We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2011
Important decisions relating to the British defence commitment in Malaysia-Singapore were made during the term of office of the Wilson Government. The Labour Party came to power in Britain at the height of the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation. At the end of confrontation in 1966 there were over 90, 000 people working for the British Services in the Malaysia-Singapore area. By April 1970 this number was down to 43, 500, with a virtually complete withdrawal expected by the end of 1971. This article outlines certain factors relevant to the formulation of British foreign policy and describes how these factors influenced the rundown of the British defence commitment in Malaysia-Singapore.
1 The reduction in uniformed personnel was from 55, 000 at the end of confrontation to about 24, 000 at the beginning of 1970. House of Commons Debates vol. 797 col. 435 (4 03 1970)Google Scholar.
2 For an illuminating discussion of Labour thinking on foreign policy, see Gordon, Michael R., Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969Google Scholar). A general discussion of Healey's approach is contained in Reed, Bruce and Williams, Geoffrey, Denis Healey and the Policies oof Power (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971Google Scholar).
3 Healey, Denis, House of Commons Debates vol. 687 col. 545 (16 01 1964Google Scholar).
4 Ibid. vol. 696 col. 1403 (17 June 1964).
5 For an analysis of the formulation of foreign policy in Britain, see Vital, David, The Making of British Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1968Google Scholar). The formulation of defence policy is considered in Snyder, William P., The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945-62 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964Google Scholar). A comprehensive analysis of the options available n i British defence policy is contained in Goldstein, Walter, The Dilemma of British Defense: The Imbalance between Commitments and Resources (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966)Google Scholar, and Brown, Neville, Arms Without Empire (Penguin Books, 1967)Google Scholar. For a general account of Britain's East of Suez policy, see Darby, Phillip, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972)Google Scholar.
6 Hirsch, F., The Pound Sterling: A Polemic (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1965), pp. 23–24Google Scholar.
7 Cmnd. 3244, Preliminary Estimates of National Income and Balance of Payments 1961 to 1966 (London: H.M.S.O., 04 1967), Table 15Google Scholar.
8 Hanning, H., ‘Britain East of Suez - Facts and Figures’, International Affairs vol. 42 no. 204 1966), pp. 253–260 at p. 255CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 The predominance of foreign affairs issues in revolts within the parliamentary Labour Party has been shown by Jackson, Robert R. in Rebels and Whips (London: Macmillan, 1968)Google Scholar.
10 Australia and New Zealand each stationed a battalion at Terendak (near Malacca) as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. The Royal Australian Air Force also had units stationed at Butterworth (near Penang), and both countries had naval vessels in the area.
11 Times 27 October 1964.
12 The decision to limit defence expenditure by 1969-70 to £2000m. at 1964 prices appears t o have been taken at a meeting of senior British ministers at Chequers on 13 June 1965. See Ibid. 14 June 1965. Wilson states that a decision was made to reduce expenditure from £2400m. for 1969-70 but does not mention a target. See Wilson, Harold, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971)Google Scholar.
13 House of Commons Debates vol. 702 col. 1028. Emphasis added.
14 Ibid. vol. 704 cols. 423-424.
15 Ibid. vol. 701 col. 37.
16 Ibid. vol. 710, ‘Written Answers’, col. 56 (6 April 1965); vol. 717, ‘Written Answers’, cols. 427-428 (5 August 1965).
17 Cmnd. 2592, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965 (London: H.M.S.O., 1965)Google Scholar.
18 Ibid. p. 9 para. 21.
19 House of Commons Debates vol. 707 col. 1569 (4 03 1965)Google Scholar.
20 Survival vol. 7 no. 6 (09 1965), pp. 229-231, 241Google Scholar.
21 Ibid. p. 231.
22 Ibid. pp. 231, 241.
23 Guardian 20 December 1965.
24 Ibid.
25 Sunday Times 19 December 1965.
26 Times 28 January 1966.
27 Age (Melbourne) 3 02 1966Google Scholar. Emphasis added.
28 Ibid. Emphasis added.
29 The percentages are for 1965-1966. Source: The Military Balance 1966-1967 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966)Google Scholar.
30 Cmnd. 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966. Part I The Defence Review (London: H.M.S.O., 1966)Google Scholar. For analyses of the White Paper, see in particular Brown, N., ‘Some features of the British defence review’, The World Today vol. 22 no. 4 (04 1966), pp. 171–176Google Scholar; Skloot, E., ‘Labour East of Suez’, Orbis vo1. 10 (1966), pp. 947–957Google Scholar; Younger, K., ‘Reflections on the Defence Review’, Political Quarterly vol. 37 no. 3 (07-09 1966), pp. 255–264CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 Cmnd. 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966. Part I The Defence Review, p. 7, para. 19.
32 Ibid. p. 8, para. 24. Cuts of £180m. were needed in defence expenditure to reach the target of £2000m. (£220m. had already been saved by economies in the field of equipment). In the course of the defence debate Healey stated that £80m. would be saved by not proceeding with the plan to build a new aircraft carrier (CVA-01), and that a further £100m. would be saved by a reduction of forces in the Far East after the end of confrontation. (House of Commons Debates vol. 725 cols. 2032, 2046 (8 March 1966)).
33 Ibid. vol. 725 col. 258 (22 February 1966). A glimpse of the political conflict which preceded the publication of the White Paper is given in Wilson, H., op. cit., pp. 212–213. Mayhew claims that Wilson's account is misleading. See Times 26 July 1971Google Scholar.
34 House of Commons Debates vol. 725 col. 255 (22 February 1966). Fo r a further statement of Mayhew's views on the East of Suez question, see his book, Britain's Role Tomorrow (London: Hutchinson, 1967)Google Scholar.
35 Times 26 May 1966.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. 16 June 1966.
38 See Age 27 June 1966 for the text of Stewart's address to the National Press Club in Canberra. For the text of his address to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, see Stewart, M., ‘British Foreign Policy Today’, Australian Outlook vol. 20 no. 2 (08 1966), pp. 109–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Healey's statement in Singapore, see Guardian 6 July 1966.
39 House of Commons Debates vol. 732 col. 632.
40 , Mayhew, op. cit., p. 7Google Scholar.
41 Age 21 February 1967.
42 Cmnd. 3203, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967 (London: H.M.S.O., 1967), p. 2Google Scholar.
43 See Wilson, H., op. cit., pp. 376–377Google Scholar.
44 Age 18 April 1967; Times 21 April 1967.
45 See Observer 23 April 1967; Age 21 April 1967; Ibid. 22 April 1967. It should be noted however that as early as 23 October 1966 Healey had told Wilson that ‘he was ready to propose an approximate terminal date for our deployment east of Suez’. See Wilson, H., op. cit., p. 297Google Scholar.
46 Age. 27 April 1967.
47 Cmnd. 3357, Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967 (London: H.M.S.O., 1967), p. 4, para. 3Google Scholar.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. p. 4, para. 4.
50 Ibid. p. 5, para. 6.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. para. 8.
53 House of Commons Debates vol. 751 cols. 1102-1103.
54 Cmnd. 3357, pp. 5-6, para. 9.
55 Ibid. p. 6, para. 10.
56 Age 21 October 1967.
57 The plan to construct another staging post at Aldabra (north of Madagascar) was abandoned at the time of the devaluation crisis in November 1967 (Times 23 November 1967, p. 15).
58 Cmnd. 3357, p. 6, para. 10.
59 See , Wilson's devaluation announcement, Times 20 11 1967Google Scholar.
60 Note however C. Douglas-Home's estimate that tota l real savings from the proposed reductions would amount to no more than £20m. (ibid. 25 November 1967). The main defence cuts were as follows: the cancellation of the Aldabra project; a reduction in the number of buccaneer aircraft on order; the advancing of the phasing out of the carrier H.M.S. Victorious; a reduction in orders of equipment for the Army (including ammunition, vehicles, instruments); the cancellation of the order for Chinook helicopters (ibid. 23 November 1967).
61 See Official Text of Healey's statement issued by the Information Service of the British High Commission in Australia, 27 November 1967.
62 Times 19 December 1967.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. 12 Januar y 1968.
65 Ages January 1968.
66 This statement is printed as Cmnd. 3515, Public Expenditure in 1968-69 and 1969-70 (London: H.M.S.O., 1968)Google Scholar.
67 Ibid. pp. 4-5, para. 11.
68 Ibid. p. 5, para. 12. The date for the final withdrawal was changed from March 1971 to December 1971 as a result of Lee Kuan Yew's visit to London in mid-January. See Straits Times 19 January 1968.
69 Cmnd. 3515, p. 7, para. 22. The F-111 force could have been deployed in the European theatre, but had originally been intended also to fulfil a strike reconnaissance role in the east of Suez region.
70 Ibid. para. 24.
71 See Economist 20 January 1968. For Wilson's account of this episode, see Wilson, H., op. cit., pp. 479–487Google Scholar.
72 Times 11 June 1968.
73 For full text of the communique, see Current Notes on International Affairs vol. 39 no. 6 (06 1968), pp. 249–250Google Scholar.
74 Times 21 June 1969.
75 The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand had announced on 25 February 1969 that their countries would retain forces in Malaysia-Singapore after 1971. See Current Notes on International Affairs vol. 40 no. 2 (02 1969), pp. 41–46Google Scholar.
76 The expected British contribution (to be based in Singapore) consists of an infantry battalion, an artillery battery with support troops, six frigates, a submarine, four or five Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and a flight of Whirlwind helicopters (Times 17 April 1971).
