cooperation, Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 5550, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956 (hereafter cited as OTQ, pp. 984–1006Google Scholar.

44. For testimony by the Underwear Institute and Northern Textile Association, see OTC, pp. 1030–31, 1326. For the outcome of H. R. 5550, see Aggarwal, with Haggard, , “Politics of Protection”, pp. 272–73Google Scholar.

45. Hunsberger, , Japan and the United States in World Trade, p. 318Google Scholar; Seymour E. Harris, “The Cotton Textile Industry and American Trade Policy”, in U. S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy, Foreign Trade Policy: A Compendium Papers on United States Foreign Trade Policy (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1957), pp. 903–4Google Scholar.

46. In the House, H. R. 8568 restated an ACMI request for limiting cotton textile imports to 150 percent of 1953 and 1954 levels. H. R. 9170 called for setting import quotas based on a comparison of foreign wages. Senate Resolution 236 called on the Tariff Commission and the president to consider the impact of imports on the textile industry and to accelerate investigations under the escape clause. The Green Amendment to a foreign aid bill before the Senate called for quantitative restrictions on cotton textile imports. The amendment failed by only two votes. Lynch, , Toward an Orderly Market, pp. 87–88, 90Google Scholar; Yoffie, , Power and Protectionism, pp. 43, 47–49Google Scholar; Brandis, R. Buford, The Making of Textile Trade Policy, 1935–1981 (Washington, D. C.: American Textile Manufacturers Institute, 1982), p. 10Google Scholar; “Four Year Extension of Reciprocal Trade”, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1958, p. 167; U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Imports of Cotton Textiles From Japan, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Green Amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1956Google Scholar, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956; “Major Legislation”, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1956, p. 424; and United States Tariff Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 9th Report (Washington, D. C.: GPO, July 1955–06 1956), pp. 115–17Google Scholar.

47. To maintain the image of voluntary concessions, congress members were told that “no U. S. formal requests, recommendations, bargaining, or agreements were being negotiated”. Lynch, , Toward an Orderly Market, p. 106Google Scholar; and Yoffie, , Power ajul Protectionism, pp. 53–55, 65Google Scholar.

48. Attached to the United States schedule of concessions presented to GAIT in 1947, the resolution reserved the right to increase “ad valorem duty (from 20 to 45 percent) on certain categories of woolen and worsted fabrics when these imports [exceed by weight] five percent of the average annual production of similar fabrics in the U. S. during the three preceding years”. The National Association of Wool Manufacturers had been pressing for the Geneva Resolution since 1953. Yoffie, , Power and Protectionism, p. 55Google Scholar; Pastore Hearings 1958, pp. 195, 199; Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, p. 52Google Scholar; and TAE 1955, pp. 858–60.

49. Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, p. 52Google Scholar; Yoffie, , Power and Protectionism, pp. 51, 55–59Google Scholar; and Hunsberger, , Japan and the United States in World Trade, p. 323Google Scholar.

50. Japanese state structure shaped the relative importance of officials within the ministry. The MITI minister and parliamentary vice-minister are politically appointed members of the prime minister's cabinet. Yet due to the difficulty in creating a working cabinet from representative of factions within the ruling Liberal Democratic party, the average tenure of these appointees has been approximately one year. Thus, in most cases, political appointees rely heavily on senior and mid-level career bureaucrats at the vice-minister, bureau chief, section chief, and deputy section chief levels. Explicit jurisdiction over textile issues within the ministry is held by the Consumer Goods Industry Bureau (Sei Katsu Sangyö Kyōku). See Pempel, T. J., “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy”, in Katzenstein, , ed., Between Power and Plenty, pp. 147–48Google Scholar; Fukui, , “The GATT Tokyo Round”, pp. 83, 102Google Scholar; and Ward, Robert E., Japan's Political System, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 157–59Google Scholar. For detail on MITI authority over textile trade policy, see Johnson, , ”MITI and Japanese International Economic Policy”, pp. 273–75Google Scholar; Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 79, 336–38Google Scholar; and Dore, Ronald P., Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy 1970–1980 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 230–33Google Scholar.

51. The new policy direction was embodied in a structural reorganization of the ministry revealed in 1973 and reaffirmed in 1974. Johnson, , “MITI and Japanese International Economic Policy”, pp. 273–74Google Scholar. For a detailed analysis of the development of this policy position from the Second Amaya Thesis of 1969 (Basic Direction of New International Trade and Industrial Policy) to the Industrial Structure Council's Report in 1971, see Johnson, , MITI, pp. 289–91Google Scholar.

52. Johnson, , “MITI and Japanese International Economic Policy”, p. 274Google Scholar. The relationship between Japanese export and import patterns is addressed in greater detail by Kiyoshi Kojima in his analysis of Kaname Akematsu's models of the product cycle. See Kojima, Kiyoshi, Japanese Direct Foreign Investment (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1979)Google Scholar.

53. Lake, , “Beneath the Commerce of Nations”, pp. 155–56, 164 (Table 2)Google Scholar; and Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, pp. 23–25Google Scholar. Lake does address the possibility that two or more ”supporters “ (distinguished by above-average productivity and moderate share of world trade) could bring greater resources to bear on the international economy than a single hegemon. Due to problems of coordination, however, such an outcome is “nlikely”. Lake, , “Beneath the Commerce of Nations”, pp. 155–56Google Scholar. Thus, under a bilateral or multilateral supportership, supporters would have great difficulty in matching a hegemon's abilities to offer side-payments as a means to alter the behavior of other countries and would be forced to rely more on the threat of sanctions. Due to the spoiler's preference for mutual protection over mutual free trade, such sanctions would do little to dissuade the spoiler from overt protectionist action. As a spoiler, Japan should have followed such a course.

54. Krasner, , Defending the National Interest, pp. 59–61Google Scholar; and Katzenstein, , Small States, pp. 23–26Google Scholar. MITI has had little difficulty in promoting change in the upstream portions of the textile industry. Yet it is difficult to attribute this to state strength and not to the fact that this portion of the industry and state policymakers have often been in agreement on future industry directions. Where MITI and industry subsectors disagree, MITI has had much less success. The greatest area of difficulty has been in promoting the rationalization of the textile weaving subsector. Characterized by predominantly small and medium-sized firms, this subsector has been slow to take advantage of MITI-backed vertical integration schemes and has steadily resisted the removal of existing support programs. Interviews with industry and government officials held in Japan 1984; and Ike, , “The Japanese Textile Industry”, pp. 444–45Google Scholar.

55. United Nations, United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1978Google Scholar, 1979.

56. For a comparison of relative productivity by agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors, seeCenter, Keizai Koho, Japan 1983: An International Comparison (Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, 1983), p. 65Google Scholar. A more recent comparison of manufacturing productivity is available in Center, Keizai Koho, Japan 1987: An International Comparison (Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, 1987), p. 71Google Scholar. For a more detailed response to Lake's contention that Japan is a spoiler, see Inoguchi, Takashi, “Japan's Images and Options: Not a Challenger, But a Supporter,” Journal of Japanese Studies 12 (Winter 1986), pp. 98–99Google Scholar.

57. On congressional linkages between trade and defense spending, see Japan Economic Institute, “Japan's Defense Spending: A Reaction from the U. S. Congress”, JEI Report4A, 29 January 1982. During the 1970s and 1980s, congressional ire focused on sectors such as, agriculture, automobiles, and telecommunications. For example, see Destler, I. M. and Sato, Hideo, eds., Coping with U. S. Japanese Economic Conflicts (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982)Google Scholar. In contrast, Japanese textile exports to the United States have long been a point of contention between the two countries at the broader, strategic level. For a past and relatively current example of American concerns with Japanese textile exports, see Destler, I. M., Fukui, Haruhiro, Sato, Hideo, The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations (Ith-aca: Cornell University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985Google Scholar.

58. Yamazawa, Ippei, “Increasing Imports and Structural Adjustment of the Japanese Textile Industry,” The Developing Economies 18 (12 1980), p. 446CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Statistics calculated (in tons) from Japan Chemical Fibers Association, Man-Made Fibers of Japan 1978/79, pp. 82–83Google Scholar.

59. The alliance consisted of the Japan Spinners Association (Nihon Boseki Kyokai), the Japan Cotton and Staple Fibers Weaving Association (Nihon Men Sufu Orimono Kogyo Rengyokai), and the Japan Silk and Rayon Fiber Weavers Association (Nihon Kinu Jinken Orimono Kogyo Kumiai Rengo-kai). In Osaka the following month, the MITI vice-minister again rejected the idea of import restrictions. Daily News Record, 24 May 1974, 18 June 1974; and Japan Economic Journal, 7 May 1974.

60. For detail on the activities of the Federation of Clothing Manufacturers and knitwear producers, see Japan Economic Journal, 15 October 1974; Daily News Record, 28 May 1974, 17 October 1974; “How to Reshape Structure as Imports Soar”, Textile Japan, 1975, pp. 89–91; and Textile Asia, December 1974. To strengthen their appeal, the garment producers also argued that imports were interfering with the long-run shift to knowledge-intensive integration and high value-added production encouraged by MITI's 1974 Textile Law. The 1974 Law on Extraordinary Measures for Structural Improvement of Textile Industry replaced a 1967 Textile Law which had aimed at restructuring specific portions of the industry through financial assistance for capacity reduction, facility modernization, and firm concentration. The revised law stemmed from the MITI minister's request in October 1972 for the Industrial Structure Council and Textile Industry Council to draft long-term policy guidelines for the textile industry in the 1970s. The 1974 law differed from its predecessor in both the shift in emphasis to knowledge intensification and the shift in coverage to the entire textile industry. The 1974 Law provided lowinterest loans to small and medium-sized companies for knowledge-intensive integration, extended joint scrapping programs begun under the 1967 law, and provided special tax treatment and research and development measures to larger companies to encourage the production of high value-added goods. The law itself made no mention of import measures; however, the underlying logic of the law reflects the orientation of MITI officials: if the law is successful in increasing the competitive power of the industry, imports will no longer be a problem and import restrictions will not be necessary. Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, The Textile and Apparel Industries of Japan, 10 1981, p. 13Google Scholar; Hirai, Toko and Iwasaki, H., Seni Gyokai (Tokyo: Kyoiku-sha, 1982), p. 159Google Scholar; Ike, , “The Japanese Textile Industry”, pp. 444–45Google Scholar; and Hornbeck, Bernice M., Developments in the Japanese Textile Industry (Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1975), p. 20Google Scholar.

61. “Cotton Textile Industry Eyes Fashion Business”, Textile Japan, January 1975, pp. 66–67; Textile Asia, October 1974; Japan Economic Journal,15 October 1974, 3 December 1974; Daily News Record, 17 October 1974, 2 December 1974; Japan Times, 28 November 1974; Mainichi Daily News, 11 March 1975; and Japan Economic Journal, “Natural Fibers”, Industrial Review of Japan 1975, pp. 102, 104Google Scholar. For detail on recession cartels, see Johnson, , MITI, pp. 98–99Google Scholar.

62. Japan Times, 28 November 1974; and Textile Asia, February 1975, December 1974. MITI officials share jurisdiction with the FTC in the granting of exceptions to Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law. See Haitani, Kanji, The Japanese Economic System: An Institutional Overview (Lexington and Toronto: D. C. Heath, 1976), pp. 132–34Google Scholar; and Mashushita, Mitsuo, “The Anti-Monopoly Law of Japan,” Law in Japan: An Annual II (1978), p. 66Google Scholar. The import surveillance program covered 300 trading companies (200 were members of the Japan Textile Importers Association). Textile Asia. February 1975; and Japan Times, 7 April 1975. For additional detail on import surveillance, see Yamazawa, Ippei, Hirata, Akira, and Taniguchi, Koji, “Trade and Industrial Adjustment in Pacific Asian Countries,” Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, 1983, pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

63. For detail on the demands raised by key producers associations in the JTF deliberations, see The Daily Yomiuri, 16 February 1975, 21 March 1975; and Textile Asia, April 1975, May 1975, September 1975. For the MITI response, see Daily News Record, 17 March 1975; and Mainichi Daily News, 30 March 1975.

64. Daily News Record, 17 March 1975; Mainichi Daily News, 30 March 1975; Japan Times, 7 April 1975; and Textile Asia, May 1975. For detail on steps taken by Cabinet officials, see Fukui, , “The GATT Tokyo Round”, p. 106Google Scholar. Among analysts of Japanese textile trade policy, the silk industry is considered to be a separate entity. Although sericulture is classified under agriculture, MITI still has influence (and therefore responsibility) over silk product trade. For details on MITI silk policy during this period, see Mainichi Daily News, 30 March 1975, 22 February 1976; Daily News Record, 4 April 1974, 28 May 1974, 2 July 1974, and 30 July 1974, 17 March 1975; and Textile Asia, May 1975, June 1975.

65. Fukui, , “The GATT Tokyo Round”, p. 101Google Scholar. For detail on the MITI “opinion”, seeAsahi Evening News, 18 April 1975.

66. With this federation request, interest convergence had increased among members of the industrial alliance. The JTF and the Japan Spinners Association jointly demanded restrictions on textile imports as allowed by GATT and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, increased import duties on textiles comparable to those in other countries, and the establishment of a consultative body “to review the textile supply and demand situation”. Textile Asia, June 1975; Asahi Evening News, 18 April 1975.

67. Interview held in Tokyo, April 1984; The Daily Yomiuri, 9 November 1975, 26 February 1977; Textile Asia, December 1975; “Proposal for Immediate Textile Measures”, Japan Textile News, February 1976, pp. 28–29; Japan Times, 1 November 1975; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 December 1975; and Japan Economic Journal, “Natural Fibers”, Industrial Review of Japan 1976, p. 106.

68. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 December 1975. The Textile Industry Council acts as a major advisory council to MITI, serving as a forum linking ministry officials, industry representatives, industry experts, and labor representatives. A second major advisory council on textile issues attached to the ministry is the Textile Committee of the Industrial Structure Council. Johnson, , MITI, p. 79Google Scholar; Johnson, , “MITI and Japanese International Economic Policy”, pp. 274–75; andGoogle ScholarHigashi, Chikara, Japanese Trade Policy Formulation (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

69. Mainichi Daily News, 22 February 1976; Textile Asia, December 1975, January 1976, March 1976, May 1976, June 1976, July 1976, November 1976; Asahi Evening News, 19 May 1977; Women's Wear Daily, 30 January 1976; and Japan Times, 29 January 1976.

70. In early 1976, for example, Japan's chief GATT textile negotiator rejected the use of MFA restrictions for the Japanese industry. Textile Asia, April 1976. In the fall of 1976, industry officials were told by the old and new directors of the Consumer Goods Industries Bureau that the textile industry ”should make its own efforts to solve its structural problem”. Textile Asia, October 1976.

71. Daily News Record, 17 December 1976; and interview held in Tokyo, April 1984; Asahi Evening News, 11 December 1976; Ippei Yamazawa, “Japan's Adjustment to the Industrial Growth of Asian NICs and ASEAN Countries”, (forthcoming); and Textile Asia, February 1977.

72. Weavers, however, would no longer be protected by the capacity registration measures under the Small Business Law. These measures capped the number of machines to avoid overproduction. Financial assistance was also available when scrapping old machines for new. The Council recommended that this program be phased out. Textile Asia, January 1977, February 1977; Asahi Evening News, 11 December 1976. It is not clear to what extent the industry's case was helped by a mid-September typhoon that adversely affected a large portion of small weaving and towel factories in central Honshu and western Shikoku. MITI Minister Toshio Komoto pledged financial relief for the typhoon damage in September but withheld promises of more detailed monetary adjustment assistance pending the awaited report by the Textile Industry Council. Textile Asia, December 1976.

73. This literature includes Stephen Krasner's arguments on countervailing and cross-cutting pressures, G. K. Helleiner's arguments on intra-industry and intra-firm trade, and work by Peter Gourevitch and Helen Milner on the impact of international situation on industry preferences. Krasner, Stephen D., “The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and the Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System,” International Studies Quarterly 23 (12 1979), pp. 491–531CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Helleiner, Gerard, Intra-firm Trade and the Developing Countries (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gourevitch, “Breaking with Orthodoxy”; and Milner, “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation”. These studies of sectoral preferences build on economic explanations of postwar protectionism. Economic approaches contend that variables such as import penetration and falling employment are correlated with sectoral demands for protection as well as the government's willingness to supply protection; see Baldwin, Robert, The Political Economy of U. S. Import Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Kym Anderson and Baldwin, Robert E., “The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries: Empirical Evidence”, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 492, 10 1981Google Scholar. Although such approaches are useful in identifying key economic variables, they are less helpful in explaining the process through which such variables actually shape state policymaker action. During the 1950s, for example, the United States turned to nonunilateral quotas to protect a textile industry facing an import penetration rate of 2.0 percent. During the 1970s, Japan avoided this pattern despite import enetration rates of close to 20 percent. Economic variables alone provide an incomplete picture of trade policy choices.

74. I have omitted a systematic test of the role of counter-coalitions that challenge the position of an industrial alliance. Demands by retail associations, trade associations, and consumer goods, however, appear to have had little impact on textile trade policy choices in either the United States, Japan, or West Germany. One question for future testing would be to what extent these coalitions (due to their political resources) decrease the industrial alliance's ability to gain a favorable response through legislative access channels. For a more detailed study of counter-coalitions, see Destler, I. M. and Odell, John, The Politics of Anti-Protection (Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987)Google Scholar.

75. For detail on industry relations with MITI and the Diet over exports, see Johnson, , MITI, pp. 224–25Google Scholar; Ike, , “The Japanese Textile Industry,” p. 529Google Scholar; Destler, , Fukui, , and Sato, , Textile Wrangle, pp. 286–314Google Scholar; and Hirai and Iwasaki, Seni Gyokai, chap. 6.

76. Destler, , American Trade Politics, pp. xii, 25–29, 59–60Google Scholar.

77. Interview held in Tokyo (April 1984). For a review of the contending arguments on MITIDiet relations, see Muramatsu, and Krauss, , “Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking,” pp. 126–46Google Scholar.

78. American state policymakers still face a strong threat of retaliation under the current multilateral supportership. United States vulnerability to retaliation has increased since the 1950s. Yet since 1980, foreign trade as a percentage of GNP has averaged only 14. 9 percent (low-to-moderate vulnerability). Calculated from United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, , Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 416, 789Google Scholar.

79. For background on NICs, see Bradshaw, Thornton F. et al. , eds., America's New Competitors: The Challenge of the Newly Industrializing Countries (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988)Google Scholar. For the impact of exchange rate trends on American and Japanese exporters during early 1988, see “At Last, a Shrinking Feeling,” The Economist, 20 February 1988; “Made in the USA,” Business Week, 29 February 1988; and “Japan's Latest Triumph: Hurdling the High Yen,” Business Week, 18 January 1988.