² For a discussion of the former function see the author’s ‘The Public Praising of Christian Benefactors: Romans 13.3–4 and 1 Peter 2.14–15’, JSNT 34 (1988) 87–103.Google Scholar

³ Käsemann, E., An die Römer (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1973) = ET Commentary on Romans (London: SCM, 1980) 345/357Google Scholar: ‘From an apocalyptic standpoint secular courts, thus political authorities, are disparaged and rejected when it is a matter of settling disputes within the community;’ and Barclay, J., ‘Paul's Alternative View of the State’, Third Way 9/11 (11 1986) 7.Google Scholar

⁴ Kριτήριο = ‘a legal cause’, έλάχιστος = ‘smallest’. See n. 6.

⁵ It has been argued that the Corinthian Christians were submitting their cases to Jewish judges (A. Stein, op. cit., 87–8), but in the words of Conzelmann, H., A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (ET Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 105Google Scholar, n. 23 that conclusion is ‘misguided’. See also Fee, G. D., The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1987) 236Google Scholar who notes that Stein's major difficulties arose out of the use of the verb καθίζειν in v. 4 which can mean ‘to appoint a judge’. Fee cites Josephus Ant. 13.75 where the verb is used of plaintiffs asking that a court be convened to hear their arguments. See also Dio Cassius Roman Histories 37.27.1 where one group in a disagreement demanded that their rights be exercised and the court be convened to hear the case (ϊνακαθιζήση); cf. LS ‘to cause an assembly or court’, i.e. to institute proceedings.

Furthermore, in Acts 18.12ff. the Jews had already dragged Paul before Gallio. The animosity engendered by that unsuccessful attempt, in addition to normal division created with the arrival of the Christian message among Jews, made for a lasting break with the synagogue. That makes it extremely unlikely that Christians would have gone for arbitration to a Jewish court which operated under the aegis of the synagogue and was presided over by a Jewish bākām, an official one step below a rabbi in status. See E. Dinkler, op. cit., 171–208 on the Jewish official. On the legal problems raised by Stein, ibid., 88–9 see the most recent treatment by Garnsey, P., ‘The Civil Suit’, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970) Part III.Google Scholar

⁶ On the influence of status and the accepted function of witnesses as partisans in Greece compared with today's perceived role see Todd, S., ‘The Purpose of Evidence in Athenian Courts’, Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society (ed. Cartledge, P., Millett, P. & Todd, S.; Cambridge: CUP, 1990) 27ff.Google Scholar

⁷ Garnsey, P., op. cit., 181Google Scholar. Criminal cases included high treason, embezzlement of state property, bribery at elections, extortion in the provinces, murder by violence or poisoning, endangering of public security, forgery of wills or coins, violent offences, adultery and seduction of reputable unmarried women, see Kunkel, W., An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1973) 66.Google Scholar

⁸ Garnsey, P., op. cit., 182.Google Scholar

⁹ Kelly, J. M., Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966) 62 ifGoogle Scholar. Exceptionally, there were cases where a patron took up the cause of his client, see Garnsey, P., op. cit., 216 n. 4.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Garnsey, P., op. cit., 187.Google Scholar

¹¹ SEG IX. 8, IV ll. 67–69 cited by Ehrenberg, V. and Jones, A. H. M., Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) No. 311, IV ll. 66–68Google Scholar and Braund, D. C., Augustus to Nero: A Sourcebook on Roman History 31 BC-AD 68 (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985) No. 543Google Scholar, D, and discussion in Jones, A. H. M., The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and Principate (Oxford: Blackwells, 1972) 98–100.Google Scholar

¹² Crook, J. A., Law and Life in Rome (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967) 86.Google Scholar

¹³ Sherwin-White, A. N., Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) 14.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Crook, J. A., op. cit., 79Google Scholar. See the Lex Irnitana Chs. 86–89 on the iudex, arbiter and re-cuperatores.

¹⁵ At times compelling an opponent to appear in court could be an extremely difficult task and it was not until the principate of Trajan that penalties were used to ensure that the accused appeared, Garnsey, P., op. cit., 170–1, 193Google Scholar. See P.Oxy 2852 (AD 104/5) for a summons and the initiating of a civil action and 726 (AD 135) 11. 17–20 where a representative was appointed to make the journey to the assize centre because of the illness. The substitute was to represent him whether the case was heard before the prefect, the epistrategus, or other judges, ἕτεροι κριταί.

¹⁶ Garnsey, P., op. cit., 6Google Scholar and Crook, J. A., op. cit., 78–9Google Scholar. Dio Cassius, Roman Histories 52.7.5 notes ‘when one is accused of committing a private wrong, he is made a defendant in a private suit before a jury of his equals … they shall sit in judgement on him’.

¹⁷ Conzelmann, H., op. cit, 104 n. 12Google Scholar and Fee, G. D., op. cit., 232Google Scholar. See also Ayles, H. H. B., ‘I Corinthians VI.1’, ET 27 (1915–1916) 334Google Scholar: ‘the prevailing idea of ἄδικος is not one who acts unfairly to others, but of one who breaks the law of God’; Barrett, C. K., The First Epistle to the Corinthians (London: A. & C. Black, 1971) 135Google Scholar: ἄδικος = ‘non-Christians’ and ἄγιος = ‘Christians’; Vischer, L., op. cit., 9Google Scholar, ‘Das Wort ist nicht im moralischen Sinne gemeint’; Fuller, R. H., op. cit, 98Google Scholar, ‘Neither word (ἄδικος nor ἄγιος) is intended in a moralizing sense.’ Paul's use of δικέω in conjunction with ποστερέω in vv. 7–8 would suggest that the cognate has a moral sense. Certainly in v. 9 the ἄδικοι are connected with moral conduct.

¹⁸ Robinson, D. W. B., op. cit., 3.Google Scholar

¹⁹ SEG IX. 8, A ll. 11–12. Jones, A. H. M., op. cit., 99.Google Scholar

²⁰ P. Fouad 26 (AD 157–159).

²¹ P. Oxy. 2454 ll. 7–8. It is of interest that many of the cases were referred to the friends, φίλοι, of the prefect, i.e. his legal advisers who act as κριταί.

²² Or. 8.9. Στρέφειν was used of a wrestler trying to avoid an adversary and metaphorically of arguments. On the use of the wrestling image for demonstration pieces or declamations see also Philo Det. 41: ‘they will be exhibiting the prowess of men sparring for practice (declamations), not that of men engaged in a real combat [actual debates]’. The young men were declaiming forensic pieces in the courtyard of Poseidon's temple during the Isthmian Games in the hope of securing a case from a plaintiff. For the dating see Jones, C. P., The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge, Mass, and London: Harvard University, 1978) 136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Or. 37.16–17. The contrast is between Greek Corinth as against Roman Corinth.

²⁴ Metamorphoses or The Golden Ass IX.33.

²⁵ SEG IX. 8, A l. 18. See also the Lex Irnitana Ch. 86 where 5,000 sesterces was specified.

²⁶ Suetonius Claudius 15,16.2.

²⁷ P.Ryl. 119 (AD 54–67).

²⁸ P. Fouad 26 11. 21–24.

²⁹ Seneca Contr. 10.1. 2 and 7.

³⁰ P. Oxy. 2745 11. 7–8. On the similar problem of the bribery of juries in Greece see Staveley, E. S., Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972) 108 ff.Google Scholar

³¹ Garnsey, P., op. cit., 4 and 199ff.Google Scholar

³² Suetonius Claudius 15.1.

³³ Crook, J. A., op. cit., 74.Google Scholar

³⁴ Garnsey, P., op. cit., 4.Google Scholar

³⁵ SEG viii 527 (AD 22–23) 11. 9–10.

³⁶ Cicero Pro Caecina 73.

³⁷ ‘Litigation as a Source of inimicitia’ and ‘Litigation as a Manifestation of inimicitia’, Epstein, D. F., Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218–43 BC (London: Croom Helm, 1987) 90–100.Google Scholar

³⁸ Jones, J. W., The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks (OUP, 1956) 151Google Scholar comments on ‘bitter wrangling rather than calm judicial inquiry’. Cf. Dio in his Alexandrian oration where he portrays the character of the first-century judicial scene in the East with ‘a multitude of quarrels and lawsuits, harsh cries, tongues that are mischievous and unrestrained, accusers, calumnies, writs, a hoard of professional pleaders [forensic orators]’, Or. 32.19.

³⁹ Kelly, J. M., Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) 98–9.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid. 98.

⁴¹ Epstein, D. F., op. cit., 91Google Scholar. See also Kelly, J. M., Studies in the Civil Judicature, 102Google Scholar: ‘In Quintilian's manual on rhetoric … we are expressly told that the beginning of a court speech should contain a consideration of the persons involved: and this must involve blackening (infamandam) the person on the other side.’

⁴² In Roman society enmity ‘could be the major impetus of a trial’, Epstein, D. F., op. cit., 102–3.Google Scholar

⁴³ Epstein, D. F., op. cit., 90.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Epstein, D. F., op. cit., 90.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Pro Cluentio 116, Epstein, D. F., op. cit., 95.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Marshall's, P. important work Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians (WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987)Google Scholar ignores 1 Cor 6 in his discussion of enmity in Corinth, although that passage fits well into his hubristic thesis and shows that the attitudes and actions of those who ‘were wise in this world’ were not only reserved for the apostle. Welborn, L. L., ‘On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1–4 and Ancient Polities’, JBL 106/1 (1987) 85–111Google Scholar, whose starting point is politics rather than the model of sophistic leadership as it related to μαθηταί in παιδεία, also ignores 1 Cor 6 where his suggestion has most relevance.

⁴⁷ For evidence see my Philo and Paul among the Sophists: a Hellenistic Jewish and a Christian Response (Macquarie University Ph.D., 1988) 177–95.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ The reasons for so arguing this is because of the established nexus between the various branches of oratory, i.e. declamation and forensic oratory, at the highest level of παιδεία and therefore in the life of secular Corinth. For a general discussion see Clarke, M. L., Higher Education in the Ancient World (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971) 39ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ ‘Biting sarcasm’ according to Fee, G. D., op. cit., 237Google Scholar, where he argues for Paul's use of irony which is seen in a series of questions in this passage.

⁵⁰ For a good example of a handbook of legal cases prepared for pupils by Quintilian see Winterbottom, A., Declamationes pseudo-Quintilianeae: Declamationes minores (Berlin, and New York: de Gruyter, 1984)Google Scholar. It was still used by English pupils of the seventeenth century: see Taylor, J., The Minor Declamations of Quintilian: Being an Excitation or Praxis upon His XII Books, Concerning the Institution of the Orator (London, 1686).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Rhodes, P. J., ‘Political Activity in Classical Athens’, JHS 106 (1986) 137Google Scholar; Crook, J. A., op. cit., 78–9Google Scholar for the Roman period. For Judaism, see Fuller, R. H., ‘Judicial Practices in Judaism’, op. cit., 103–4Google Scholar, and Delcor, M., ‘The Courts of the Church of Corinth and the Courts of Qumran’, Paul and Qumran: Studies in New Testament Exegesis (ed. Murphy-O'Connor, J.; London: G. Chapman, 1968) ch. 4.Google Scholar

⁵² Crook, J. A., op. cit., 78–9Google Scholar citing as an example the Herculaneum Tablets where a person was ‘to be arbitrator by agreement’ between X and Y and was ‘to give a decision’. See also the Lex Irnitana Ch. 86 where the parties by agreement could also have access to an arbiter who was appointed on an annual basis.

⁵³ Contra Robinson, D. W. B., op. cit., 4ffGoogle Scholar. where he suggests that the Jewish Christians had the right to act as judges in the congregation because they were ‘the saints’, i.e. the faithful Jews who had the scriptures.

⁵⁴ His instructions cannot be construed to mean that he was setting up a quasi-permanent court parallel to the Jewish ones. Contra Delcor, M., op. cit., 71Google Scholar although he is careful to argue that similarity does not imply dependence.

⁵⁵ Robinson, D. W. B., op. cit., 6.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Paul uses the same verb, ξουθεῖν in 1.28 and 6.4. For comments of the sophists using a similar synkrisis see Philo Det. 32–34 and my discussion in Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 104ff.

⁵⁷ Fiori, B., ‘“Covert Allusion” in 1 Corinthians 1–4’, CBQ 47 (1985) 85–102Google Scholar. See further the discussion in Philo and Paul among the Sophists 206 ff. which shows how Paul deliberately negates the covertness of that rhetorical device.

⁵⁸ In this passage Paul uses the term κκλησία to mean the actual gathering of Christians in the same way as it was used to refer to a recognized gathering in the secular world, cf. Acts 19.39.

⁵⁹ The place of τοτο δελφούς in the whole sentence lays stress on the Christian status of the defendant. Fee, G. D., op. cit., 239Google Scholar, n. 4 believes that the use of τοτο combines the wronging and cheating together. The continuative use of the single neuter demonstrative pronoun which points to a previous action would suggest that the reference is to cheating.

⁶⁰ For an interesting example of Christians resolving a claim and counter-claim involving a large sum of money and garments in AD 481, see Dewing, H. B., ‘A Dialysis of the Fifth Century AD in the Princeton Collection of Papyri’, AJP 53 (1922) 113–27Google Scholar. They signed a dialysis which was a legal contract recording the settlement between a bishop and two presbyters and a deacon.

⁶¹ Cf. 1 Cor 3.4, κατ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεν.

⁶² Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 209.

⁶³ Contra Robertson, A. and Plummer, A., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary of the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914) 110Google Scholar who suggested that a ‘fair, if rough summary’ of Paul's teaching in the two passages was ‘obey the criminal courts, but do not go out of your way to invoke the civil courts’. However, Paul proscribes the use of the latter.