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Two Theories of Names

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2010

Gabriel M. A. Segal
Gabriel M. A. Segal
Affiliation:
King's College, London
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Extract

The aim of this paper is to assess the relative merits of two accounts of the semantics of proper names. The enterprise is of particular interest because the theories are very similar in fundamental respects. In particular, they can agree on three major features of names: names are rigid designators; different co-extensive names can have different cognitive significance; empty proper names can be meaningful. Neither theory by itself offers complete explanations of all three features. But each theory is consistent with them and goes some way towards explaining them.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 51 , March 2002 , pp. 75 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2002

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