¹ Dawson, Mark & Witte, Floris de, Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis, 76 Mod. L. Rev. 817, 824– 25 (2013); Dagmar Schiek, European Legal Studies Online-Papers: A Constitution of Social Governance for the European Union 9–10 (2015).Google Scholar

² See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 151–61, Oct. 26, 2008, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU] (regarding limitations found in the Social Policy Chapter of the TFEU).Google Scholar

³ See Witte, Floris de, The Architecture of a Social Market Economy 7 (London Sch. Econ. Working Papers, Working Paper No. 13-2015, 2015).Google Scholar

⁴ See Hinarejos, Alicia, The Euro Area Crisis and Constitutional Limits to Fiscal Integration, 14 Cambridge Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 243 (2012); see also id. (providing an overview of the evolution of EU social policy).Google Scholar

⁵ Schiek, , supra note 1, at 10 (stating that “the question which is as yet unanswered, is whether the new economic governance in promoting and enforcing EMU can be reconciled with the EU's social values substantively. This can be doubted since the dynamics resulting from new economic governance as management by objectives are coupled with the macro-economic structure engrained in the legal frame of the 2on currency. … New economic governance allows the EU to actively influence national social policies and wage levels within Member states in order to achieve such adjustment.”).Google Scholar

⁶ See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union pmbl. & art. 3(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TEU]; TFEU art. 9.Google Scholar

⁷ See TEU art. 6(1) for a discussion that rights, as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, indicating that “the rights, freedoms, and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.”Google Scholar

⁸ See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, ch. IV, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter CFEU].Google Scholar

⁹ The European Social Charter is an instrument of the Council of Europe.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Collective Complaint No. 76/2012, IKA-ETAM v. Greece, Eur. Comm. Soc. Rts. (2012); Collective Complaint No. 77/2012, Panhellenic Federation of Public Service Pensioners v. Greece, Eur. Comm. of Soc. Rts. (2012); Collective Complaint No. 78/2012, ISAP v. Greece, Eur. Comm. of Soc. Rts. (2012); Collective Complaint No. 79/2012, POS-DEI v. Greece, Eur. Comm. of Soc. Rts. (2012); Collective Complaint No. 80/2012, ATE v. Greece, Eur. Comm. of Soc. Rts. (2012), http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng#.Google Scholar

¹¹ Case 474/2013 [Constitutional Court of Portugal] (Aug. 28 2013), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/home.html; Case 187/13 [Constitutional Court of Portugal] (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/home.html; see also Case 253/201, [Constitutional Court of Portugal] (May 23, 2013), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/home.html; Case 474/2013 [Constitutional Court of Portugal] (Aug. 29 2013), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/home.html; see Roberto Cisotta & Daniel Gallo, The Portuguese Constitutional Jurisprudence during the Economic Crisis, in Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights' Challenges 85–94 (Claire Kilpatrick & Bruno De Witte eds., Eur. Univ. Inst. ed. 2014); Colm O'Cinneide, Austerity and the Faded Dream of a Social Europe, in Economic and Social Rights After the Global Financial Crisis 169, 189 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014); see also Case 2009-43-01 [Constitutional Court of Latvia] (Dec. 21 2009), http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/; Cases 46-52/2010, 70/2010, 77/2010, 82-87/2010, 94/2010,100-101/2010, 109/2010, 114/2010, 123-124/2010, 128-129/2010, 133-134/2010, 142-143/2010, 1-2/2011, 5/2011, 8/2011, 16/2011, 21/2011, 23/2011, 25/2011, 29/2011, 32/2011, 37/2011, 39/2011 [Constitutional Court of Lithuania] (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.lrkt.lt/en/; Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Issue Paper on Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Economic Crisis, at 7 (Dec. 3, 2013), https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2664103&SecMode=1&DocId=2215366&Usage=2; Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Issue Paper on the ISSA Crisis Monitor Project on Coping with the Crisis: Managing Social Security in Uncertain Times, at 25 (Jan. 2012), http://observatorio.anses.gob.ar/archivos/documentos/OBS-000210%20-%20Coping%20with%20the%20crisis_Managing%20social%20security%20in%20uncertain%20times.pdf.Google Scholar

¹² See Report of Committee on Employment and Social Affairs on Employment and Social Aspects of the Role and Operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission, and IMF) with Regard to Euro Area Programme Countries (2014/2007(INI)) para. 40, Eur. Parl. Resol. A7-0135/2014 (2014).Google Scholar

¹³ Council of Europe Press Release DC011(2014), Secretary General Calls for Better Protection of Social Rights in Times of Austerity (January, 28 2014), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=DC-PR011%282014%29&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE .Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy: The EU Institutions and the Conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding (2014); see also O'Cinneide, supra note 11; Dagmar Schiek, The EU Constitution of Social Governance in an Economic Crisis in defense of a Transnational Dimension to Social Europe, 20 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 185, 207 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Hinarejos, , supra note 4, at 247; Koen Lenaerts, Economic Integration, Solidarity and Legitimacy: The EU in a Time of Crisis, in Euroforum KU Leuven (2013), T 4? https://www.kuleuven.be/euroforum/viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=DOCS&ID=860 .Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hofmeister, See Hannes, To Bail out or not to Bail Out – Legal Aspects of the Greek Crisis, 13 Cambridge Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 113–34 (2011), for an overview on the Greek bailout; Manos Matsaganis, The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case of Greece, 21 J. Eur. Soc. Pol'y 501, 501–12 (2011); see also The Greek Sovereign Debt Tragedy: Approaching the Final Act, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1769 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Council Decision 2010/320 of May 10, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 145) (addressing Greece with view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy situation of excessive deficit).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Council Decision 2011/344, art. 3(6)(h) of May 30, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 159) 88 (EU) (granting Union financial assistance to Portugal).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Council Decision 2010/320, art. 2(2)(b) of June 8, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 146) (addressing Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit), repealed by Council Decision 2011/734 of July 12, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 296) (addressing Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit).Google Scholar

²⁰ See Council Decision 17211/1/10, art. 3(7)(d) of Dec. 7, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 30) 34 (granting Union financial assistance to Ireland).Google Scholar

²¹ See Council Decision 2011/734, annex, of Dec. 4, 2012, 2013 O.J. (L 4) (providing some examples with regard to Greece and repealing Council Decision 2010/320); Council Decision 2010/320, art. 2(e)(f)(g) of June 8, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 146) (addressing Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit); Council Implementing Decision, art. 2(9)(i) of Sept. 13, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 250) 40–45 (regarding Cyprus's approval of the macroeconomic adjustment programme for Cyprus) (repealing Decision 2013/236) (EU).Google Scholar

²² See Council Decision 17211/1/10, art. 7(1) of Dec. 7, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 30) 34 (on granting Union financial assistance to Ireland); see also Council Decision 2011/344, art. 3 & 6(h) of 30 May 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 159) 88 (EU) (granting Union financial assistance to Portugal).Google Scholar

²³ See Armstrong, Kenneth, Governing Social Inclusion: Europeanization Through Policy Coordination 264–99 (2010); see also Paul Schoukens & Joris Beke Smets, Fighting Social Exclusion under EU Horizon 2020: Enhancing the Legal Enforceability of the Social Inclusion Recommendations, 15 Eur. J. Soc. Security 5 (2014).Google Scholar

²⁴ Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Austria and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Austria, 2015 (C 272); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Bulgaria and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Bulgaria, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Croatia and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Croatia, 2014 (C 247).Google Scholar

²⁵ See Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Austria and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Austria (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Belgium (C 272); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Bulgaria and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Bulgaria, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of the Czech Republic and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of the Czech Republic, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Finland and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Finland, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Lithuania and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Lithuania, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Luxembourg and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Luxembourg, 2015 (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Malta and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Malta, 2015 (C 272).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Bulgaria and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Convergence Programme of Bulgaria (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Croatia and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Convergence Programme of Croatia (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of the Czech Republic and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Convergence Programme of the Czech Republic (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Germany and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Germany (C 271); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Ireland and delivering a Council opinion the 2015 Stability Programme of Ireland (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Lithuania and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Lithuania (C 272); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of the Netherlands and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of the Netherlands, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Slovakia and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Slovakia (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Spain, 2015 (C 272).Google Scholar

²⁷ See Bekker, Sonja, European Socioeconomic Governance in Action: Coordinating Social Policies in the European Semester, 19 Eur. Soc. Observatory 5 (2015), http://www.ose.be/files/publication/OSEPaperSeries/Bekker_2015_OseResearchPaper19.pdf; Witte, supra note 3, at 15.Google Scholar

²⁸ For example the budgetary discipline in the Growth and Stability Pact has been complemented and tightened by the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack. The Six-Pack consists of five regulations and one directive and covers both fiscal and macro-economic surveillance; four of the six measures apply to all member states, while two, which define possible sanctions, apply only to Eurozone member states:Google Scholar

(1) Council Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, O.J. (L 306) 12–24 (Nov. 23 2011) (amending Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies);Google Scholar

(2) Council Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, O.J. (L 306) 25–32 (Nov. 23, 2011);Google Scholar

(3) Council Regulation 1177/2011 of 8 November amending regulation no. 1467/97 on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, O.J. (L 306) 33–40 (Nov. 23, 2011);Google Scholar

(4) Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of the Member States, O.J. (L 306) 23, 41–47 (Nov. 23, 2011);Google Scholar

(5) Regulation no. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, O.J. (L 306) 1–7 (Nov. 23, 2011);Google Scholar

(6) Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on Enforcement Measures to Correct Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area, O.J. (L 306) 8–11 (Nov. 23 2011).Google Scholar

The Two-Pack consists of two regulations and aims at further strengthening the surveillance mechanisms in the euro area; they entered into force at 30 May 2013:Google Scholar

(1) Council Regulation 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Common Provisions for Monitoring and Assessing Draft Budgetary Plans and Ensuring the Correction of Excessive Deficit of the Member States in the Euro Area, O.J. (L 140) 11–13 (May 27, 2013);Google Scholar

(2) Council Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the Strengthening of Economic and Budgetary Surveillance of Member States in the Euro Area Experiencing or Threatened with Serious Difficulties with Respect to Their Financial Stability, O.J. (L 140) 1–10 (May 27, 2013).Google Scholar

²⁹ Under the macro-economic imbalance procedure, it is possible to adopt preventive recommendations for member states. These recommendations are part of the Country Specific Recommendations under the European Semester. It can be decided to open up an excessive imbalance procedure for more severe cases requiring member states to adopt a clear roadmap and deadlines. Furthermore, a more rigorous enforcement regime is established for euro area countries, consisting of a two-step approach: an interest-bearing deposit can be imposed after one failure to comply with the recommended corrective action, after a second compliance failure, this interest-bearing deposit can be converted into a fine. See also http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/index_en.htm.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Schoukens, Paul, Becker, Eleni De & Smets, Joris Beke, Ontwikkelingen van sociaal Europa: de socio-economische monitoring van de EU juridisch afgetoetst aan het grondrecht op sociale zekerheid (Europees Sociaal Handvest), 2e Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid 215, 221–22 (2014), for more information on the EFSF and ESM; see also Lenaerts, supra note 15, at 17–24, for a discussion on the Pringle judgment.Google Scholar

³¹ For example, Greece received its first loan in 2010 through a pooled bilateral loan agreement (the Greek loan facility). Earlier loans to non-Eurozone countries such as Romania (2008) were passed off on the basis of Article 143 TFEU. With the establishment of the EFSF and EFSM, we see that countries, such as Portugal and Ireland, received financial assistance through the EFSF (international law) and the EFSM (EU law). The same has happened with the ESM-treaty: the financial assistance measures to Cyprus were for example passed off through the ESM. More information for the different countries is available at the website of the EU Commission, giving an overview of the different documents for each country, see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/index_en.htm.Google Scholar

³² Fischer-Lescano, See, supra note 14 for an extensive discussion on the Memoranda of Understanding under the ESM-Treaty; see also Claire Kilpatrick, Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because they are not EU Law?, 10 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 393 (2014) (analyzing the different financial assistance measures separately, also looking at non-Eurozone countries, such as Hungary, Latvia and Romania, who received financial assistance in 2008).Google Scholar

³³ See Keppene, Jean-Paul, The Economic and Monetary Union: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Economic Governance with the EU (Ulla Neergaard, Catherine Jacqueson & Jens Hartig Danielsen eds., FIDE XXVI Congress, 1st ed. 2014); see also Koen Lenaerts, EMU and the European Union's Constitutional Framework, 6 Eur. L. Rev. 753, 756 (2014).Google Scholar

³⁴ See Case T-289/13, Ledra Advertising v. Comm'n, paras. 56–59 (Nov. 10, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/; see also Case T-291/13, Eleftheriou and Papachristofi v. Comm'n, paras. 56–59 (Nov. 10, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case T-293/13 Theophilou v. Comm'n, paras. 59–60 (Nov. 10, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/ (stating that “it must be noted that, in the context of an action for annulment covered by Article 263 TFEU, the General Court has jurisdiction only to review the legality of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union. In applying the disputed passages to be annulled; the applicant seeks the annulment in part of the MoU, which was adopted jointly by the Republic of Cyprus and the ESM. Since neither the ESM, nor the republic of Cyprus is among the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, the General Court has no jurisdiction to examine the legality of acts which they have adopted together.”); Case C-370/12, Pringle, para. 180 (Nov. 27, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/ (finding member states are not implementing EU law, and, as a result, the CFEU is not applicable).Google Scholar

³⁵ See Pringle, Case C-370/12 at para. 174; see also Kilpatrick, supra note 32; Alexander Kornezov, Social Rights, the Charter and the ECHR – Caveats, Crises and Other Disasters, in Euroforum KU Leuven 4–7 (2015), https://www.kuleuven.be/euroforum/page.php?LAN=E&FILE=policy-papers.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Council Regulation 472/2013, art. 7, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Strengthening of Economic and Budgetary Surveillance of Member States in the Euro Area Experiencing or Threatened with Serious Difficulties with Respect to their Financial Stability, O.J. (L 140) 1–10 (May 27, 2013).Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. Google Scholar

³⁸ Lenaerts, , supra note 33, at 759.Google Scholar

³⁹ Id. Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Commission Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union, at 21 (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf (stating that in stage 2 the ESM should be integrated into the EU law framework).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See TFEU art. 263(4).Google Scholar

⁴² See Case C-207/01, Altair Chimica, 2003 E.C.R. I-8894, paras. 41–43:Google Scholar

As regards, third, the interpretation of Recommendation 81/924, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, even if recommendations are not intended to produce binding effects and are not capable of creating rights that individuals can rely on before a national court they are not without any legal effect. The national courts are bound to take recommendations into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding Community provisions.“Google Scholar

Id. (regarding the binding effects of recommendations); see also Case C-322/88, Grimaldi, 1989 E.C.R. 04407, paras. 7, 16, & 18; Case C-55/06, Arcor, 2008 E.C.R. I-02931, para. 94; Cases C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08, C-320/08, Alessini et al., 2010 E.C.R. I-02213, para 40.Google Scholar

⁴³ See Council Regulation 473/2013, art. 8, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Common Provisions for Monitoring and Assessing Draft Budgetary Plans and Ensuring the Correction of Excessive Deficit of the Member States in the Euro Area, O.J. (L 140) 11–13 (May 27, 2013).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Case C-27/04, Comm'n v. Council, 2004 E.C.R. I-06649, paras. 44–51.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ TFEU art. 267(1)(b).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Grimaldi, Case C-322/88 at para. 18.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Austria and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Austria, 2015 (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Belgium, 2015 (C 272); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Bulgaria and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Bulgaria, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of the Czech Republic and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of the Czech Republic, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Finland and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Finland, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Lithuania and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Lithuania, 2014 (C 247); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Luxembourg and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Luxembourg (C 272); Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Malta and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Malta (C 272).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Council Regulation no. 473/2013, art. 8, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Common Provisions for Monitoring and Assessing Draft Budgetary Plans and Ensuring the Correction of Excessive Deficit of the Member States in the Euro Area, O.J. (L 140) 11–23 (May 27, 2013).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See TFEU art. 263(4) (indicating that only individuals will need to show direct and individual concern in order to bring an action for annulment before the CJEU. The European Parliament, the Council, Commission and the European Council can be considered as privileged applicants as they do not need to show direct and individual concern. This is different for the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the Committee of Regions as they can bring an action for annulment for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Case T-541/10, Adedy v. Greece, 2012 E.C.R. 00000, para. 64.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Id. Google Scholar

⁵² Id. Google Scholar

⁵³ Id. Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Id. at para. 72.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Id. at paras. 82–84.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Adedy, Case T-541/10 at paras. 84–85.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Kilpatrick, , supra note 32, at 417; see also Schoukens, De Becker & Smets, supra note 30, at 259–60.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Case C-25/62, Plaumann v. Comm'n, 1963 E.C.R. 00199.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Adedy, Case T-541/10 at para. 93Google Scholar

[F]irstly it is apparent from the case-law that admissibility of an action for annulment before the European Union courts does not depend on whether there is a remedy before a national court enabling the validity of the act being challenged to be examined. A fortiori the admissibility of an action before the European Union courts cannot depend on the alleged slowness of national proceedings. In that regard, it must also be borne in mind that the second subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU provides that Member states are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law.“Google Scholar

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⁶⁰ See Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte, paras. 8–14 (Mar. 7, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, paras. 17–22 (Oct. 21, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-134/12, Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor v. Biroul Executiv Central, 2012 E.C.R. 00000, paras. 11–15; Case C-665/13, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, paras. 11–16 (Oct. 21, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte, paras. 8–14 (Mar. 7, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, paras. 17–22 (Oct. 21, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/; Case C-134/12, Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor v. Biroul Executiv Central, 2012 E.C.R. 00000, paras. 11–15; Case C-665/13, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, paras. 11–16 (Oct. 21, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/.Google Scholar

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⁶⁴ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁵ IKA-ETAM, Collective Complaint No. 76/2012 at para 78.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Id. at para. 79.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See O'Cinneide supra, note 11, at 197–98.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See IKA-ETAM, Collective Complaint No. 76/2012; Panhellenic Federation of Public Service Pensioners, Collective Complaint No. 77/2012; ISAP, Collective Complaint No. 78/2012; POS-DEI, Collective Complaint No. 79/2012; ATE, Collective Complaint No. 80/2012. Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See IKA-ETAM, Collective Complaint No. 76/2012; Panhellenic Federation of Public Service Pensioners, Collective Complaint No. 77/2012; ISAP, Collective Complaint No. 78/2012; POS-DEI, Collective Complaint No. 79/2012; ATE, Collective Complaint No. 80/2012; Council of the State of Greece, Case No. 668/2012; see also Council of State of Greece, Cases No. 1283-1286/2012 (Apr. 2, 2014); Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, Welfare Rights in Crisis in Greece: The Role of Fundamental Rights Challenges, 1 Eur. J. Soc. L. 12, 19–21 (2014).Google Scholar

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⁷² See World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building Economic Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social Justice, International Labour Report, 2014, at xxv.Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ TEU art. 6(1).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ CFEU art. 34(1).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. (C 303/17).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ European Social Charter (Revised) art. 12, May 3, 1996, C.E.T.S. No. 163 [hereinafter ESC].Google Scholar

⁷⁸ CFEU art. 52(3).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Tooze, Jennifer, Article 34: Social Security and Social Assistance, in Economic and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 161, 166 (Tamara Hervey & Jeff Kenner eds., 2003).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ CFEU art. 51(2).Google Scholar

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