¹ While not a subjectivist in his ethics Hayek clearly does not think, following Hume, that reason is capable of formulating an objective set of moral principles. Instead he argues that a process of evolution will select out those moral rules most conducive to prosperity and progress. See his The Fatal Conceit (London: Routledge, 1988).Google Scholar

² Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 32–3.Google Scholar

³ For a discussion of autonomy, see Griffin, J., Well Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)Google Scholar, Ch. xi. Also, Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Chs. 14 and 15.Google Scholar

⁴ For a standard account of the market's co-ordinating properties, see 1. Kirzner, , Competition and Entrepreneurship (University of Chicago Press, 1973)Google Scholar. The market as a co-ordinating mechanism should be distinguished from perfectly competitive equilibrium, see Barry, N. P., The Invisible Hand in Economics and Politics (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1988).Google Scholar

⁵ Nevertheless, what is valuable must presumably be desired by somebody. The perfectionist argument is that value ought not to be equated with the satisfaction of immediate desires and, further, that objects of desire ought not to be considered equally valuable.

⁶ See Raz, , The Morality of Freedom, 114–17Google Scholar, for a valuable discussion of this point. A large part of this section has been very much influenced by Raz's excellent book.

⁷ Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 310–15Google Scholar and Dworkin, R., ‘Equality of Resources’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1981), 283–345Google Scholar. The liberal egalitarianism of both Rawls and Dworkin seems to derive from the view that unequal earnings that emerge from exercise of natural talents constitute a form of ‘rental’, or unearned income, to which the recipient has no moral entitlement.

⁸ See, for example, Simons, H. C., Economic Policy for a Free Society (University of Chicago Press, 1948).Google Scholar

⁹ Raz, , The Morality of Freedom, 162.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Oakeshott, M., ‘The Character of a Modern European State’, in On Human Conduct (Oxford University Press, 1975), 185–326.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Friedman, D., The Machinery of Freedom (New York: Arlington, 1973)Google Scholar and Rothbard, M., The Ethics of Liberty (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982)Google Scholar. It should be pointed out that Rothbard is not a subjectivist in ethics; he believes that an objective natural law is the ultimate foundation of anarcho-capitalism, see Ethics of Liberty, 1–26.Google Scholar

¹² For an introduction to public good theory, see y. Ng, Welfare Economics (London: Macmillan, 1979).Google Scholar

¹³ However, see Coase, R. H., ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1960), 1–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a theory of how conventional‘externalities’ may be ‘internalised’ within the rules of a common law system.

¹⁴ It is this point which gives ‘anarcho-capitalism’ some intellectual plausibility, however remote the doctrine might be from political reality; see Barry, N. P., On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism (London: Macmillan, 1986), Ch. 9.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, Brittan, S., ‘The Economic Contradictions of Democracy’, British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1971), 129–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ J. Schumpeter was the first to make this comparison; see his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 5th ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976).Google Scholar

¹⁷ For communitarian critique of individualism, see Sandel, M., ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ ‘The Inadequacies of Rootless Liberalism’, The Independent (4 02 1989)Google Scholar. For a thorough analysis, see Macintyre, A., Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).Google Scholar

¹⁹ A further individualist implication of this is that such government action might itself increase the propensity to riot.

²⁰ This change has often been levelled against Rawl's contractarianism, see Barry, B., The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), Ch. 9.Google Scholar

²¹ Nozick, , Anarchy, State and Utopia, 178–82.Google Scholar

²² Buchanan, J., The Limits of Liberty (University of Chicago, 1975), Ch. 2.Google Scholar

²³ Hayek, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), 89–91.Google Scholar

²⁴ Libertarians who take this view normally concentrate on land: this is a non-augmentable resource which yields a rent to its lucky owners. The early Herbet Spencer believed that the existing distribution of holdings was unjust; see his Social Statics (London: William and Norgate, 1854).Google Scholar

²⁵ Sen, A. K., ‘The Moral Standing of the Market’, in Ethnics and Economics, Paul, Ellen Frankel, Miller, Fred and Paul, Jeffrey (eds), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 1–19.Google Scholar

²⁶ Nozick, , Anarchy, State and Utopia, 177.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Barry, , On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism, Ch. 8.Google Scholar

²⁸ For Buchanan's political philosophy, see The Limits of Liberty, and also his Freedom in Constitutional Contract (Austin: A & M University Press, 1977)Google Scholar. For a critique, see Barry, N. P., ‘Agreement, Unanimity and Liberalism’, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 579–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ Buchanan argues that rational individuals would be more likely to chose the two thirds majority rule than simple majority rule because, although it would harm their interests on some occasions, over a run of political decisions, its application would produce collective benefits; see his Nobel Prize Lecture, ‘The Constitution of Economic Policy’, American Economic Review, LXXVII (1987), 243–50.Google Scholar

³⁰ For an intriguing development of these ideas, see Sugden, R., The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).Google Scholar