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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2017
EU external relations law – Court of Justice of the European Union – Common Foreign and Security Policy – Judicial actors – International courts – Jurisdiction – EU law – Primacy – Damages – Infringements – Direct actions – Preliminary references – the Opinion procedure – Staffing – Future scenarios
Assistant Professor of Law, Aarhus University, Denmark. Email: gb@law.au.dk. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the ‘Access to Justice and Restrictive Measures in the Context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ conference at the University of Luxembourg in May 2017, and the International Society of Public Law (ICON-S) ‘Courts, Power, Public Law’ conference at the University in Copenhagen, Denmark in July 2017. The author wishes to thank Stanislas Adam, Andrés Delgado Casteleiro, Mauro Gatti, Xavier Groussot, Stian Øby Johansen, Helle Krunke, Mirka Kuisma, Joachim Munkstrup, Eleftheria Neframi, Jed Odermatt, Sara Poli, Allan Rosas, Robert Schütze, Peter Van Elsuwege, Bart Van Vooren, Ramses A. Wessel, and the anonymous reviewers for all their comments and discussion. The usual author disclaimer applies.
1 Hillion, C. and Wessel, R.A., ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’, in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart Publishing 2008) p. 112 Google Scholar.
2 Art. 24(1) TEU, second para.: ‘The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures…’
3 Opinion of AG Wahl in ECJ 19 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:212, H v Council of the European Union, paras. 38 and 45. See also R.A. Wessel, ‘Lex Imperfecta: Law and Integration in European Foreign and Security Policy’, 1 European Papers (2016) p. 439.
4 Art. 24(1) TEU, second para.: ‘…The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.’
5 Dougan, M., ‘What Are We to Make of the Citizens’ Initiative?’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 1807 at p. 1837CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 GC 10 May 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:323, Michael Efler v European Commission.
7 Art. 23 TEU: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to this Chapter, shall be guided by the principles, shall pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1.’
8 Art. 275 TFEU: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions. However, the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of the Treaty on European Union and to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union’.
9 See Wessel, R.A., ‘The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly Coherent Framework of Action and Interpretation’, 5 EuConst (2009) p. 117 at p. 133Google Scholar.
10 For example, see Garbagnati Ketvel, M.-G., ‘The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2006) p. 77 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gosalbo-Bono, R., ‘Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) p. 337 Google Scholar.
11 Koutrakos, P., ‘Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations: Moving Away from the Big Picture’, 33 European Law Review (2008) p. 666 at p. 683Google Scholar.
12 Art. 19 TEU.
13 See Hillion, C., ‘A Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds.), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing 2014)Google Scholar.
14 ECJ 24 June 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (‘Mauritius’).
15 ECJ 12 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:753, Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo.
16 ECJ 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
17 ECJ 19 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:569, H v Council of the European Union.
18 ECJ 28 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:236, PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury.
19 Mauritius, supra n. 14, para. 70.
20 De Baere, G. and Van den Sanden, T., ‘Interinstitutional Gravity and Pirates of the Parliament on Stranger Tides: The Continued Constitutional Significance of the Choice of Legal Basis in Post-Lisbon External Action’, 12 EuConst (2016) p. 85 at p. 110Google Scholar.
21 Van Elsuwege, P., ‘Securing the Institutional Balance in the Procedure for Concluding International Agreements: European Parliament v. Council (Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius)’, 52 Common Market Law Review (2015) p. 1379 at p. 1389CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 ECJ 14 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:435, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (‘Tanzania’).
23 See Thym, D., ‘Transfer Agreements for Pirates Concluded by the EU – a Case Study on the Human Rights Accountability of the Common Security and Defence Policy’, in P. Koutrakos and A. Skordas (eds.), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2014)Google Scholar; Ott, A., ‘The Legal Bases for International Agreements Post-Lisbon: Of Pirates and The Philippines’, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2014) p. 739 Google Scholar; Van Der Mei, A.P., ‘EU External Relations and Internal Inter-Institutional Conflicts: The Battlefield of Article 218 TFEU’, 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2016) p. 1051 Google Scholar.
24 Art. 218(10) TFEU: ‘The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure.’
25 Sánchez-Tabernero, S.R., ‘The Choice of Legal Basis and the Principle of Consistency in the Procedure for Conclusion of International Agreements in CFSP Contexts: Parliament v. Council (Pirate-Transfer Agreement with Tanzania)’, 54 Common Market Law Review (2017) p. 899 at p. 919Google Scholar.
26 Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo, supra n. 15.
27 GC 4 June 2013, ECLI:EU:T:2013:292, Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo, para. 45.
28 Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo, supra n. 15, para. 49.
29 H v Council of the European Union, supra n. 17.
30 GC 10 July 2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:702, H v Council of the European Union.
31 Wessel, R.A., The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (Kluwer Law International 1999) p. 302 Google Scholar.
32 Van Elsuwege, P., ‘Upholding the Rule of Law in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: H v. Council’, 54 Common Market Law Review (2017) p. 841 at p. 850Google Scholar.
33 Barring an honourable exception, O’Leary, S., ‘Accession by the European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights—The Opinion of the ECJ’, European Human Rights Law Review (1996) p. 362 at p. 366Google Scholar.
34 ECJ 28 March 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140, Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
35 Council of Europe and European Commission, ‘Fifth Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (Council of Europe 2013) 47+1(2013)008rev2.
36 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 16, para. 251.
37 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 16, para. 252.
38 Eckes, C., ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Consequences of the Court’s Extended Jurisdiction’, 22 European Law Journal (2016) p. 492 at p. 493Google Scholar; Butler, G., ‘Attacking or Defending? Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, 19 Europarättslig Tidskrift (2016) p. 671 at p. 680Google Scholar.
39 PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra n. 18.
40 For example, the Kadi I and Kadi II sagas. See, amongst others, J. Kokott and C. Sobotta, ‘The Kadi Case––Constitutional Core Values and International Law––Finding the Balance?’, in Cremona and Thies, supra n. 13; De Búrca, G., ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’, 51 Harvard International Law Journal (2010) p. 1 Google Scholar; Avbelj, M. et al. (eds), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial (Routledge 2014)Google Scholar.
41 See Cardwell, P.J., ‘The Legalisation of European Union Foreign Policy and the Use of Sanctions’, 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2015) p. 287 Google Scholar.
42 For example, Eckes, C., EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case of Individual Sanctions (Oxford University Press 2009)Google Scholar.
43 GC 12 December 2006, ECLI:EU:T:2006:384, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council of the European Union.
44 Notably, however, the General Court noted it did not have the jurisdiction to review the CFSP Common Position. Eckes, C., ‘Case T-228/02, Organisation Des Modjahedines Du Peuple d’Iran v. Council and UK (OMPI)’, 44 Common Market Law Review (2007) p. 1117 at p. 1118Google Scholar. However, CFSP Common Positions no longer exist since the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, and thus, are now simply CFSP Decisions.
45 GC 2 June 2009, ECLI:EU:T:2007:207, Jose Maria Sison v Council of the European Union, and GC 11 July 2007, ECLI:EU:T:2007:211, Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council of the European Union.
46 See Gazzini, T. and Herlin-Karnell, E., ‘Restrictive Measures Adopted by the EU from the Standpoint of International and EU Law’, 36 European Law Review (2011) p. 798 Google Scholar.
47 Hinarejos, A., Judicial Control in the European Union: Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillars (Oxford University Press 2009) p. 151 Google Scholar.
48 ECJ 27 February 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:116, Segi, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga v Council of the European Union. See Peers, S, ‘Salvation Outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and Segi Judgments’, 44 Common Market Law Review (2007) p. 883 Google Scholar; Eckes, C., ‘How Not Being Sanctioned by a Community Instrument Infringes a Person’s Fundamental Rights: The Case of Segi’, 17 King’s Law Journal (2006) p. 144 Google Scholar.
49 ECJ 31 March 1971, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities (European Agreement on Road Transport) (‘ERTA’) and ECJ 20 March 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:164, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.
50 ECJ 13 September 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:542, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union (‘Environmental Criminal Penalties’). See Spinellis, D., ‘Court of Justice of the European Communities: Judgment of 13 September 2005 (Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council) Annulling the Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law’, 2 EuConst (2006) p. 293 Google Scholar.
51 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 16, para. 251.
52 Case T-715/14, Rosneft and Others v Council.
53 PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra n. 18.
54 Art. 54, para. 3 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union: ‘Where the Court of Justice and the General Court are seised of cases in which the same relief is sought, the same issue of interpretation is raised or the validity of the same act is called in question, the General Court may, after hearing the parties, stay the proceedings before it until such time as the Court of Justice has delivered judgment or, where the action is one brought pursuant to Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, may decline jurisdiction so as to allow the Court of Justice to rule on such actions. In the same circumstances, the Court of Justice may also decide to stay the proceedings before it; in that event, the proceedings before the General Court shall continue.’
55 Pech, L. and Ward, A., ‘Article 47 – Right to an Effect Remedy and to a Fair Trial (Effective Judicial Remedies before the Court of Justice)’, in S. Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart Publishing 2014) p. 1248 Google Scholar.
56 PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra n. 18, para. 67. In doing so, it cited ECJ 15 February 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:101, Nachi Europe GmbH v Hauptzollamt Krefeld, paras. 35 and 36, and, ECJ 29 June 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:382, Criminal proceedings against E and F, paras. 45 and 46, as reference points.
57 PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra n. 18, para. 67.
58 PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra n. 18, paras. 126–130.
59 ECJ 9 March 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:90, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. See Ross, M.G., ‘Limits on Using Article 177 EC’, 19 European Law Review (1994) p. 640 Google Scholar.
60 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, supra n. 59, para. 18.
61 PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra n. 18, para. 81.
62 See Pech, L., ‘Between Judicial Minimalism and Avoidance: The Court of Justice’s Sidestepping of Fundamental Constitutional Issues in Römer and Dominguez’, 49 Common Market Law Review (2012) p. 1841 Google Scholar.
63 Case T-715/14, Rosneft and Others v Council.
64 Juenger, F.K., ‘Forum Shopping, Domestic and International’, 63 Tulane Law Review (1989) p. 553 at p. 553Google Scholar.
65 ECJ 14 December 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689, Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd.
66 Maher, I., ‘Competition Law Modernization: An Evolutionary Tale?’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 733 Google Scholar.
67 Segi, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga v Council of the European Union, supra n. 48.
68 Eckes, C, ‘Sanctions against Individuals: Fighting Terrorism within the European Legal Order’, 4 EuConst (2008) p. 205 at p. 212Google Scholar.
69 For a critical view, see Alemanno, A. and Pech, L., ‘Thinking Justice Outside the Docket: A Critical Assessment of the Reform of the EU’s Court System’, 54 Common Market Law Review (2017) p. 129 Google Scholar.
70 L 341/14. Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 Amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
71 Regan, E., ‘The Treaty of Nice’, 6 The Bar Review (2001) p. 205 at p. 206Google Scholar.
72 Although, they are not obligatory. See Rosas, A., ‘Oral Hearings before the European Court of Justice’, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2014) p. 596 at p. 598Google Scholar.
73 For the short and long history, see Rasmussen, H., ‘Why Is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plaintiffs?’, 5 European Law Review (1980) p. 112 Google Scholar; Jacobs, F., ‘Access by Individuals to Judicial Review in EU Law: Still an Issue of Concern?’, in H. Koch et al. (eds), Europe. The New Legal Realism: Essays in Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen (Djøf Publishing 2010)Google Scholar.
74 See Sarmiento, D., ‘The Reform of the General Court: An Exercise in Minimalist (but Radical) Institutional Reform’, 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2017) p. 1 Google Scholar.
75 Albors-Llorens, A., ‘Changes in the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice under the Treaty of Amsterdam’, 35 Common Market Law Review (1998) p. 1273 Google Scholar; N. Fennelly, ‘Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice Following the Entry into Force of the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (1999) European Parliament: Liberty, Security, Justice: An Agenda for Europe, Working Document, Civil Liberties Series, LIBE 106 EN 19.
76 For the most comprehensive study, see Hinarejos, supra n. 47.
77 See Gill-Pedro, E. and Groussot, X., ‘The Duty of Mutual Trust in EU Law and the Duty to Secure Human Rights: Can the EU’s Accession to the ECHR Ease the Tension?’, 35 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2017) p. 258 at p. 273CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
78 Council of Europe and European Commission, supra n. 35.
79 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 16. For a selection of literature, see de Witte, B. and Imamović, Š., ‘Opinion 2/13 on Accession to the ECHR: Defending the EU Legal Order against a Foreign Human Rights Court’, 40 European Law Review (2015) p. 683 Google Scholar; Douglas-Scott, S., ‘Autonomy and Fundamental Rights: The ECJ’s Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the EU to the ECHR’, 19 Europarättslig Tidskrift (2016) p. 29 Google Scholar; Halleskov Storgaard, L., ‘EU Law Autonomy versus European Fundamental Rights Protection – On Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR’, 15 Human Rights Law Review (2015) p. 485 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eeckhout, P., ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?’, 38 Fordham International Law Journal (2015) p. 955 Google Scholar; Besselink, L.F.M. et al., ‘A Constitutional Moment: Acceding to the ECHR (or Not)’, 11 EuConst (2015) p. 2 Google Scholar; Lock, T., ‘The Future of the European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: Is It Still Possible and Is It Still Desirable?’, 11 EuConst (2015) p. 239 Google Scholar; Łazowski, A. and Wessel, R.A., ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union to the ECHR’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 179 Google Scholar; Polakiewicz, J., ‘Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – An Insider’s View Addressing One by One the CJEU’s Objections in Opinion 2/13’, 36 Human Rights Law Journal (2016) p. 10 Google Scholar.
80 Art. 6(2) TEU: ‘The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.’
81 See, Neuwahl, N., ‘Editorial Comment: Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights – Foreign Policy Implications’, 20 European Foreign Affairs Review (2015) p. 155 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Butler, G., ‘The Ultimate Stumbling Block? The Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights’, 39 Dublin University Law Journal (2016) p. 229 Google Scholar.
82 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 16, para. 252.
83 Art. 51(1) of the Charter: ‘The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.’
84 ECJ 7 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, para. 21.
85 ECJ 19 December 1968, ECLI:EU:C:1968:54, SpA Salgoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade, Rome.
86 Hofmann, H.C.H., ‘Article 47 – Right to an Effect Remedy and to a Fair Trial (Specific Provisions) (Meaning)’, in S. Peers et al., supra n. 56, p. 1212 Google Scholar.
87 C 364/1. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01).
88 For example, see Wouters, J., ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – Some Reflections on Its External Dimension’, 8 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2001) p. 3 Google Scholar.
89 Art. 47 of the Charter (Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial): ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice’.
90 ‘Editorial: After Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni’, 9 EuConst (2013) p. 169 at p. 171.
91 De Búrca, G., ‘The Domestic Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 49 Irish Jurist (2009) p. 56 Google Scholar.
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93 Lenaerts, K. and Gutiérrez-Fons, J.A., ‘The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice’, in Peers et al., supra n. 56, p. 1572 Google Scholar.
94 PJSC Rosneft Oil Co v Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra n. 18, para. 74.
95 Arnull, A., ‘Does the Court of Justice Have Inherent Jurisdiction?’, 27 Common Market Law Review (1990) p. 683 at p. 700Google Scholar.
96 Cremona, M., ‘The Union’s External Action: Constitutional Perspectives’, in G. Amato et al. (eds.), Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution: Commentary on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in the light of the travaux préparatoires and future prospects (Bruylant 2007) p. 1194 Google Scholar.
97 ECJ 15 July 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.
98 Van Elsuwege, P., ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) p. 987 at p. 989Google Scholar.
99 ECJ 9 March 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA. See Usher, J.A., ‘The Primacy of Community Law’, 3 European Law Review (1978) p. 214 Google Scholar.
100 Although it was put into the Constitution for Europe. See Cramér, P., ‘Does the Codification of the Principle of Supremacy Matter?’, in J. Bell and C. Kilpatrick (eds.), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2004–2005: Volume 7 (Hart Publishing 2006)Google Scholar. The treaty never made it into force, and was abandoned in the Treaty of Lisbon, barring a note in a Declaration. For a healthy discussion on primacy in the context of the Constitution for Europe, see ‘Editorial: The CFSP under the EU Constitutional Treaty? Issues of Depillarisation’, 42 Common Market Law Review (2005) p. 325.
101 Declaration (No. 17) concerning primacy: ‘The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law.’
102 Larik, J., Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2016) p. 186 Google Scholar.
103 Cremona, M., ‘The Two (or Three) Treaty Solution: The New Treaty Structure of the EU’, in A. Biondi et al. (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 53 Google Scholar.
104 Declaration (No. 13) concerning the common foreign and security policy, and Declaration (No. 14) concerning the common foreign and security policy.
105 Other such policies of a parallel nature include development cooperation and humanitarian aid: A. Delgado Casteleiro, The International Responsibility of the European Union: From Competence to Normative Control (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 29.
106 See Neframi, E., ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking Its Scope through Its Application in the Field of EU External Relations’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) p. 323 Google Scholar; Hillion, C., ‘Mixity and the Coherence in EU External Relations: The Significance of the “Duty of Cooperation”’, in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing 2010)Google Scholar. Albeit, the duty was originally considered more flexible in practice: see Hyett, S., ‘The Duty of Co-Operation: A Flexible Concept’, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), The General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet and Maxwell 2000)Google Scholar.
107 Art. 24(3) TEU furthermore states, ‘… The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.’
108 De Baere, G., Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford University Press 2008) p. 203 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
109 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 16, para. 167.
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112 Thies, A., International Trade Disputes and EU Liability (Cambridge University Press 2013) p. 76 Google Scholar.
113 Art 268 TFEU: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second and third paragraphs of Article 340’, and Art. 340 TFEU: ‘The contractual liability of the Union shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract in question. In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. Notwithstanding the second paragraph, the European Central Bank shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by it or by its servants in the performance of their duties. The personal liability of its servants towards the Union shall be governed by the provisions laid down in their Staff Regulations or in the Conditions of Employment applicable to them’.
114 Gutman, K., ‘Liability for Breach of EU Law by the Union, Member States and Individuals: Damages, Enforcement and Effective Judicial Protection’, in A. Łazowski and S. Blockmans (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law (Edward Elgar 2016) p. 445 Google Scholar.
115 See generally, Wils, W., ‘Concurrent Liability of the Community and a Member State’, 17 European Law Review (1992) p. 191 Google Scholar; furthermore, Craig, P., EU Administrative Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2012) pp. 698-702 Google Scholar.
116 For example, see GC 7 June 2004, ECLI:EU:T:2004:171, Segi v Council of the European Union; GC 28 May 2013, ECLI:EU:T:2013:273, Mohamed Trabelsi v Council of the European Union, para. 48, where the General Court said the claim was damages was ‘manifestly inadmissible’; and, GC 17 February 2012, ECLI:EU:T:2012:82, Habib Roland Dagher v Council of the European Union.
117 Hillion, supra n. 13, p. 51.
118 Van Gerven, W., ‘The Legal Protection of Private Parties in the Law of the European Economic Community’, in F.G. Jacobs (ed.), European Law and the Individual (North Holland 1976) p. 14 Google Scholar.
119 Thies, A., ‘General Principles in the Development of EU External Relations Law’, in Cremona and Thies (eds.), supra n. 13, p. 150 Google Scholar.
120 See Cremona, M., ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’, 40 Common Market Law Review (2003) p. 1347 Google Scholar.
121 Lenaerts, K. and Corthaut, T., ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’, 31 European Law Review (2006) p. 287 at p. 314Google Scholar.
122 ECJ 27 February 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:115, Gestoras Pro Amnistía, Juan Mari Olano Olano and Julen Zelarain Errasti v Council of the European Union, and Segi, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga v Council of the European Union, supra n. 48. The damages points by the Court here are ‘practically identical’; Lenaerts, K., ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’, 44 Common Market Law Review (2007) p. 1625 at p. 1630Google Scholar.
123 Gutman, K., ‘The Evolution of the Action for Damages against the European Union and Its Place in the System of Judicial Protection’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 695 at p. 701Google Scholar.
124 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 16, para. 133.
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126 GC 9 November 2016, ECLI:EU:T:2016:660, Liam Jenkinson v Council of the European Union.
127 L 245/17. Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the Establishment of the European Defence Agency.
128 Case T-286/15, KF v CSUE, pending.
129 L 200/5. Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the Establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre (2001/555/CFSP).
130 L 266/55. Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 Defining the Statute, Seat and Operational Rules of the European Defence Agency.
131 L 276/1. Council Decision 2009/747/CFSP of 14 September 2009 Concerning the Staff Regulations of the European Union Satellite Centre.
132 L 39/44. Staff Regulations of the European Union Satellite Centre’; ‘L 235/28. Staff Regulations of the European Union Satellite Centre.
133 See the views of one member of the General Court in Öberg, U. et al., ‘On Increased Specialisation at the General Court of the European Union’, in M. Derlén and J. Lindholm (eds), The Court of Justice of the European Union: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing Google Scholar, forthcoming).
134 L 301/33. Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union Military Operation to Contribute to the Deterrence, Prevention and Repression of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery off the Somali Coast.
135 L 122/31. Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med). See G. Butler and M. Ratcovich, ‘Operation Sophia in Uncharted Waters: European and International Law Challenges for the EU Naval Mission in the Mediterranean Sea’, 85 Nordic Journal of International Law (2016) p. 235.
136 De Baere, G., ‘European Integration and the Rule of Law in Foreign Policy’, in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 369 Google Scholar.
137 Art. 258 TFEU.
138 Art. 259 TFEU.
139 Art. 24(1) TEU, second para.
140 McDonagh, B., Original Sin in a Brave New World: The Paradox of Europe: An Account of the Negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Institute of European Affairs 1998) p. 113 Google Scholar.
141 Feld, W., The Court of the European Communities: New Dimension in International Adjudication (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1964) p. 34 Google Scholar.
142 For example, see Art. 21 TEU for the general provisions on the Union’s external action.
143 See de Witte, B., ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process’, in P. Beaumont et al. (eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart Publishing 2002)Google Scholar.
144 GC 17 June 1998, ECLI:EU:T:1998:127, Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council of the European Union and GC 19 July 1999, ECLI:EU:T:1999:157, Heidi Hautala v Council of the European Union, followed on appeal in ECJ 6 December 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:661, Council of the European Union v Heidi Hautala.
145 Mauritius, supra n. 14, para. 70.
146 ECJ 19 July 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:472, European Parliament v Council of the European Union (‘Smart Sanctions’).
147 Called ‘PESCalised’ in an English-French amalgamation. Hillion, C., ‘Fighting Terrorism through the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds.), EU Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and Crises (Brill 2014) p. 83 Google Scholar.
148 Art. 21 TEU. Akin to ‘motherhood and apple pie’: Dashwood, A. et al., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 6th edn (Hart Publishing 2011) p. 903 Google Scholar.
149 Art. 13 TEU: ‘The Union shall have an institutional framework…’
150 Lenaerts, K., ‘The Basic Constitutional Charter of a Community Based on the Rule of Law’, in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) p. 309 Google Scholar.
151 Paladini, L., ‘The European Charter of Fundamental Rights After Lisbon: A “Timid” Trojan Horse in the Domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy?’, in G. Di Federico (ed.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Springer 2011) p. 284 Google Scholar.
152 See the approach taken in Van Gerven, W., ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 Common Market Law Review (2000) p. 501 at p. 502CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
153 Lenaerts, K. et al., EU Procedural Law, 3rd edn (ed. Janek Tomasz Nowak, Oxford University Press 2014) p. 458 Google Scholar.
154 ECJ 22 October 1987, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost. See Arnull, A., ‘National Courts and the Validity of Community Acts’, 13 European Law Review (1988) p. 125 Google Scholar.
