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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Corruption necessarily involves particularistic advantages at the expense of the society as a whole. It might be, however, misleading to assume these implications are a priori negative. The moral assessment of corrupt practices depends on contemporary ethical standards, which differ from country to country and undergo change over time. As a result, some practices labeled as corrupt might become legitimate while others turn from legitimate actions to offenses. When ethical dimensions are considered, corrupt practices reveal an inherent tension between particularistic and universalistic normative standards. Particularistic standards belong to the person-specific obligations and the expectations of actors involved in corruption. These necessarily clash with universalistic standards, which are valid and applicable for everyone and are usually approved by legal provisions or codes of conduct. As a result corrupt exchanges reveal both positive social features between corruption partners—such as mutual trust—and negative societal ramifications—such as disadvantages of non-involved actors. Corrupt partners behave fairly and honestly with respect to their partners but unfairly and dishonestly with respect to anyone else.
1 For bribe givers who intend to benefit their company or organization, see generally, Markus Pohlmann, Kristina Bitsch, & Julian Klinkhammer, Personal Gain or Organizational Benefits? How to Explain Active Corruption, in this special issue of the German Law Journal. Google Scholar
2 See Ambraseys, Nicholas & Bilham, Roger, Corruption Kills, 469 Nature 153, 155 (2011).Google Scholar
3 See Niehaus, Holger, Donations Granted Amongst “Friends” in Public Office—Kindness or Corruption?—There Ain't No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, in this special issue of the German Law Journal. Google Scholar
4 See Graeff, Peter, Im Sinne des Unternehmens? Soziale Aspekte der korrupten Transaktionen im Hause Siemens, in Der Korruptionsfall Siemens: Analysen und praxisnahe Folgerungen des wissenschaftlichen Arbeitskreises von Transparency International Deutschland 151 (Peter Graeff, Katharina Schröder & Sebastian Wolf eds., 2009).Google Scholar
5 Under certain circumstances specific provisions of anti-corruption measures are not desirable, see Sebastian Wolf, Dark Sides of Anti-Corruption Law: A Typology and Recent Developments in German Anti-Bribery Legislation, in this Special Issue.Google Scholar
6 See generally Dungan, James, Waytz, Adam & Young, Liande, Corruption in the Context of Moral Trade-Offs, 26 J. Interdisc. Econ. 97 (2014).Google Scholar
7 For a perspective that tries to transcend the logic of economic exchange, see Verena Rauen, Corruption: Uncovering the Price of Normative Morality and the Value of Ethics, in this Special Issue.Google Scholar
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