I have borrowed and amended the first part of the title from Robert A. Dahl, “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph fora Monument to a Successful Protest,” The American Science Review 55 (December 1961), pp. 763–72.1 thank two anonymous referees and especially Prof. Robert O. Keohane for very helpful comments on the first draft of this review.

Editor's note. Editorial decisions regarding this article were made by the former editor and the present and previous chairs of the Board of Editors.

1. Unfortunately, the learning curve seems to have remained flat for many Southern analysts. For the failure to learn on the part of the UNCTAD “circle,” see Cutajar, Michael Zammit, ed., UNCTAD and the South-North Dialogue (New York: Pergamon, 1985)Google Scholar. The failures of the past are still attributed to “resistance to change by powerful corporate and governmental interests in industrialized countries” (p. viii), and there is no questioning of the wisdom or soundness of the policies and approaches advocated by UNCTAD.

2. For example, a decade ago I argued that “many or most of the problems of the underdeveloped countries can be adequately explained by fundamental differences in power and capacity…. Poverty and weakness in the context of a complex environment are usually sufficient [to understand Third World problems in the international system]. “ Rothstein, Robert L., The Weak in the World of the Strong (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 8Google Scholar. In contrast to Krasner, however, I sought to examine the shifting interaction between domestic and external choices without assuming the primacy of the latter.

3. These matters are discussed more fully in Rothstein, Weak in the World of the Strong, chaps. 5 and 8.

4. Krasner contends that Third World leaders were more concerned with gaps that measured power differences, but it should be noted that even those that did well within the system did so by increasing their dependence, not their autonomy, which suggests the ambiguities of a straight power argument for the weak. Those countries that were not doing well increased dependence without any increase in capacity to maneuver within a dependent system. For a discussion of increasing dependencies, see Rothstein, Robert L., The Third World and U. S. Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1981), chaps. 3–5Google Scholar.

5. Krasner contends that the failure of the non-OPEC Third World to react negatively to the damage OPEC inflicted on the Third World provides evidence that economic performance was not central to the Third World and that OPEC was spared attack because doing so would have undermined ideological coherence and weakened unity (pp. 105–10). But this interpretation, while surely containing elements of truth, also seems oversimplified. A more balanced explanation of the response to OPEC would also need to include the fear of further damage from OPEC, the desire for OPEC aid (and perhaps preferential prices for oil), and the hope of using OPEC's leverage in other negotiations.

6. See Brooke, James, “In Guinea, the Economy Thrives on Liberalization,” The International Herald Tribune, 29 12 1987, p. 5Google Scholar. For further evidence, see “Business in the Developing World,” The Economist, 26 December 1987, pp. 84–92.

7. The quote is from a review of Riddell, Roger, Foreign Aid Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) which appeared in The Economist, 12 12 1987, p. 98Google Scholar.

8. Krasner's blanket assertion that “developing countries have rejected liberal regimes” (p. 65) is also undermined in the multi-fiber regime where the Third World has sought a strong, liberal regime and the North has supported a protectionist regime. See Aggarwal, Vinod K., “The Unravelling of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 1981: An Examination of International Regime Change,” International Organization 37 (Autumn 1983), pp. 617–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. Not for the neoclassical school or for their radical critics.

10. There is a good discussion of this issue in Streeten, Paul P., “Development Dichotomies,” in Meier, Gerald M. and Seers, Dudley, eds., Pioneers in Development (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1984), p. 353Google Scholar.

11. Aggarwal, , “Unravelling of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 1981,” pp. 617–18Google Scholar.

12. For more extensive discussion, see Keohane, Robert O., ed., Neo Realism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. A normative critique of realism is largely bypassed here, although it is bound to be important in any asymmetrical conflict. My focus instead is on the descriptive and analytic adequacy of the realist approach.

13. For an extended analysis, see Rothstein, Robert L., “The Security Dilemma and the Poverty Trap' in the Third World,” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (12 1986), pp. 1–38Google Scholar.

14. For evidence on this point, see Rothstein, Robert L., Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

15. On the latter point, see the interesting discussion in Rosecrance, Richard, The Rise of the Trading Slate—Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986)Google Scholar.

16. Another interesting work that criticizes structural approaches (including dependency theorists) for an inability to explain change and for failure to give due weight to subjective factors (especially the aims of key actors) is Kahler, Miles, Decolonization in Britain and France—The Domestic Consequences of International Relations (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

17. See Keohane, Robert O., “The Study of International Regimes and the Classical Tradition in International Relations,” paper prepared for delivery at the 1986 meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 16ffGoogle Scholar.

18. For unfortunate evidence about the last point, see Cutajar, , UNCTAD and the South-North Dialogue and Gauhar, Altaf, ed., Third World Strategy—Economic and Political Cohesion in the South (New York: Praeger, 1983)Google Scholar.

19. For an earlier criticism from this perspective, see Rothstein, Robert L., “On the Costs of Realism,” Political Science Quarterly 87 (09 1972), pp. 347–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. Keohane, , “Study of International Regimes,” p. 15Google Scholar.

21. That is, the Third World countries had leverage where cooperation was necessary for all the parties to achieve national goals.

22. For an argument suggesting the different institutional settings that might be appropriate for different negotiations, see Rothstein, Robert L., “Is the North-South Dialogue Worth Saving?” Third World Quarterly 6 (01 1984), pp. 155–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. Cassen, Robert et al. , eds., Rich Country Interests and Third World Development (London: Croom Helm, 1982)Google Scholar; Bergesen, Helge Ole, Holm, Hans Henrik, and Mc Kinlay, Robert D., eds., The Recalcitrant Rich (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Taylor, Philip and Raymond, Gregory A., eds., Third World Policies of Industrialized Nations (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

24. See especially the articles by Stuart Harris on Australia, Bernard Wood on Canada, and Vince Cable on Great Britain, all in Cassen et al., Rich Country Interests.

25. Information about interpretation of interests in the South is even more fragmentary. What evidence we do have suggests that many governments concentrate on bilateral relationships and instruct delegates at international conferences to follow the-group line, which gives great power to international bureaucrats and a few activist states. Some large countries seeking regional influence do fit Krasner's argument rather well, as they seek political influence, occasionally at the expense of economic gains. But many of the other states do not always even know what their interests are or what effects various international decisions will have in terms of reducing vulnerability. Thus Krasner's argument appears oversimplified in this context also. Evidence for my comments can be found in my Third World and U. S. Foreign Policy, pp. 25–28, and Jackson, Richard L., The Non-Aligned, the U. N. and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 105Google Scholar.

26. For a more extended argument on the latter point, see Rothstein, Robert L., Peaceful Transitions from Authoritarianism: The Implications for U. S. Policy Toward the Third World, report prepared for the Office of the Historian, Department of State, 05 1985Google Scholar.

27. Krasner is properly cautious about the possibilities of collective self-reliance. However, his analysis could have been even sharper (and more pessimistic) if he had noted that dissatisfaction with the North could be diminished only over the long run because an effort at increased autonomy would probably require increased dependence on the North in the short run. Also, collective self-reliance could very well repeat the pattern of North-South dominance but within the Southern coalition—and in a more dangerous form because power asymmetries are less pronounced, and thus more consequential, within the South. For further discussion, see Rothstein, The Third World and U. S. Foreign Policy, chap. 5.

28. One potentially useful way of understanding North-South change might be to think of the South as an international social movement seeking to promote change in a number of areas. In this sense the South had some success in becoming an accepted voice for a set of interests, in having some of its ideas accepted, and in marginally altering some aspects of public opinion. It was much less successful in achieving specific goals because it chose an inappropriate negotiating strategy and it proposed policies that were technically and politically flawed—and because the trends that I will discuss undermined substantive unity within an already weak coalition.

29. Drucker, Peter F., “The Changed World Economy,” Foreign Affairs 64 (Spring 1986), pp. 768–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30. Ibid., pp. 771ff. One should note that the proportion of commodities in total world exports has fallen by 13 percent in the past two decades and that the developing country share of world commodity exports has also fallen. The developing countries have also procured an increasing share of their own commodity imports from the developed countries. See UNCTAD Information Bulletin (Geneva: TAD/1NF/1858, 05 1986), p. 4Google Scholar.

31. Ibid., p. 775.

32. The Economist, 18 April 1987, p. 65. The argument needs to be qualified because demand for some commodities may remain or become robust. Note that the recent upsurge in commodity prices does not undermine the argument about a long-term secular decline in demand for many commodities.

33. See Rothstein, , Weak in the World of the Strong, pp. 8–86Google Scholar.

34. Some Third World importers of commodities may be helped by lower commodity prices, especially manufacturing exporters such as South Korea. But this helps the strong at the expense of the weak.

35. Drucker, , “The Changed World Economy,” pp. 755ffGoogle Scholar.

36. There is some parallel here to the difficulties of switching from inter-industry to intraindustry trade.

37. This suggests, as with commodities, the likelihood of a problem with declining terms of trade for Third World manufactured exports.

38. “Impact of New Technologies on Trade and Development: Some Preliminary Findings,” UNCTAD Bulletin 225 (September-October 1986), p. 9.

39. Ibid., p. 10.

40. Drucker, , “The Changed World Economy,” pp. 782ffGoogle Scholar.

41. For further discussion, see Rothstein, , The Third World and U. S. Foreign Policy, pp. 33–35Google Scholar. Differentiation has resulted from differences in initial endowments and skills and escalating differences in economic and political performance. Its significance has frequently been denied by Third World leaders, if ineffectually, because of the threat to unity.

42. Changes in the international division of labor are always occurring, but the point here is the rapidity with which they were occurring and the generally negative implications for the South. The latter include increasing conflicts within the South, demands for a new order of coping skills, rising internal pressures, declining terms of trade for both commodities and some manufactured exports, and increasing dependence on the developed countries for shares of declining or static resources (aid, loans, access to markets, and so on).