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Computers—Data Banks and the Individual: Is the Problem Privacy?1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2016

Carol Farhi
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Extract

The problem of computerized data has been largely conceived of in terms of the concept of privacy. Thus any check of legal periodicals will disclose a number of articles on computers and privacy, and a recent Bill before the English Parliament is entitled “A Bill to Prevent the Invasion of Privacy through the Misuse of Computer Information”.

In fact privacy is only one aspect of a wider complex problem, and the concept of privacy both factually and legally is far from coextensive with that problem. Proposals such as the English Bill which speak in terms of privacy are really concerned with problems of accuracy of information, its dissemination and use; and the information may be public or private, it may have been acquired legally or illegally, with or without intrusion of privacy, with or without knowledge, with or without consent.

Perhaps the problem could here be categorized as one in which society is attempting to set standards of fair acquisition, fair dissemination, and fair use of information. It is confusing, as will be illustrated below, to set these standards in terms of privacy which is only one of a number of personal and societal values involved.

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Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , October 1970 , pp. 542 - 558
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1970

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References

2 Bill 150 ordered to be brought by Mr. Kenneth Baker et al., May 6, 1969. A still more recent one is reported in (1969) 119 N.L.J. 1082.

3 Miller, A., “Personal Privacy in the Computer Age”, (1969) 67 Mich. L. R., 1178.Google Scholar

4 Time, December 20, 1968, p. 47.

5 Ibid.

6 Miller, op. cit., 1124.

7 Ibid., 1107.

8 Ibid., 1118.

9 Cf. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama 357 US 466 (1958).

10 Cf. Katz v. United States 389 US 347 (1967).

11 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1964).

12 Ibid., 357 US 466.

13 Cf. Schneider v. Smith 390 US 17 (1967); U.S. v. Robel 389 US 258 (1967).

14 360 US 481 (1959).

15 (1890) 4 Harv. L.R. 193.

16 See Salmond on Torts (15th ed., 1969).

17 (1955) 11 P.M. 202. See also Rabinovitz v. Mirlin (1957) 11 P.D. 1224, 1225.

18 2 De G & SM 652–718; S.C. on appeal, 1 Mac & G 25.

19 2 De G & SM at 671.

20 Ibid., at 696.

21 Jacob, and Jacob, , “Protection of Privacy in English Law”, (1969) 119 N.L.J. 157.Google Scholar

22 Ministry of Justice, Research in Jewish Law (Monograph in Hebrew), March, 1970.

23 385 US 374, 413 (1966).

24 Nimmer, M.B., “The Right to Speak from Time to Time”, (1968) 56 Cal. L.R.Google ScholarCf. Salmond, on Torts (15th ed., 1969) which adopts the Prosser classification as definitive.Google Scholar

25 Prosser on Torts (3rd ed., 1964), 843.

26 Fried, , “Privacy”, (1968) 77 Yale L.J. 475.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 Warren, and Brandeis, , (1890) 4 Harv. L.R. 193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 Op. cit., 851.

29 Supreme Court Advance Sheet, March 10, 1969.

30 Presser, op. cit., 839.

31 (1834) 1 C.M. & R. 193.

32 (1863) 15 C.B. 148, 418.

33 Waller v. Loch (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 622.

34 (1907) 1 K.B. 371, 382.

35 (1930) 2 K.B. 226, 235.

36 MacKintosh v. Dunn (1908) A.C. 1930.

37 194 F 2nd 160, cert. den. 344 US 821, rehearing den. 345 US 960.

38 Prosser, op. cit., 810.

39 Ibid., 811.

40 19 L.S.I. 254.

41 Stroud's Judicial Dictionary.

42 22 N.Y. 2nd 48 (1969).

43 Sun Life Ass. Co. of Canada v. Dalrymple, 50 D.L.R. (2).

44 (1969) (II) 23 P.D. 135.

45 (1871) 41 L.T. 588.

46 Defamatory matter is anything the publication of which may “injure a person in his office, whether it be a public or any other office, or in his business, vocation or profession”. Subsection (2) would cover credit—“bringing a person into disrepute because of acts, conduct or qualities attributed to him”.

47 (1969) 1 Lloyds Rep. 535.

48 (1962) 1 Q.B. 396; (1964) A.C. 465.

49 7 N.Y. 2nd 56 (1960).

50 Op. cit., 1180.

51 Ibid.