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An ‘international’ theory of inter-ethnic war*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 1996

Stuart J. Kaufman
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Extract

Over the years, a number of scholars have noted that ethnic groups in violent conflict act much like states in the international system; James O'Connell describes the dynamics as ‘international relations without safeguards’. Brief observations aside, however, few works actually apply International Relations theory to explain large-scale ethnic violence. While the oversight ought to be surprising, it is easily explained in terms of what International Relations theory calls the ‘level of analysis problem’.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , April 1996 , pp. 149 - 171
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1996

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References

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5 The only real exception is Posen, Barry, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35 (1993), pp. 27–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other third-image models, such as Rothchild, Donald, ‘An Interactive Model for State-Ethnic Relations’, in Deng, Francis M. and Zartman, I. William (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, DC, 1991)Google Scholar, are not primarily about large-scale violence; while others, such as Crighton, Elizabeth and Iver, Martha Abele Mac, ‘The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict’, Comparative Politics, 23 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, are only tangentiaily third-image explanations.

6 These definitions are from Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge, 1981), p. 66Google Scholar; and idem, , The Ethnic Origins of Nations (London, 1986), pp. 22–30Google Scholar.

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13 Fears of ethnic extinction need not, of course, be perceptual, even for a majority population. The Israelis, who are a declining majority within their border s and a tiny minority in the region, are one example. The author would like to thank T. V. Paul for pointing out this fact.

14 New York Times, 4 February 1993, p. 1.

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32 One clear case for a security dilemma causing war is Janice Gross Stein, ‘Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo’, and ‘Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem’, in Jervis et al. (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence, pp. 37, 68-9.

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67 Tamara Dragadze, ‘Azerbaijanis’, in G. Smith (ed.), Nationalities Question, p. 177.

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74 Early examinations of Moldovan nationalist mobilization are Crowther, William, ‘The Politics of Mobilization: Nationalism and Reform in Soviet Moldavia’, Russian Review, 50 (April 1991), pp. 183–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Jonathan Eyal, ‘Moldovians’, in G. Smith (ed.), Nationalities Question, pp. 123-41. A treatment of the later ethnic war is Lamont, Neil V., ‘Territorial Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: The Moldovan Case, 1991-March 1993’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 6 (Dec. 1993), pp. 576–612CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75 See Dima, Nicholas, From Moldavia to Moldova (New York, 1991)Google Scholar.

76 See, e.g., Crowther, ‘Politics of Mobilization’, pp. 186-7.

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79 Sovetskaia Moldavia, 4 November 1990.

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