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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2016
Some years ago I called attention to these words of the early thirteenth-century decretalist, Vincentius Hispanus, on the powers of the pope and of the prince: ‘… sit voluntas pro ratione.’ What is the meaning? Did Vincentius hold that the supreme authority was arbitrarily absolute, that the voluntas of the monarch must in all circumstances be accepted as reason itself? Must we believe that he advanced a doctrine of unlimited absolutism — of the pope in the Church and of the emperor in the Empire? And that he anticipated a theory of sovereignty as the authority and powers of the ruler subject neither to the law nor to the laws?
1 See my study ‘Ratione publicae utilitatis, ratio status, und ‘Staatsräson’ (1100–1300),’ in Die Welt als Geschichte 21 (1961) 94 n. 118 — now in my Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100–1322 (Princeton 1964) 302 (henceforth referred to as Studies). Below it will be shown how Ennio Cortese, La norma giuridica (2 vols., Milan 1962–64) has also observed some medieval usages of pro ratione voluntas (II 217, 260f., 277, 296f.), but without any reference to Vincentius Hispanus. There is no treatment of the subject by Walter Ullmann — see below, nn. 18, 27, 43, 45. Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge 1963) 151f., 154, has observed pro ratione voluntas in Guillaume Durantis and Augustinus Triumphus, but assumes that it meant an arbitrary, unlimited absolutism.Google Scholar
2 Sovereignty, transl. by Huntington, J. F. (Cambridge 1957) 209.Google Scholar
3 Sovereignty 170, 209–11.Google Scholar
4 I quote Ramsey's, G. G. translation: Juvenal and Persius, in the Loeb Classical Library.Google Scholar
5 Sovereignty 209.Google Scholar
6 Sovereignty 170.Google Scholar
7 Sovereignty 210f.Google Scholar
8 Sovereignty 209f.Google Scholar
9 Above, at n. 1.Google Scholar
10 Cortese, La norma giuridica II 261 n. 41, referring to Rota, A., ‘L’Apparato di Pillio alle Consuetudines feudorum,’ Studi e memorie per la storia dell'Università di Bologna 14 (1938) 47. Rota's study has not been available to me.Google Scholar
11 D. 1.3.20 Non omnium, and D. 4.2.14.2, and the Glos. ord. thereto.Google Scholar
12 C. 6.57.14: ‘… nullo discrimine in successionibus habito, cum natura utrumque corpus ediderit … quis patiatur … ipsas vero [non] … posse … succedere, sed propter hoc solum puniri, quod feminae natae sunt … ?’Google Scholar
13 C. 6.28.4: ‘… Qui enim tales differentias inducunt, quasi naturae accusatores existunt, cur non totos masculos generavit….’ The gloss of Accursius is in his Apparatus to the Libri feudorum, 1.1.3 ad V. legibus (in the Volumen Legum, vol. 5 of the Corpus Iuris Civilis; Lyon 1604): ‘quid enim peccavit natura, quod masculos non procreavit?’Google Scholar
14 See Cortese, , La norma giuridica II, Indici, S.V. legge, for some meanings of ratio and mens legis — also S.V. mens and ratio.Google Scholar
15 See my article, ‘Bracton on Kingship,’ Tulane Law Review 42 (1968) 519–54, and references therein; also Cortese, op. cit. I 144f., 152–55, II 402f., and Indici, s. VV. principe, voluntas principis.Google Scholar
16 Cortese, op. cit. II 260f. On the placet of the prince see below, nn. 27, 38, 53, 54. No doubt other examples of the usage exist. According to Bartolus, Accursius accepted the same principle — in the Apparatus to Extravagantes 1, Ad reprimendam (a constitutio of Emperor Henry VII, in Volumen Legum). Bartolus quotes Accursius as saying that leges which are ‘mere positive’ are not subject to interpretation in accordance with ‘ratio iuris antiqui’; the ratio of purely positive or human laws is taken from the particular law itself, or from its preface if the ratio is stated in it; also, if the ratio is not apparent, a literal interpretation of the words is necessary (Vol. Legum, Extrav., 133f.).Google Scholar
17 See Kuttner, Stephan, Repertorium der Kanonistik … (Studi e Testi 71; Città del Vaticano 1937) 355–57.Google Scholar
18 On this the literature is abundant, e.g., Walter Ullmann, Medieval Papalism (London 1949), ch. III, esp. pp. 55f. But Watt, J. A., ‘The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century,’ Traditio 20 (1964) 179–317, esp. 211–36, 260–65, does not discuss the decretal Quanto personam. For the text of the decretal see E. A. Friedberg, ed., Corpus Juris Canonici 2 (Leipzig 1881), Decr. Greg. IX 1.7.3; also Friedberg, Quinque compilationes antiquae (Leipzig 1882), Comp. III 1.5.3.Google Scholar
19 No doubt potestas originally; see below at nn. 22 and 23.Google Scholar
20 Vinc, actually refers to a dictum of Gratian, after c.21 Nihil prodest, De poenit., Dist. 3. This is an error; the reference should be to De poenit., Dist 3 c.22 Quamvis — St. Augustine, ‘… quis tamen audeat dicere Deo: “Quare, etc.”’ Significantly, Johannes Teutonicus says ad V. Deo: ‘Vel pape.’ The words ‘contra hoc fac.’ may be related to non disputare (below, n. 49).Google Scholar
21 Bamberg, Staatsbibl., MS Can. 20, fol 104V. On the Appar. of Vine, see Kuttner, Repertorium 356f. For the gloss see also my Studies 302 n. 132.Google Scholar
22 Paris, B.N., MS lat. 3967, fol. 1; my Studies 302 n. 132. For a similar reference to ‘sleepless nights,’ from Auth. 2.2 (Nov. 8), see the Gloss, ord. of Bernard of Parma to Decr. Greg. IX, Prooem., ad V. servus. The duty of the ruler to spend sleepless nights, to be always vigilant, in the interest of State or Church, was a commonplace in the later-twelfth and thirteenth centuries — Justinian's ideal is stated even for Henry II of England. See below, n. 37.Google Scholar
23 MS lat. 3967, fol. 30V. Whether Jo. refers to Joh. Galensis or to Joh. Teutonicus is uncertain, but it is probably Joh. Gal. Trancred gives the same opinion without attribution: ‘In hoc gerit vicem dei. … Item de nichilo facit aliquid ut deus…’: to Comp. III 1.5.3 ad V. dei vicem gerit, in Bamberg, MS Can. 19, fol. 124V.Google Scholar
24 I have not found Juvenal's pro ratione voluntas either in the Policraticus or in the Metalogicon — see the editions by Webb, C. C. J., and the Indexes; also Polier. 4.2.4, 5.2, and 6.25; below at n. 63. Nor does Hans Liebeschütz, Mediaeval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury (Studies of the Warburg Institute 17; London 1950), refer to it.Google Scholar
25 See above, at nn. 3, 5–7.Google Scholar
26 Below, at nn. 43–45, on Tancred and Johannes (Galensis ?); at n. 56 on Bernard of Parma; at n. 59 on Guillaume Durantis.Google Scholar
27 , R. W. and Carlyle, A. J., A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West (Edinburgh and London 1903–1936) I 64 (‘the Emperor's will is law’) — but with qualifications on the subject of the medieval legists, II 56–67, because of the theory of some of them that the powers which the populus or community had conferred upon the emperor could be taken from him, and that the customs of the community could not be arbitrarily overridden by laws promulgated by the emperor. See also Fritz Schulz, ‘Bracton on Kingship,’ English Historical Review 60 (1945) 145, 154f.; and Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton 1957) 103, 150–55. Walter Ullmann assumes that placuit meant an arbitrary voluntas: Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London 1961) 101f., 159, 281, and Index, S.V. voluntas principis; and The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (Baltimore 1966) 72f., 94. (See below, at nn. 38, 53, for the correct interpretation by the late Mrs. Ewart Lewis.) Wilks also assumes that voluntas and placet mean arbitrariness: Problem of Sovereignty (cit. supra, n. 1) 151–54.Google Scholar
28 Carlyle, II 56–67; Ullmann, Principles, Index, S.V. voluntas populi; Cortese, La norma giuridica II chs. 3–5.Google Scholar
29 Bamberg, MS Can. 19, fol 124V, to Comp. III 1.5.3, ad V. dei vicem gerit. It is interesting that he accepts Vincentius' error in the reference — see above, n. 20. The full gloss of Tancred is quoted below, n. 43.Google Scholar
30 Also above, at nn. 21, 23. It is difficult to translate ‘reformare.’ Since in his later opinion Vine, said ‘informare,’ perhaps the meaning of ‘to shape,’ ‘to make use of,’ or ‘use’ or ‘employ’ is better than ‘to reform.’ After all, why should he say that the prince or pope is obligated to ‘reform’ his power, when his power was in theory steadily the same ? Of course, ‘to inform’ might do, in the sense that it was the duty of the ruler to be aware that the real substance or form of his potestas was its end, the public welfare of State or Church.Google Scholar
31 Translation quoted from Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies 104.Google Scholar
32 For details and references see my study, ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (cit. supra, n. 15) 519f., 528–31, 536–42, 544–46.Google Scholar
33 See my Studies 269–82.Google Scholar
34 Ibid. 264–69.Google Scholar
35 On the papal authority and the status Ecclesiae see Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory … (Cambridge 1955) 50–53, and ch. II in general; also my Studies 264–69, and my article ‘Copyists’ Errors and the Problem of Papal Dispensations …’ Studia Gratiana 9 (1966) 361–68.Google Scholar
36 Bamberg, MS. Can. 20, fol. 160.Google Scholar
37 Auth. 2.2 (Nov. 8): ‘Omnes nobis dies ac noctes contingit … degere … pernoctantes, et noctibus sub aequalitate dierum utentes, ut nostri subiecti sub omni quiete consistant … illa agere quaerentes, quae utilitatem nostris subiectis introducendo …’; and Auth. 8.15 (Nov. 115): ‘Nostrae serenitatis sollicitudo remediis invigilat subiectorum, nec cessamus inquirere si quid sit in nostra republica corrigendum. Ideo namque voluntarios labores appetimus, ut quietem aliis praeparemus. Unde ad universorum utilitatem praeparemus….’ The influence of these words on Innocent III and Vincentius is obvious. This imperial piety and duty Justinian repeats elsewhere also: it is always the pious duty of the emperor to rule in accordance with law and justice and for the safety and welfare of all his subjects (see my Studies 361, 417–19).Google Scholar
The duty of the Roman emperor to spend sleepless nights became a commonplace for kings also in the twelfth - fourteenth centuries (see Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies 131. 134, 143, referring to the fourteenth century; for the earlier period, Glos. ord. to Decr. Greg, IX, Prooem., Rex pacificus, ad V. servus — on the pope like the emperor). Bracton speaks of Henry II's ‘sleepless nights passed in formulating the writ of novel disseisin,’ Doris M. Stenton, English Justice … 1066–1215 (Philadelphia 1964) 39, 49. Lady Stenton does not refer to the probable influence of Justinian's words. Cf. above, n. 22.
38 On the placet of the ruler see Ewart Lewis, ‘King above Law ?…’ Speculum 39 (1964) 243 n. 1. On the general development of voluntas and ratio, see below, n. 63; also my Studies, ch. V in general.Google Scholar
39 Gloss in Paris, B.N., MS lat. 15398, fol. 112V, to Comp. III 1.5.3 Quanto personam, ad VV. non puri hominis: ‘Unde potestas eius ultra hominem et citra deum. Celeste enim dicitur arbitrium habere princeps secularis, nedum vicarius iesu christi, ut C. de summa tri. l. i in fi. Nec ei lex posita est, ut ix. Q. iii. aliorum hominum. Ipse est lex, ut e. Q. ipsi sunt, et aut. de consulibus. §. ult. coll. iiij [rather, Auth. Coll. 8]; et quod placet ei lex est, ut Inst. de iure naturali. §. sed quod principi.’Google Scholar
On the glosses to Comp. III in this manuscript (also in Bamberg, MS Can. 19) see Kuttner, Repertorium 356; Franz Gillmann, Der Laurentius Hispanus Apparat zur Comp. III (Mainz 1935); G. Post, ‘The So-Called Laurentius Apparatus…,’ The Jurist 2 (1942) 3–29; and P. Antonio García, O.F.M., Laurentius Hispanus (Roma-Madrid 1956) 73–87. My own thesis, that this Appar. was not compiled by Laurentius, is now supported by Knut W. Nörr, ‘Der Apparat des Laurentius zur Compilatio III,’ Traditio 17 (1961) 542f.
40 On the prince as lex animata and as lex see Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies, Index, S.V. Lex animata. By 1220 a decretist had already compared the pope with the emperor in this respect — Glos. ord. to Decretum, C.9 q.3 c.16 Ipsi sunt: ‘Sicut Imperator est lex animata in terris: ut in authen. de consulibus, in fi. coll. iiii (Auth. 8.6; Nov. 105).’Google Scholar
41 About 1230, on the lex animata of the emperor, Accursius (to Auth. 8.6; Nov. 105 in fi.) granted this, but he refers to C. 1.14.4 Digna vox and D. 1.3.31 Princeps legibus solutus and holds that, while the emperor is above the laws, he should voluntarily submit to them. He reflects the general doctrine of voluntas, that it does not mean arbitrary absolutism.Google Scholar
42 Actually Tancred's words are ‘de iusticia potest tacere iniusticiam.’ See the MS reading below, n. 43. But surely the correct reading is this: ‘de iniusticia potest facere iusticiam.’ Bernard of Parma, to Decr. Greg. IX 1.7.3 Quanto personam, ad vv. veri Dei vicem, gives the correct reading: ‘… Item de iniustitia potest facere iustitiam corrigendo iura et mutando …’Google Scholar
43 I now quote the whole gloss from Bamberg, MS Can. 19, fol. 124v, to Quanto personam, ad vv. dei vicem gerit (Comp. III 1.5.3): ‘In hoc gerit vicem dei quia sedit in loco iesu christi qui est verus deus et verus homo, ut in constit. innocentii “firmiter credimus.” Item de nichilo facit aliquid ut deus. ar. iii. Q. vi. hec quippe (C.3 q.6 c.9), et C. de rei uxo. acc. 1. una in prin. (C. 5.13.1). Item in hoc gerit vicem dei quia plenitudinem potestatis habet in rebus ecclesiasticis, ut ii. Q. vi. decreto (c.10), infra de usu pallii. c.ii (Comp. III 1.7.2 Ad honorem; Decr. Greg. IX 1.8.4). Item quia potest dispensare supra ius et contra ius, ut infra de conce. pre. non vacantis. c.i. (Comp. III 3.8.1 Proposuit; Decr. Greg. IX 3.8.4). Item quia de iusticia potest facere iniustitiam [see above, n. 42] corrigendo ius et mutando, ut in constit. domini Innoc. iii. ut debitus (Decr. Greg. IX 2.28.59), et c. non debet (Decr. Greg. IX 4.14.8). Nec est qui dicat ei cur ita facis, ut de pe. di. iii. §. ex persona [rather, De poenit., Dist. 3, c.22 Quamvis; see above, n. 20]. t.’Google Scholar
The gloss is not adequately analyzed by Ullmann, Medieval Papalism (cit. supra, n.18) 51f., nor by Tierney, Conciliar Theory (cit. supra, n. 35) 88. Watt, ‘Theory of Papal Monarchy’ (cit. supra, n. 18) 263 n. 42, quotes Tancred from another manuscript; his analysis is also incomplete.
44 See text and references above, n. 43.Google Scholar
45 The gloss, perhaps by Galensis, Johannes, is in Bamberg, MS Can. 19, fol. 175v. For the full text see my ‘Copyists’ Errors …’ (cit. supra, n. 35) 378f. Cf. Tierney, Conciliar Theory 88–95, and Ullmann, Medieval Papalism 51–55 (with some exaggeration of the papal power of dispensing). See also above, at n. 23.Google Scholar
46 Above, n. 20.Google Scholar
47 Above, at nn. 29 and 43.Google Scholar
48 C. 1.25.5 Sacrilegii, and C. 9.19.2 Disputare.Google Scholar
49 Gratian's, Dictum, ‘Qui autem,’ following c. 22 Si quis, C.17 q.4, referring to C. 9.19.2 Disputare: ‘… Committunt etiam sacrilegium …, aut qui de principali iudicio disputant. … Similiter de iudicio summi pontificis alicui disputare non licet.’ A late-twelfth-century canonist, Honorius, says in his Distinctiones or Summa decretalium questionum (Paris, B.N., MS lat. 14591, fol. 50): ‘Item ipse [papa] est canon. … Item sacrilegii instar habet de facto pape disputare….’; and the author of a thirteenth-century Summa juris (Monte Cassino, Archivio, MS 396, fol. 57): ‘… magna et ampla est potentia pape, nec de ea disputandum.’ On Honorius see Stephan Kuttner and Eleanor Rathbone, ‘Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth Century,’ Traditio 7 (1949–51) 304–16. On papal heresy and the General Council, see Tierney, Conciliar Theory 42–45 and ch. II.Google Scholar
50 De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. Woodbine, G. E. (New Haven - London 1915–1942) II 33 and II 168f; see Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies 158.Google Scholar
51 See my ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (cit. supra, n. 15) 519–54 for a general treatment and references to Schulz, Tierney, Lewis, and others.Google Scholar
52 Gloss in MS Vat. lat. 1377, fol. 13, to Comp. I. 1, tit. de off. et pot. iud. del., c. Consultationibus, ad v. restituitur: ‘Ergo mortaliter peccat papa si iustitiam negat, vel ad consultationem non respondet … R.’Google Scholar
53 Lewis, , ‘King above Law?’ (cit. supra, n. 38) 243 n. 1; and C. 1.14.8 Humanum. Cf. above, n. 38.Google Scholar
54 See also at nn. 27, 38.Google Scholar
55 Odofredo, For, above, at n. 16.Google Scholar
56 ord., Glos. of Bernard of Parma, in 1558 edn. (Lyon) of Decr. Greg. IX; given in full by Watt, ‘Theory of Papal Monarchy’ (cit. supra, n. 18) 262f., but with no reference to Vincentius as one of the sources — only Tancred is referred to (n. 42). Cf. above, nn. 29, 43.Google Scholar
57 Above, nn. 21, 37, for Vincentius.Google Scholar
58 See Cortes, , La norma giuridica II 296 n. 2; also, for a thorough treatment of limited absolutism in the papalism of Hostiensis, Arturo Rivera Damas, Pensamiento politico de Hostiensis (Zürich 1964) — emphasis on papacy and Empire rather than on the papal authority in the Church itself.Google Scholar
59 Speculum iudiciale (Basel 1574) I.i. De legato, no. 51: the pope has the plenitudo potestatis, ‘… et per omnia potest facere et dicere quicquid placet, auferendo etiam ius suum cui vult: quia non est qui ei dicat, Cur ita facis. … Nam et apud eum est pro ratione voluntas, et quod ei placet, legis habet vigorem….’ Cortese, La norma giuridica II 277, calls attention to this passage; so also Wilks, Problem of Sovereignty (cit. supra, n. 1) 151.Google Scholar
60 Speculum iud., I.i. De dispensationibus; Ullmann, Medieval Papalism 53 n. 1.Google Scholar
61 Novella Com. to Decr. Greg. IX (Venice 1581), I.4a. No. 7: ‘… Dicit Vin. quod magna est eius potestas: sed debet eam conformare publice utilitati …’; nor is pro ratione voluntas mentioned in the comments on 1.7.3 Quanto personam.Google Scholar
62 See my Studies, ch. v in general; on Augustinus Triumphus' extreme papalism and on the emperor's voluntas in Dante, see Wilks, Problem of Sovereignty (cit. supra, n. 1) 154. But Wilks does not consider the whole context of Dante's thought.Google Scholar
63 For John of Salisbury see my Studies 259–61, 513–21; for the legists and canonists, 262–90, 521–55. For Bracton, as well as earlier legists, see my ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (cit. supra, n. 15) 537–44; and my forthcoming article, ‘Bracton as Jurist and Theologian on Kingship.’Google Scholar
The theory of Thomas Aquinas is well presented by McIlwain C. H., Growth of Political Thought (New York 1932) 328: the placet of the prince in legislation should be controlled by reason and the common utility; the will of the ruler must be controlled by reason ‘if it is to bear the character of a law,’ ‘and so the maxim voluntas principis habet vigorem legis is to be understood’ (McIlwain has here created a maxim, but it is fitting); and ‘there is no true will but a rational will’ (p. 329); the prince is legibus solutus with respect to the coercive power (vis coactiva) of the law, but is under the law with respect to its directive force (vis directiva); the prince should subject himself voluntarily to the law.
64 On the standard theories of legislation in the feudal monarchies of the thirteenth century see Carlyle, Medieval Political Theory V, chs. V and VI. For the theories of the legists as reflected in the Glos. ord. of Accursius, see Brian Tierney, ‘ “The Prince is Not Bound by the Laws,”’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 (1963) 397f. Google Scholar
65 Cortese, , La norma giuridica — see Indici, s. vv. legge, mens, ratio, and voluntas — esp. I 245f., 286f., 294f.; II 380, 257–64, 383, 350f., 393f.Google Scholar
66 On this also Lewis, ‘King above Law?’ (cit. supra, n. 38) 243.Google Scholar
67 Stubbs, William, Select Charters …9 (Oxford 1929) 170–73 (assize or statute of Clarendon, ‘de consilio omnium baronum’); 179–81 (the counsel of the barons is not mentioned, but the contents indicate that the royal justices, and no doubt some barons, were consulted). The royal placet and voluntas are thus indicated: (173) ‘Et vult dominus rex quod haec assisa teneatur in regno suo quamdiu ei placuerit’; (179, c.1) ‘… et amodo quamdiu domino placuerit….’ Quamdiu placuerit does notse em to indicate any more arbitrariness in the king's voluntas than the placuerit of the Roman emperor in C. 1.14.8 Humanum (above, at n. 66). It is probable that it means only that the assize or statute will be the law until it is officially rescinded by the king after the proper procedure of consultation with his proceres (justices and barons) takes place. On Henry II's ira et voluntas see J. E. A. Jolliffe, Angevin Kingship (London 1955), ch. IV (where there is no consideration of legal meanings of voluntas); on his placet or placuerit, Doris M. Stenton, English Justice (cit. supra, n. 37) 72. Her interpretation is not based on legal ideas but is good. Wilks, Problem of Sovereignty 152, wrongly assumes that ira et voluntas was ‘an established feature of … monarchies in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.’Google Scholar
68 Glanville, , Tractatus de legibus (ed. and transl. by G. D. H. Hall; London and Edinburgh 1965) 2: saying that ‘quod principi placet, legis habet vigorem’ is a lex, the author explains that English laws, though unwritten, can properly be called leges if they ‘are known to have been promulgated about problems settled in council on the advice of the magnates (proceres) and with the supporting authority of the prince’ (Hall's translation). On Bracton see Lewis, ‘King above Law?’ (cit. supra, n. 38) 240–52, for the texts and for a good discussion of scholarship on the subject (also above, at n. 66).Google Scholar
69 Above, nn. 10–16; again I refer to D. 1.3.20 and the glosses.Google Scholar
70 See my ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (cit. supra, n. 15) 520–54; on honestas, Jacques de Révigny, quoted by Cortese, La norma giuridica I 149.Google Scholar
71 The literature on equity and ratio and on natural reason in the two laws is abundant; see Cortese, La norma giuridica I 287–91, II 350–54, and Indici, s.v. aequitas; also, on John of Salisbury, Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies 94–97.Google Scholar
72 Buisson, Ludwig, König Ludwig IX., der heilige, und das Recht (Freiburg 1954) 66–70 (and ch. 2 in general), 100–30. On the actual practice in England see now Ralph V. Turner, The King and His Courts: The Role of John and Henry III in the Administration of Justice, 1199 – 1240 (Ithaca 1968) 49f., 57–101, also ch. 3.Google Scholar
73 Strayer, J. R., ‘Philip the Fair: A “Constitutional” King,’ American Historical Review 62 (1956) 18–32. Recently Professor Bryce Lyon has attacked this interpretation, holding that Philip's authority was absolute, above the law, and unlimited by such ‘constitutional’ restraints as a general assembly or the laws protecting the rights of his subjects: ‘What made a Medieval King Constitutional,’ in Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson, ed. by T. A. Sandquist and M. R. Powicke (Toronto 1969) 157–75. I accept Strayer's view with perhaps this modification: the royal authority was theoretically absolute in that the final jurisdiction lay in the king, the royal council, and the royal court (the Parlement of Paris); but this means that the king consulted with his council and decided cases in the Parlement; hence, even if counsel and judgments were given in accordance with the king's own initiative and policies (but policies no doubt sometimes resulted from the advice given by the royal counsellors), the king did not rule by his own arbitrary voluntas, but by the final right vested in his public authority to decide after proper consultation and judgment in the Parlement. (In most cases appealed to the Parlement the decision was made by the royal justices without the king's intervention; but always, legally, formally, the Parlement was the king's court, and its decisions were the king's also.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
74 See the Glos. ord. of Accursius ad v. sacris; and my Studies 284–87, 379f.Google Scholar
75 My Studies, Introduction and ch. v.Google Scholar
76 Lewis, , ‘King above Law?’ (cit. supra, n. 38) 262; Schulz, ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (cit. supra, n. 27) 173; and Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies 158. In these studies facta is not explained, although Kantorowicz (158 n. 209) gives the Roman origin of non disputare (C. 9.29.2). I have touched on the problem in my ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (cit. supra, n. 15) 524; but a detailed study of facta is needed, and I am preparing what I hope is a legally and historically sound one.Google Scholar
77 Stubbs, Select Charters 9 395–97.Google Scholar
78 See my Studies ch. x, Part 2; also, on the king of France as princeps in his regnum (ca. 1250), see Robert Feenstra, ‘Jean de Blanot et la formule “Rex Franciae in regno suo princeps est,”’ in Études d'histoire du droit canonique; dédiées à Gabriel Le Bras (Paris 1965) II 885–895; and, most recently on the French king as imperator and sovereign both over the kingdom and over its coastal waters, Fredric L. Cheyette, ‘The Sovereign and the Pirates, 1332’ Speculum 45 (1970) 40–68.Google Scholar
79 On C. 9.29.2 see Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies 158n., 209.Google Scholar
80 Casus to C. 1.25.5 Sacrilegii — in edns. of the Corpus Juris Civilis with the Glos. ord. of Accursius.Google Scholar
81 C. 6.23 De testamentis 19 Omnium; also the Glos. ord. thereto.Google Scholar
82 C. 6.23.3 Ex imperfecto, and D. 1.3.31 Princeps; and the glosses to C. 6.23.3 and 19. On certa scientia see Cortese, La norma giuridica, II, Indici, s.v. scientia.Google Scholar
83 Turner, , King and His Courts (cit. supra, n. 72) 49f., 110f.Google Scholar
84 My Studies 279f., 320f.Google Scholar
85 I accept the interpretation of Hinsley, F. H., Sovereignty (London 1966) 120–25. De Jouvenel offers a similar conclusion, that according to Bodin there must be a supreme power in the state to make the laws and invest the magistrates, ‘a power which is itself subject to no law other than the laws of God and nature’ (Sovereignty 183); and sovereignty must be good, voluntas limited by ratio (169f.).Google Scholar
86 ‘Princips non est sub lege fori, est tamen sub lege poli,’ quoted by Cortese, La norma giuridica I 150. This surely expresses the same idea (though nearly a century later) that Bracton expressed in his famous statement: ‘Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem’; for the influence of D. 1.3.31 and C. 1.14.4 and other sources on Bracton see my ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (cit. supra, n. 15) 519–25, with references; also Kantorowicz, King's Two Bodies 143–64.Google Scholar
