Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T20:02:18.768Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Introduction to the Oliver E. Williamson memorial issue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Richard N. Langlois
Richard N. Langlois*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, The University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT06269-1063USA
*
Corresponding author. Email: Richard.Langlois@UConn.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Oliver E. Williamson, who died on May 21, 2020 at the age of 87, was one of the most influential social scientists of modern times. In 2009, he was co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics. As of mid-October 2021, he had been cited an astonishing 317,838 times according to Google Scholar. His measured influence outdistances that of even his fellow Nobel Laureates Elinor Ostrom (230,667), Douglass C. North (187,577) and Ronald H. Coase (123,686). This special issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics brings together a distinguished roster of scholars to remember Williamson, to elucidate some of his key ideas and influences, and to extend the reach of his ideas to new arenas.

Keywords

Antitrustcapabilitiesrelational contractstransaction costsvertical integration
Type
Introduction
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , April 2022 , pp. 175 - 180
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Millennium Economics Ltd.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Argyres, N. and Zenger, T. (2021), ‘Oliver Williamson and the Strategic Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000539.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chassagnon, V. (2021), ‘Atmosphere, Private Ordering and Industrial Pluralism: Williamson's Evolving Science of Organization’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000618.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coase, R. H. (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, 4: 386–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dow, G. K. (2021), ‘The Labor-Managed Firm, Oliver Williamson, and Me’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000448.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbons, R. (2021), ‘Deals That Start When You Sign Them’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000680.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Ownership’, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 691–719.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansmann, H. (1996), The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Hodgson, G. M. (2004), ‘Opportunism is Not the Only Reason Why Firms Exist: Why an Explanatory Emphasis on Opportunism May Mislead Management Strategy’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(2): 401–418.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hovenkamp, H. (2005), The Antitrust Enterprise, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joskow, P. (2021), ‘From Hierarchies to Markets and Partially Back Again in Electricity: Responding to Decarbonization and Security of Supply Goals’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klepper, S. (2016), Experimental Capitalism: The Nanoeconomics of American High-Tech Industries, Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langlois, R. N. (1984), ‘Internal Organization in a Dynamic Context: Some Theoretical Considerations’, in Jussawalla, M. and Ebenfield, H. (eds.), Communication and Information Economics: New Perspectives. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 23–49.Google Scholar
Langlois, R. N. (1986), Economics as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics, New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Langlois, R. N. (1992), ‘Transaction Cost Economics in Real Time’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 1(1): 99–127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Machlup, F. (1963), Essays on Economic Semantics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Macneil, I. R. (1974), ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’, Southern California Law Review, 47(May): 691–816.Google Scholar
Mahoney, J. T. and Nickerson, J. (2021), ‘Oliver Williamson: A Hero's Journey on the Merits’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000151.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Masten, S. E. (2021), ‘Adaptation, Adjudication, and Private Ordering: Contractual Relations Through the Williamson Lens’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McMackin, J. F., Chiles, T. H. and Lam, L. W. (2021), ‘Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and Transaction Cost Economics – 25 Years On: Reflections in Memory of Oliver Williamson’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000576.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ménard, C. (2021) 'Hybrids: Where Are We?' Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000230.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Penrose, E. T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Richardson, G. B. (1972), ‘The Organisation of Industry’, The Economic Journal, 82(327): 883–896.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sent, E.-M. and Kroese, A. L. J. (2021), ‘Commemorating Oliver Williamson, a Founding Father of Transaction Cost Economics’, Journal of Institutional Economics, published online. doi:10.1017/S1744137421000606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (1964), The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’, Journal of Law and Economics, 22: 233–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (1983), ‘Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, Where It's Going’, Saint Louis University Law Journal, 27(2): 289–314.Google Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (1999), ‘Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives’, Strategic Management Journal, 20: 1087–1108.3.0.CO;2-Z>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (2007), ‘An Interview with Oliver Williamson’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 3(3): 373–386.Google Scholar
Williamson, O. E. (2009), ‘Opening the Black Box of Firm and Market Organization: Antitrust’, in Bjuggren, P.-O. and Mueller, D. C. (eds.), The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 11–42.Google Scholar