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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2011
The sudden collapse of France in June 1940 presented Japan with a golden opportunity to exploit French discomfiture and remove several obstacles to its New Order in East Asia. Indeed, the military extremists, who had been temporarily held in check since the humiliation caused by the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939, could no longer be restrained. By seizing Indochina, Japan would be in a strong position to force an end to its interminable struggle with China on its own terms. The large quantity of supplies that had flowed through Indochina to Chinese forces — a situation that had greatly embittered the Japanese and had slowly poisoned Franco–Japanese relations during the past three years — could be brought to a halt. Chiang Kai-shek, further isolated and confronted with the loss of one of his few remaining channels of supply, might be finally forced to give up the fight. Moreover, Indochina could provide Japan with significant supplies of rubber, tin, coal, and rice and thus go a long way toward ending its dependence upon foreign sources for these strategic raw materials. Finally, the strategic location of Indochina meant that it could serve admirably as an advanced base from which the Japanese could strike out against the Far Eastern possessions of the other Western colonial powers — the East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines.
The author wishes to thank the American Philosophical Association and the Research Committee of Wichita State University for financial awards that facilitated the research and writing of this article.
1 As General Shunroka Hata, the Japanese War Minister, and a moderate in military circles, declared, “We should not miss the present opportunity or we shall be blamed by posterity.” Quoted in Langer, William L. and Gleason, S. Everett, The Challenge to Isolation (New York, 1952), p. 603Google Scholar.
2 For a study of the deterioration of Franco–Japanese relations between the outbreak of the Sino–Japanese conflict and the war in Europe, see Dreifort, John E., “France, the Powers, and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1937–1939”, The Historian 39 (August 1977): 733–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar. By establishing air bases in Indochina, the Japanese would also bring themselves within striking distance of the newly completed Burma Road, the only other significant supply route for Chiang Kai-shek's forces.
3 It must have given Tani particular satisfaction to issue such a statement. A notorious Francophobe, only a few months earlier the French government had refused to receive him as Japan's ambassador to Paris, so the revenge must have been sweet.
4 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, p. 6713. Hereafter cited as IMTFE. See also, Levy, Roger, Lacom, Guy, and Roth, Andrew, French Interests and Policies in the Far East (New York, 1941), pp. 150–51Google Scholar; Jones, F.C., Japan's New Order in East Asia, 1937–1945 (London, 1954), p. 221Google Scholar; and Toynbee, Arnold and Toynbee, Veronica M., eds., The Initial Triumph of the Axis (London, 1958), p. 583Google Scholar. To add force to their demands, the Japanese began moving their Army in China's Kwangsi Province into position along the Indochinese border. Units of the Japanese navy were dispatched to manoeuvre in the Gulf of Tonkin.
5 Craigie (Tokyo) to Foreign Office, 21 June 1940, Unpublished British Foreign Office Papers, FO 371, vol. 24719, no. F3429/3429/61. Hereafter cited as FO 371, followed by volume and document numbers. See also, memo, of conversation between Saint-Quentin, and Stanley Hornbeck (Adviser on Political Relations), 20 June 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, IV: 20. Hereafter cited as FRUS; Catroux, Georges, New York Times, 2 Aug. 1945Google Scholar; and Catroux, Georges, Deux actes du drame Indochinois (Paris, 1959), p. 58Google Scholar.
6 Catroux, New York Times, 2 Aug. 1945. No State Department memo, concerning this conversation has ever been found, but other documentation confirms its substance. See the record of a conversation between Saint-Quentin and Stanley Hornbeck on the following day, 20 June in FRUS, 1940, IV: 29. See also Baudouin, Paul, The Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin (London, 1948), p. 146Google Scholar; Charles-Roux, F., Cinq Mois Tragiques au Affaires Etrangères (21 Mai–1 Novembre 1940) (Paris, 1949), p. 71Google Scholar; Chauvel, Jean, Commentaire, vol. I: De Vienne a Alger (1938–1944) (Paris, 1971), p. 232Google Scholar; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 598; Reed (Hanoi) to Sec. St., 17 June 194Q, FRUS, 1940, IV: 25–26; and Catroux, Deux actes, pp. 54–55.
7 Memo, by Hornbeck, 20 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 29; and Catroux, Deux actes, p. 55.
8 Catroux, New York Times, 2 Aug. 1945.
9 See FO memo, by B.E.F. Gage, 19 July 1940, FO 371, 24719, F3526/3429/61. At a meeting on the twenty-seventh with Admiral Sir Percy Noble, Commander-in-Chief of Britain's Far Eastern forces, Decoux became convinced that British naval forces would not be sent to defend Indochina. Catroux, Deux acles, p. 70.
10 Quoted in note from Francefort (Free French Mission in London) to FO, 17 June 1944, FO 371,41723, F2894/66/61.
11 Catroux indicated that all freight shipped to China would be prohibited and that he would agree to the establishment of a Japanese control commission provided that it operated in a “discreet” manner. Grew (Tokyo) to Sec. St., 20 June 1940, FRUS, 1940,1V: 31; and Catroux, Deux actes, pp. 58–61.
12 Catroux, New York Times, 2 Aug. 1945.
13 Quoted in Hytier, Adrienne Doris, Two Years of French Foreign Policy, Vichy 1940–1942 (Paris, 1958), p. 215Google Scholar. For other rationalizations sent to his superiors, see Catroux, Deux actes, pp. 62–66.
14 Baudouin, Private Diaries, p. 146; Decoux, Jean, A la barre de l'Indochine: Histoire de mon Gouvernement Général (1940–1945) (Paris, 1949), p. 66Google Scholar. Catroux's independence had become increasingly obvious. In a series of telegrams sent to Vichy after 20 June, he petulantly asserted his need to be “free to judge and to act”.
15 See Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, pp. 55–58; and memo, by Gage, 19 July 1940, FO 371,24719, F356/3429/61.
16 For more on this, see Chauvel, Commentaire, I: 230–31; and Biddle (Bordeaux) to Sec. St., 20 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 30. Chauvel surmised that despatches between Catroux and de Gaulle may have been intercepted. But more likely, Catroux's tendency to seize the bit worried Riviere that such a decree would be “interpreted as an encouragement to dissidence”.
17 For discussions of the nature and depth of Anglophobia in France at the time of its defeat, see Osgood, Samuel M., “Le mythede 'la perfide Albion'en France, 1919–1940”, Cahiers d'Histoire 20 (1975): 18–20Google Scholar; and Bell, P.M.H., “The Breakdown of the Alliance in 1940”, in Waites, Neville, ed., Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century (London, 1971) pp. 200–27Google Scholar.
18 See de Gaulle, Charles, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle (New York, 1955–59), pp. 83–84Google Scholar.
19 Quoted in Henderson (Saigon) to FO, 20 June 1940, FO 371, 24327, C7343/7327/17.
20 Henderson (Saigon) to FO, 27 June 1940, FO 371, 24328, C7405/7327/17. The following day, 28 June, Catroux further revealed his attitude when he met with Admiral Noble. He indicated that he planned to obey outwardly the orders of the Petain government, while still seeking British support. See Noble to Admiralty, 28 June 1940, FO 371, 24328, C7405/7327/17. For the meeting with Noble, see also Decoux, A labarrede l'Indochine, pp. 42–48.
21 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 72.
22 Quoted in Hammer, Ellen J., The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, 1954), p. 18Google Scholar. For an opposite viewpoint, see du Gard, Maurice Martin, La Carte Imperiale: Histoire de la France outre-mer, 1940–1945 (Paris, 1949), p. 420Google Scholar.
23 FO to Henderson (Saigon), 20 June 1940, FO 371, 24328, C7405/7327/17. Admiral Noble reported that Catroux seemed encouraged by the British promises of aid, but Noble doubted whether the Governor-General would be able to resist pressure from Pétain's government.
24 Henderson (Saigon) to FO, 20 June 1940, FO 371, 24327, C7343/C7380/7327/17.
25 Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 19. Furthermore, by 10 July, it was reported that morale among military officers had deteriorated badly and that defeatism was rampant due to the inertia caused by the Catroux-Decoux controversy. See minute by Gage, 19 July 1940, FO 371, 24719, F3526/3429/61. It was also rumoured that Catroux feared reprisals against his family in France if he did not resign. It seems unlikely, however, that this kind of pressure could have influenced him too much, considering his subsequent allegiance to de Gaulle's movement and the fact that his son had already left for London.
26 Catroux (Cairo) to de Schompre (Singapore) through Lampson (Cairo) to FO, 24 Dec. 1940, FO 371, 24722, F5739/3429/61. See also, Lampson (Cairo) to FO, 26 Nov. 1940, FO 371, 24721, F5402/3429/61. Apparently de Schompre, headquartered at Singapore as de Gaulle's representative in the Far East, later advocated an insurrection against Decoux's pro-Vichy regime. The idea was torpedoed by Catroux.
27 Minute by L. Dening on Craigie (Tokyo) to FO, 2 Sept. 1940, FO 371, 24719, F4126/3429/61. From Tokyo, the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, urged that everything possible be done to prevent an uprising in favour of the French National Committee in London.
28 As one British official put it, “We should all naturally prefer that General de Gaulle should keep quiet about Indo-China.” Minute by J.C. Sterndale Bennett, 20 Dec. 1940, FO 371, 24723, F5616/3429/61. At the end of the year, the British Far Eastern Committee reported that it had been preoccupied with the problem of encouraging resistance to further Japanese encroachments. “In Indo-China this has meant refraining from any subversive movement in favor of de Gaulle in the hope that either the constituted authorities or the army independently would feel strong enough to withstand Japanese demands.” War Cabinet, W. P.(40)484, 18 Dec. 1940, “Report by the Far Eastern Committee” in FO 371, 24711, F5683/143/61.
29 Quoted in Levy et al., French Interests, p. 155.
30 Catroux, New York Times, 2 Aug. 1945; and Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, pp. 68–71.
31 IMTFE, pp. 6713–14, 6886. See also Baudouin, Private Diaries, p, 187; and Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 250. On the following day Colonel Sato, Nishihara's subordinate and temporary replacement, made similar demands to Decoux. It is doubtful that this was coordinated with Tokyo, for it was later reported that upon his return on 10 Aug., Nishihara quickly banished his impetuous subordinate back to the Canton Army. It is conceivable that intra-military politics may have led Sato to attempt to undercut his superior and garner some glory for himself. In any event, Decoux put him off by indicating that he would have to refer such matters to Vichy. Some analysts believe that Tokyo was interested in dealing directly with Vichy anyhow. See Jones, Japan's New Order, p. 225. See also Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, pp. 94–95; and Francefort to FO, 17 June 1944, FO 371, 41723, F2844/66/61.
32 Baudouin, Private Diaries, pp. 187–88. Baudouin also suggested that it was the form rather than the substance of the Japanese demands to which the French government objected.
33 Chauvel, Commentaire, I: 238–39.
34 Ibid., p. 236; and Baudouin, Private Diaries, pp. 199–200.
35 Buhrer's basic arguments were put forth in a memorandum that he submitted to Pétain on 7 Aug. He believed that Japan's long war in China had revealed serious weaknesses in the Japanese military. In an area that favoured the defence, the French army would equal what Japan could muster for an invasion. Moreover, he still hoped for, indeed, anticipated, American and especially British intervention. Regardless, France must make the effort or else it would “lose face” with the Indochinese population. “To abandon Indochina is to erase a glorious past, more than a half century of effort and sacrifice, to accept without a fight the retreat of the French and the white man from the Far East.” General X [Jules Buhrer], Aux heures tragiques de l'Empire (Paris, 1947), pp. 262–65Google Scholar.
36 Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, p. 98.
37 Murphy, Robert, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York, 1964), p. 75Google Scholar.
38 Baudouin, Private Diaries, p. 200. See also Chauvel, Commentaire, I: 239.
39 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, pp. 251–52; and Dunn (Adviser on Political Relations) to Welles, 6 Aug. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 64–65.
40 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 252.
41 Ibid.
42 Baudouin, Private Diaries, pp. 199–201.
43 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 254; see also Toynbee, Initial Triumph of the Axis, p. 615.
44 Baudouin, Private Diaries, p. 203.
45 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 254; and Murphy (Vichy) to Sec. St., 17 Aug. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 80–81.
46 Shortly after sending the new instructions to Arsène-Henry, Baudouin called Murphy to inform him of the French action and to point out that the temporary nature of the Japanese occupation could be better insured if the United States would make a démarche to that effect in Tokyo. See Baudouin, Private Diaries, pp. 204–205; and Murphy (Vichy) to Sec. St., 17 Aug. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 80–81.
47 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, pp. 254–55; and Grew (Tokyo) to Sec. St., 7 Aug. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 68.
48 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 255; and Baudouin, Private Diaries, p. 204.
49 Quoted by Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 255. See also Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 12.
50 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, pp. 255–56.
51 Ibid., p. 257. Charles-Roux generally supported Baudouin's viewpoint, cognizant that Indochina was incapable of resisting a determined Japanese attack by itself.
52 Tokyo sought to have Germany put pressure on Vichy to accede to Japan's demands. But, unwilling to offer the quid pro quo of a tripartite pact sought by the Germans, Tokyo found Berlin inclined to lend only lukewarm support for its demands. See Presseisen, Ernst L., Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933–1941 (The Hague, 1958), p. 256CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Jones, Japan's New Order, p. 227.
53 Baudouin, Private Diaries, pp. 218–20. Decoux and General Martin were confident that they could resist a Japanese attack. Martin had the distinct impression that the Japanese army in position along the Indochinese frontier wanted to create an incident that would have halted the negotiations entirely. See Martin's, General testimony in Procès du Maréchal Pétain (Paris, 1945), p. 277Google Scholar; and Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, pp. 101–102.
54 IMTFE, pp. 6396–99;Baudouin, Private Diaries, pp. 223–24; and Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 258.
55 Quoted in Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 138. See also Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, p. 103.
56 Testimony of General Martin, Procès du Pétain, p. 177; and Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, p. 103.
57 Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, pp. 107–108.
58 Baudouin, Private Diaries, p. 235.
59 Hull to Grew (Tokyo), 3 Sept. 1940, FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, II: 291–92.
60 See Matthews (Vichy) to Sec. St., 5 Sept. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 100–101; and Hull to Matthews, 9 Sept. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 104–106. See also Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 14.
61 Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), I:904Google Scholar.
62 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, p. 259.
63 Ibid., p. 260.
64 Matthews (Vichy) to Sec. St., 19 Sept. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 134.
65 Charles-Roux, Cinq Mois, pp. 260–61.
66 Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, pp. 109–10; and Baudouin, Private Diaries, pp. 243–44; Matthews (Vichy) to Sec. St., 22 Sept. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 141.
67 Francefort to FO, 17 June 1944, FO 371, 41723, F2894/66/61; and Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, pp. 11–12.
68 Hull, Memoirs, I: 906.
69 Ibid.
70 For text of the agreement, see IMTFE, p. 6954; see also Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, p. 112; Reed (Hanoi) to Sec. St., 22 Sept. 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 141–42.
71 Bergamini, David, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York, 1971), pp. 727–28Google Scholar, argues that the Japanese attack resulted from initiatives taken by Major-General Tominaga Kyoji, a special General Staff emissary to the negotiations and that Tojo's disciplinary action was only symbolic as the instigators were quickly reassigned to important posts by Hirohito. He also suggests that the Indochinese forces resisted “stoutly”. Certainly few French observers viewed the resistance so favourably. Although Robert Butow rather casually dismisses the incident as an exchange of fire caused by difficult communications, he more persuasively argues that Tokyo was truly embarrassed by the incident. Consequently, Tojo's disciplinary action was consistent with his determination to control the army and therefore meant to be taken seriously. See Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, 1961), pp. 193–94Google Scholar.
72 Baudouin, Private Diaries, p. 250.
73 Johnson, (Chungking) to Sec. St., 24 July 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV: 407Google Scholar.
74 Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbour (Princeton, 1950), p. 57Google Scholar.
