¹ See generally Fukuyama, Francis, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000); Tamar Frankel, Trust and Honesty (2006). For emphasis on the integrative power of trust for a society, see Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel 326 (Kurt Wolff ed. & trans., 1950) (“Trust is one of the most important synthetic forces within society.”); Niklas Luhmann, Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion Sozialer Komplexität [Trust and Power] (4th ed. 2000). See also Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 553 (2001); Onora O'Neill, A Question of Trust (2002) (emphasizing the costs or negative externalities of trust); Ute Frevert, Vertrauensfragen: Eine Obsession der Moderne 147–220 (2013) (identifying and criticizing the moral and political underpinnings of the proponents of the idea that trust is a societal “resource”). See Ernst Rudolf Huber, Verfassungsrecht des Großdeutschen Reiches 279 (1939), for the affinity of the public law literature in the Third Reich to the concept of trust.Google Scholar

² But see Mitchell, Lawrence E., Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425 (1993); Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Contract Law and the Economics of Interorganizational Trust, in Trust Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications 146 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. Corp. L. 869 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 1735 (2001); Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457 (2005); Bruce Ian Carlin et al., Public Trust, the Law, and Financial Investment, 92 J. Fin. Econ. 321 (2009); Helge Rossen-Stadtfeld, Das Wissen der “Wissensgesellschaft”, 82 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift 223, 227–28 (1999); Dieter Schmidtchen, Vertrauen und Recht: Eine Ökonomische Analyse, in Bausteine zu einer Verhaltenstheorie des Rechts 75 (Fritjof Haft et al. eds., 2001); Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Georgios Dimitropoulos, Vertrauen in und durch Recht: Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Vertrauen und Recht als Beitrag zu einer Phänomenologie des Vertrauens, in Vertrauen in der Krise. Zugänge verschiedener Wissenschaften 129 (Markus Weingart ed., 2011); Ann-Katrin Kaufhold, Gegenseitiges Vertrauen. Wirksamkeitsbedingung und Rechtsprinzip der justiziellen Zusammenarbeit im Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts, Europarecht 408 (2012).Google Scholar

³ See Brescia, Raymond H., Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-Regulation, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1361 (2009); Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 577, 577–80 (2010).Google Scholar

⁴ See Council, Report on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by Mr. P. Jenard, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1–65, 46. See infra notes 31 and 66, for the different connotations of trust, confidence, Vertrauen. Google Scholar

⁵ See Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.Google Scholar

⁶ See Commission Report Standard Barometer 81 on Public Opinion in the European Union 88–96 (Spring 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_publ_en.pdf; see also Jan-Herman Reestman & W. T. Eijsbouts, Mutual Trust: Editorial, 2 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 1 (2006); Iris Canor, My Brother's Keeper? Horizontal Solange: “An Ever Closer Distrust Among the Peoples of Europe,” 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 383 (2013). See infra Section D.II, discussing the crisis of trust in the EU judicial cooperation in civil and criminal Matters.Google Scholar

⁷ Judgment in Les Verts v Eur. Parliament, C-294/83, EU:C:1986:166, paragraph 23.Google Scholar

⁸ See Ely, John Hart, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980). See Joseph H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights in the European Community, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1103 (1986), for an adaptation of this motive to the EU; see also Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust (2008).Google Scholar

⁹ See Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council (Oct. 15–16, 1999). The story behind the success of the mutual recognition principle on the Tampere summit reconstructs meticulously Hans G. Nilsson, Mutual Trust or Mutual Mistrust?, in La Confiance Mutuelle Dans L'espace Pénal Européen 29 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Judgment in Turner v Grovit, C-159/02, EU:C:2004:228, paragraphs 24, 28.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Gisèle Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Surano, Laura, Analysis of the Future of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the European Union: Final Report 20 (2008).Google Scholar

¹² See Opinion 2/13, supra note 5, at paras. 191, 194.Google Scholar

¹³ The “Maastricht Treaty” (Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1) implemented the pillar structure. The third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs was based on intergovernmental cooperation rather than on supranational governance. In 1997, the pillar's scope was reduced to cooperation in the fight against crime and it was renamed Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, see Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. With the “Lisbon Treaty” (Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 12, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1), the pillar was absorbed into the area of freedom, security and justice; see also infra Section C.II.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The focus on the ECJ and the proposal of a re-conceptualization of the legal principle of mutual trust distinguish this article from approaches that are primarily concerned with empirical evaluations, with recommendations for an administrative or legislative reform agenda, or that simply give an account of the case law. For recent studies see Pim Albers et al., Towards a Common Evaluation Framework to Assess Mutual Trust in the Field of EU Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (2013); Ester Herlin-Karnell, From Mutual Trust to the Full Effectiveness of EU Law: 10 Years of the European Arrest Warrant, 38 Eur. L. Rev. 79 (2013); infra Part C.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Ute Frevert, Vertrauen—eine historische Spurensuche, in Vertrauen: Historische Annäherungen 7 (Ute Frevert ed., 2003), for the conceptual history of trust.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Frevert, Ute, Wer um Vertrauen wirbt, weckt Misstrauen: Politische Semantik zwischen Herausforderung und Besänftigung, Eurozine (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-01-13-frevert-de.html.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J. L. & Econ. 453, 453 (1993), for definitions of “trust”; Kirsimarja Blomqvist et al., Towards Measuring Interorganizational Trust (2002), http://www.impgroup.org/uploads/papers/4586.pdf, for a concise, though slightly dated overview over the theories and concepts of trust until 2002; see also Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 93 Am. J. Soc. 623, 623 (1987) (speaking of a “confusing potpourri of definitions applied to a host of units and levels of analysis”).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (1950), for the seminal work on “basic trust” that understands the capacity to trust as an essential step in the psycho-social development of human beings. The influential neuro-scientific research uses a “thick” concept of trust as well. For important neuro-scientific studies on trust see Michael Kosfeld et al., Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, 435 Nature 673 (2005); Ernst Fehr et al., Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 346 (2005). See also John Conlisk, Professor Zak's Empirical Studies on Trust and Oxytocin, 78 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 160 (2011), for a critical assessment of these and similar studies.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See sources cited supra note 1, for the role of trust in public politics. See also, e.g., Mark Warren, Democracy and Trust (1999). See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 1, for economics. For attempts to measure institutional trust see Blomqvist et al., supra note 17; John Ermisch et al., Measuring People's Trust, 172 J. Royal Stat. Soc'y: Series A 749 (2009); Onora O'Neill, Perverting Trust: Presentation at the 2010 New Zealand Aronui Lecture Series (Mar. 10, 2009) (critiquing those attempts), http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/media/Lecture-Notes-Perverting-Trust.pdf.Google Scholar

²⁰ For the role trust plays in science see, e.g., Piotr Sztompka, Trust in Science, 7 J. Classical Soc'y 211 (2007); Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (2002). For a historical perspective on science as an “order” of trust see Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (1994); Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (1995).Google Scholar

²¹ Putnam, , supra note 1, at 136–37.Google Scholar

²² Luhmann, , supra note 1, at 61–79.Google Scholar

²³ See Williamson, , supra note 17, at 479; Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 577, 580 (2010). See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 Wash. Univ. L. Rev. 1717, 1724–27 (2006), for a similar distinction between “trust in” and “trust that” is made.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Hartmann, Martin, Die Praxis des Vertrauens (2011) (developing extensively this dimension of trust).Google Scholar

²⁵ Offe, See Claus, How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?, in Democracy and trust 42 (Mark Warren ed., 1999), for an attempt to deduce systemic trust from interpersonal trust.Google Scholar

²⁶ Putnam, , supra note 1, at 466.Google Scholar

²⁷ Whether or not the idea of “thin” and “systemic” trust overstretches the conceptual core has been the subject of much debate. For reasons of conceptual clarity some authors recommend using the word trust exclusively to describe interpersonal relationships. See, e.g., Talcott Parsons, Action Theory and the Human Condition 45–47 (1978); Williamson, supra note 17, at 463; Frevert, supra note 1, at 209–20). For attempts by others to revive the moral dimension of trust cf. Annette C. Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 Ethics 231 (1986); Carolyn McLeod, Trust, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (Feb. 7, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/trust.Google Scholar

²⁸ Cf. Kyrill-A. Schwarz, Vertrauensschutz als Verfassungsprinzip 43 (2002).Google Scholar

²⁹ McLeod, See, supra note 27, § 4, for a summary of the debate over this criterion.Google Scholar

³⁰ Luhmann, See Niklas, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations 94 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).Google Scholar

³¹ In German this is marked by the distinction between Vertrauen (trust) and Zuversicht (confidence) with the latter being a more or less passive (cognitive) attitude. The distinction, however, is neither precise nor universal in German. See Luhmann, supra note 30, for the complex interplay between Vertrauen and Zuversicht. The difference between the German terms Vertrauen and Zuversicht is much stronger than between trust and confidence in English which can often be used interchangeably. But see Neil Walker, The Problem of Trust in an Enlarged Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Conceptual Analysis, in Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders, 23 (Malcolm Anderson & Joanna Apap eds., 2002). While in English it can be either “trust in the market” or “confidence in the market,” in German only Vertrauen would make sense. See infra note 66, for the specific circumstances for the use of these terms in the multilingual EU system.Google Scholar

³² See Hill, & O'Hara, supra note 23, at 1724. Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie 179–82 (1987) (the decision to trust as a social “strategy”); Luhmann, supra note 1, at 27; Luhmann, supra note 30, at 97; Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 393, 395 (1998); Annette C. Baier, Vertrauen und seine Grenzen, in Vertrauen: Die Grundlage des sozialen Zusammenhalts 37, 43 (Martin Hartmann & Claus Offe eds., 2001); Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1739– 40 (“[A] willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another, based on the belief that the trusted person will choose not to exploit one's vulnerability.”); Ribstein, supra note 1, at 553 (“vulnerability”); Walker, supra note 31, at 23; Hartmann, supra note 24, at 99 (“accepted vulnerability”); Hartmann, supra note 24, at 268; McLeod, supra note 27, § 1.Google Scholar

³³ Simmel, See Georg, Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung 393–94 (1908); McLeod, supra note 27, § 2, for an overview over the questions connected to this epistemological dimension of trust. See also for how the epistemological question relates to law Rossen-Stadtfeld, supra note 2, at 225; Kaufhold, supra note 2, 419–20.Google Scholar

³⁴ Herzog, See Lisa, Persönliches Vertrauen, Rechtsvertrauen, Systemvertrauen, 61 Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 529 (2013), for how trust has been replaced by credulousness in the financial markets pre-2008/09.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Luhmann, , supra note 1, at 40–41; Frankel, supra note 1, at 49 (describing trust as “believing that others tell the truth and will keep their promises”); Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 495, 496–97 (2001).Google Scholar

³⁶ Baier, See, supra note 27, at 244, for an analysis the complexity of this process.Google Scholar

³⁷ See Luhmann, , supra note 1, at 75. See also Schmidtchen, supra note 2, for a game-theoretic analysis of trust see.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Martin Endreß, Vertrauen 53 (2002), for empirical studies on trust-building. On trust as an educational experience see Luhmann, supra note 1, at 33–34, 48–50; Walker, supra note 31, at 23.Google Scholar

³⁹ See Frevert, , supra note 16; Ken Ruscio, Trust, in The Encyclopedia of Leadership 1573, 1573 (George R. Goethals et al. eds., 2004).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Hardin, See, supra note 20, at 53, for an analysis of the emergence of trustworthiness through adherence to social norms and constraints. See also McLeod, supra note 27, at Introduction (describing that the question of how warranted trust is, is a question of degree).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Peter L. Berger & Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 83 (1991), for the connection between rules and institutions. See also Seumas Miller, Social Institutions, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (Feb. 7, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/social-institutions/, for an overview.Google Scholar

⁴² These rules are not only legal rules. For a discussion on the relationship between trust and other modes of social order see, e.g., Christoph Engel, Vertrauen: Ein Versuch 31–33 (Nov. 1999), https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/1999_12online.pdf; Antje Möller, Ökonomische Analyse von Vertrauen in umweltorientierten Innovationskooperationen, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Discussion Paper No. 03-04 14–15 (July 2003), http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/vwb/paper/vwbrub03-04.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴³ Tyler has presented data showing that trust in legal institutions depends less on the outcome of the decision and more on the fact that the representatives of the institution follow the rules and procedures. See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 Behav. Sci. & L. 215 (2001).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ This is one of the major differences between “thick” interpersonal and systemic trust. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 463, 494 (2002).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Brandimarte, Laura et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, 4 Soc. Psychol. & Personality Sci. 340 (2013).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For the trust-building effect of legal rules or the “rule of law”—on the general level of “societal trust” as well as on the micro-level for example through the legal protection of the doctor-patient-relationship—see, e.g., Claudio Franzius, Europäisches Vertrauen? Eine Skizze, 12 Humboldt Forum Recht 159, 173 (2010); Schmidt-Aßmann & Dimitropoulos, supra note 2; Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 418–19; Wolfgang Kahl, Vertrauen (Kontinuität), in Leitgedanken des Rechts. Paul Kirchhof zum 70. Geburtstag 297 (Hanno Kube et al. eds., 2013).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ According to Luhmann, the specific function of law is the “stabilization of normative expectations.” See Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System 148 (2004).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ When legal rules can encourage trust, they can encourage distrust, too. See Ribstein, supra note 1, at 576–84, for potential negative externalities of regulation on the micro-economy of trust.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Luhmann, , supra note 1 and 32, at 44, 181.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Canor, , supra note 6, at 421.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Paul J. Zak & Knack, Stephen, Trust and Growth, 111 Econ. J. 295 (2001), for empirical data supporting the assumptions of Putnam and Fukuyama. See also Niclas Berggren et al., Trust and Growth: A Shaky Relationship, 35 Empirical Econ. 251 (2008), for a skeptical perspective on the empirical claim of a trust-growth nexus.Google Scholar

The complexity problem concerns not only studies on trust, but nearly every empirical study on the nexus between law, its social resources and the consequences of legal regulation. The problem has been addressed extensively in the literature on law and development. See The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Michael Riegner & Thomas Wischmeyer, “Rechtliche Zusammenarbeit” mit Transformations- und Entwicklungsländern als Gegenstand öffentlich-rechtlicher Forschung, 50 Der Staat 436 (2011) (giving particular emphasis to pages 461–62 for the current state of empirical research); David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in The New Law and Economic Development 95, 147 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (providing a critical perspective on these empirical approaches); Veronica Taylor, The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transitional Countries, in Law Reform in Developing and Transitional States 83 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2007).

The critics argue convincingly that complexity must never serve as an excuse to bolster mere sociological hunches. Nevertheless, as long as empirical phenomena are too complex to generate reliable statistical data, the only solution is to build one's arguments not on positive empirical knowledge, but to use “reason informed by experience,” for example to proceed cautiously and to accept that all statements are falsifiable. Cf. Ann Willcox Seidman et al., Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change: A Manual for Drafters 28–29 (2001).

⁵² Seidman, Ann Willcox et al., Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change: A Manual for Drafters 28–29 (2001); see also supra, note 51.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Judgment in N.S. v Sec'y of St. for Home Dep't & M.E. v Refugee Applications Comm'r, C-411 & 493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraphs 78–80 [hereinafter N.S.]; Kay Hailbronner & Daniel Thym, Vertrauen im europäischen Asylsystem, in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 406 (2012); Hemme Battjes et al., The Principle of Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migration, and Criminal Law: Reconciling Trust and Fundamental Rights (2011); Evelien Brouwer, Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof, 9 Utrecht L. Rev. 135 (2013).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Cf. Blair, & Stout, , supra note 2; Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, supra note 2; Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, supra note 2.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See Deakin, & Wilkinson, , supra note 2; Mathew Boyle, The Relational Principle of Trust and Confidence, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 633 (2007).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Schmidt-Aßmann & Dimitropoulos, , supra note 2, at 132–38.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Brandimarte, et al., supra note 45.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Schmidt-Aßmann & Dimitropoulos, , supra note 2, at 144–47.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Cabrelli, David, Implied Duty of Mutual Trust and Confidence: An Emerging Overarching Principle?, 34 Indus. L.J. 284 (2005).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Tyler, Tom R. & Huo, Yuen J., Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (2002).Google Scholar

⁶¹ See generally Judgment in Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, C-120/78, EU:C:1979:42 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon]; see also Commission Interpretative Communication of 3 Oct. 1980, 1980 O.J. (C 256) 2, at 2; Giandomenico Majone, Mutual Recognition in Federal Type Systems (1993); The Principles of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process (Fiorella Padoa-Schioppa ed., 2005); Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms 589 (2d ed. 2007); Markus Möstl, Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition, 47 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 405 (2010); Christine Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law (2013).Google Scholar

⁶² For further analysis of the historical process see Karen Alter & Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, Judicial Politics in the European Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision, 26 Comp. Pol. Stud. 535 (1994). Mutual recognition as a regulatory tool was analyzed recently by Susanne K. Schmidt, Mutual Recognition as a New Mode of Governance, 14 J. Eur. Pub. Pol'y 667 (2007).Google Scholar

⁶³ See, e.g., Judgment in Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, C-55/94, EU:C:1995:411, paragraph 37.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Council, supra note 4, at 46.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, para. 93, COM(85) 310 final (June 28–29, 1985).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ The ECJ mentioned the principle of mutual trust first in cases concerning intra-Community health inspections. See, e.g., Judgment in Ludwig v Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, C-138/77, EU:C:1978:151, paragraph 5. In the context of the EU's “four freedoms,” the ECJ or the Advocates General used the “principle of mutual trust” or “mutual confidence.” See, e.g., Judgment in Wurmser, C-25/88, EU:C:1989:187, paragraph 18; Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven in Van den Berg, C-169/89, EU:C:1990:124, paragraphs 7, 9–10; Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Commission v Belgium, C-11/95, EU:C:1996:178, paragraph 101; Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Commission v France, C-184/96, EU:C:1997:495, paragraph 30; Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Commission v France, C-212/03, EU:C:2004:652, paragraph 39; Opinion of Advocate General Mangozzi in Markus Stoß et al., C-316 & 358/07 et al., EU:C:2010:109, paragraph 103; Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in dos Santos Palhota and Others, C-515/08, EU:C:2010:245, paragraph 82. In the multilingual EU law there exists no conceptual distinction between “mutual trust” and “mutual confidence.” Whether trust or confidence is used for translating the French confiance or the German Vertrauen does not follow a strict rule. See Canor, supra note 6, at 400; see also supra note 31.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Cf. Majone, Giandomenico, Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and the Evolution of Rules for a Single European Market (1995); La confiance mutuelle dans l'espace pénal européen (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005); Burkhard Hess, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht 91–100 (2010); Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 408.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See Janssens, , supra note 61, at 141 (speaking of an “intrinsic link between mutual trust and mutual recognition”).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Luhmann, Niklas, Organisation und Entscheidung 408 (2000).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Mayntz, Renate, New Challenges to Governance Theory 8 (1998); Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations (Bernd Marin & Renate Mayntz eds., 1991); Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Verwaltungsorganisation und Verwaltungsorganisationsrecht als Steuerungsfaktoren, in 1 Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts § 16, margin numbers 134–57 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).Google Scholar

⁷¹ See Luhmann, , supra note 1, at 121 (arguing that in hierarchical systems trust is unnecessary, because other strategies exist to compensate uncertainty). See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 35, at 495, for an account that distrust might even be the more efficient as well as the normatively superior way of structuring social relations in a hierarchical system.Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ For a reference to the principle of mutual trust, see Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Keller v INSS, C-145/03, EU:C:2005:17, paragraph 18, in the context of the European social security system; Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v Finanzamt Köln-Mitte, C-347/04, EU:C:2006:350, paragraph 46, in the context of the common tax policy; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Commission v Germany, C-442/08, EU:C:2010:167, paragraph 63, in the context of the Customs Union; N.S., supra note 53, at paras. 78–80, 83, in the context of the Common European Asylum System.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ With regard to the preliminary reference procedure cf. the Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Melki & Abdeli, C- 188/10 and C- 189/10, EU:C:2010:319, paragraph 64.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano v ONEm, C-34/09, EU:C:2010:560, paragraph 147 (describing of the cooperation between the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as governed by the “spirit of cooperation and mutual trust”); see also the remarks of the President of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in Andreas Voßkuhle, Multilevel cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 6 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 175 (2010).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ The particular importance of trust for EU law emphasizes, for example, Hans Christian Röhl, Akkreditierung und Zertifizierung im Produktsicherheitsrecht. Zur Entwicklung einer neuen europäischen Verwaltungsstruktur 44 (2000) (for product safety law); Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Diskussionsbemerkung, 66 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer 201 (2007); Wolfgang Kahl, Begriff, Funktionen und Konzepte von Kontrolle, in 3 Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts § 47, margin numbers 220, 233 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, et al. eds., 2^nd ed. 2013); Franzius, supra note 46, at 164-67; Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Perspektiven der Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechts, in Das Europäische Verwaltungsrecht in der Konsolidierungsphase, Die Verwaltung, Beiheft 10 263, 270 (Peter Axer, et al. eds., 2010); Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 418; Hans-Heinrich Trute, Die Demokratische Legitimation der Verwaltung, in 1 Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts § 6, margin number 115 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See, for example, the summary of aim and content of the first mutual recognition Directive 89/48, concerning the recognition of professional qualifications in Commission, Bull. E.C. 6-1988, 11, at http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/65119 (“[R]ecognition is to be based on the principle of mutual trust, without prior coordination.”). The same, rather simplistic, line of reasoning appears in many opinions of the Advocates General, see, for example, Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Commission v Italy, C-145/99, EU:C:2001:240, paragraph 62; Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Beuttenmüller v Land Baden-Württemberg, C-102/02, EU:C:2003:464, paragraph 28; Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos v Administración del Estado, C-330/03, EU:C:2005:414, paragraph 50; Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri v Cavallera, C-311/06, EU:C:2008:130, paragraph 33; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Koller, C-118/09, EU:C:2010:306, paragraphs 79, 91.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Majone, , supra note 61, at 15; Wolfgang Kahl, Commentary to Art. 114 AEUV, in Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und AEU-Vertrag margin number 16 (Christian Callies & Matthias Ruffert eds., 2011).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Majone, , supra note 61, at 20.Google Scholar

⁸¹ On the historical development of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters in the EU, see Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 410–12; Hess, supra note 67, at 80–122.Google Scholar

⁸² The most relevant legal rules governing the process of mutual assistance were Article 220 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 1958 and the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1–27 (consolidated version).Google Scholar

⁸³ See Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, supra note 9, at paras. 33–37.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ But cf. Article 10 of Protocol No. 36 of the Lisbon Treaty on transitional provisions, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1–388. See also Herlin-Karnell, supra note 14, at 79–91, describing the “Lisbonisation” of the former Third Pillar instruments, especially of the European Arrest Warrant.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ For further reading, see the study of Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See Council, supra note 4. The Council of Europe mentioned “confiance mutuelle” in the context of judicial cooperation even earlier. See Daniel Flore, Le rôle de la notion de confiance mutuelle, in La Confiance Mutuelle dans L'Espace Penal Europeen 17, 18 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005). On trust and the 1968 Brussels Convention, supra note 82, compare Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Coursier v Fortis Bank and Martine Coursier, née Bellami, C-267/97, EU:C:1998:269, paragraph 19; with Opinion of Advocate General Alber in Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Maxicar SpA, C-38/98, EU:C:1999:325, paragraph 49.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ On this aspect see Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 420–21; Ann-Katrin Kaufhold, Vertrauen als Voraussetzung, Inhalt und Gegenstand von Recht, in Was ist Vertrauen: Ein interdisziplinäres Gespräch 101, 116 (Jörg Baberowski ed., 2014).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Gözütok and Brügge, C-187/01 and C-385/01, EU:C:2002:516, paragraph 124; see also Janssens, supra note 61, at 142–43.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ The participants in Tampere presupposed mutual trust, argue Flore, supra note 86, at 18, and Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 411.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ The last two “five-year plans” for the AFSJ both emphasized the importance of trust. See Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, 2005 O.J. (C 53) 10–11 [hereinafter Hague Programme]; Council, The Stockholm Programme: An open and secure Europe serving the citizen, 2010 O.J. (C 115) 5, 13 [hereinafter Stockholm Programme]. Moreover, trust is mentioned in most of the regulations, directives and initiatives on judicial cooperation. See, e.g., Recital 22 of Council Regulation No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1–18 (EC); Recital 16 and 17 of Council Regulation 44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000, Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1–23 (EC); Council, Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (C 12) 5, 6; Council, Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters, 2001 O.J. (C 12) 10, 11; Recital 10 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of June 13, 2010, European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1–20; Recital 9 of Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of Oct. 6, 2006, Application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, 2006 O.J. (L 328) 59–78.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Judgment in Gözütok and Brügge, C-187/01 and C-385/01, EU:C:2003:87, paragraph 33 (“[T]here is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems. …”) (emphasis added); see also Judgment in Gasser v MISAT Srl, C-116/02, EU:C:2003:657, paragraph 72.Google Scholar

⁹² Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Gasparini, C-467/04, EU:C:2006:406, paragraph 107; see also sources cited supra note 87.Google Scholar

⁹³ See Janssens, , supra note 61, at 142 (“The ECJ's explicit references to both recognition and trust would hardly make sense if both concepts meant the same thing.”); see, e.g., Judgment in TNT Express Nederland v AXA Versicherung AG, C-533/08, EU:C:2010:243, paragraphs 54-56 [hereinafter TNT Express Nederland] (“In the case of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the relevant principles are those … of free movement of judgments and mutual trust in the administration of justice (favor executions).”). The principle of mutual trust does not bind arbitral tribunals. See Judgment in Gazprom OAO v Lithuania, C- 536/13, EU:C:2015:316, paragraphs 34-37.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Judgment in Van Esbroeck, C-436/04, EU:C:2006:165, paragraph 30. The identical argument is made in Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Kraaijenbrink, C-367/05, EU:C:2006:760, paragraph 43. Cf. also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Zoran Spasic, C- 129/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:586, paragraph 94.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ See, e.g., Judgment in Turner, C-159/02, EU:C:2004:228, paragraphs 24-28; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Allianz v West Tankers, Inc., C-185/07, EU:C:2008:466, paragraphs 22-26, 34-35.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo in Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad, C-303/05, EU:C:2006:552, paragraphs 17, 46, 62; and the Judgment in the same case, paragraph 57; Judgment in Melvin West, C-192/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:404, paragraphs 53, 62 [hereinafter Melvin West]. Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Judgment in Rinau, C-195/08 PPU, EU:C:2008:406, paragraph 50 [hereinafter Rinau]; Judgment in Detiček v Sgueglia, C-403/09 PPU, EU:C:2009:810, paragraph 45; Judgment in Aguirre Zarraga v Pelz, C-491/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:828, paragraphs 46, 70; Judgment in Health Service Executive v S.C., C-92/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:255, paragraphs 100-104 [hereinafter Health Service Executive]; Judgment in C. v M., C- 376/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:2268, paragraph 66.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See TNT Express Nederland, supra note 93, at paras. 54-56; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Prism Investments v. Meer, C-139/10, EU:C:2011:653, paragraphs 40-42; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Bank Handlowy and Adamiak, C-116/11, EU:C:2012:308, paragraph 66; Judgment in ERSTE Bank Hungary Nyrt v. Állam, C-527/10, EU:C:2012:417, paragraph 34.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See, e.g., Janssens, , supra note 61, at 141 (“The ECJ's succinct statement on mutual trust contrasts sharply with the wide-ranging reflections and questions these statements have prompted among legal commentators.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ See Flore, , supra note 86, at 19 (“La confiance mutuelle et établie par ses effets … elle existe parce que la disposition concernée de la convention … n'aurait pas été possible si la confiance n'avait pas existé.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Schutter, Olivier De, La contribution du contrôle juridictionnel à la confiance mutuelle, in La confiance mutuelle dans l'espace pénal européen 79, 98, 101 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005); see also, Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 416; Cathryn Costello, Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an end to blind trust across the EU?, in Asiel & Migrantenrecht 83, 90 (2012) (“This comes close to asserting that because we believe it, it must be true. Just because there is trust, does not mean that trust is warranted.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Herlin-Karnell, supra note 14, at 80.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Regensburg v Bourquain, C-297/07, EU:C:2008:206, paragraph 45.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Coursier, Case C-267/97, see supra note 86, at para. 19. For the 1968 Brussels Convention, see supra note 82.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Rinau, supra note 97, at para. 50. See Judgment in Povse v Alpago, C-211/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:400, paragraph 40 [hereinafter Povse] (“[G]rounds for non-recognition should be kept to the minimum required.”); see, e.g., TNT Express Nederland, supra note 93, at paras. 54-56; Melvin West, supra note 96, at para. 62; C., Case C- 376/14 PPU at para. 66; see also Recital 22 of Council Regulation 2201/2003 of Nov. 27, 2003 (concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility), 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1 (EC).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Prism Investments, supra note 98, at paras. 40-42 (emphasis added); see also Judgment in Salzgitter Mannesmann Handel GmbH v SC Laminorul SA, C-157/12, EU:C:2013:597, paragraphs 31-36; Judgment in Lithuanian Airlines AS v Starptautiskā lidosta Rīga VAS, C- 302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 45.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Melvin West, supra note 96, at para. 62.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See cases cited supra note 94; Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 423 (providing an overview).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Tiggelen, Vernimmen-van & Adamo, , supra note 11, at 20. For a similar assessment, see Möstl, supra note 61, 419.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See Tiggelen, Vernimmen-van & Adamo, , supra note 11, at 9–10. This was recently acknowledged in European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Draft report with recommendations to the Commission on the review of the European Arrest Warrant by Sarah Ludford (Rapporteur)”, Nov. 19, 2013, 2013/2109(INL). The draft report calls for major changes to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), including the introduction of a specific human rights' clause.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Pitto, Emanuele, Mutual Trust and Enlargement, in La Confiance Mutuelle dans L'Espace Pénal Européen 47 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005) (analyzing the relationship between enlargement and mutual trust).Google Scholar

¹¹² Fichera, Massimo, Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law 1 (Univ. Edinburgh Sch. L., Working Papers 2009/10) (giving an overview over the slow reform process in the area of criminal law since 2000).Google Scholar

¹¹³ Walker, See, supra note 31, at 32; Malcolm Anderson, Trust and Police Co-operation, in Police and Justice Cooperation and the New European Borders 46 (Malcolm Anderson & Joanna Apap eds., 2002).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Cf. also Anderson, , supra note 113, at 41-42.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Cf. Canor, , supra note 6, at 392.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See Gasser, Case C-116/02; see also Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Gazprom OAO v Lithuania, C- 536/13, see supra note 93, at para. 145.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ See infra note 142.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ This is now explicitly recognized in Recital 9 of Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA, supra note 90. See also Recital 4 of European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2010/64 of Oct. 20, 2010, The right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, 2010 O.J. (L 280) 1.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Recital 4 of Directive 2010/64/EU, supra note 118.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Majone, , supra note 61, at 20.Google Scholar

¹²¹ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament -Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and Future Orientations, COM (2004) 401 final (Feb. 26, 2004). In its 2009 evaluation of The Hague Programme, the Commission complains about the lack of any significant progress: European Commission, Justice, Freedom and Security in Europe since 2005: An Evaluation of the Hague Programme and Action Plan, COM (2009) 263 final (Oct. 6, 2009).Google Scholar

¹²² 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1. Article I-42 of this Treaty declared that the EU should promote “mutual confidence between the competent authorities of the Member States, in particular on the basis of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions.”Google Scholar

¹²³ Hague Programme, supra note 90, at 10–12; Stockholm Programme, supra note 90, at 5, 13–14 (p. 5: “Ensuring trust and finding new ways to increase reliance on, and mutual understanding between, the different legal systems in the Member States will thus be one of the main challenges for the future.”); see also European Commission, Strengthening Mutual Trust in the European Judicial Area—A Green Paper on the Application of EU Criminal Justice Legislation in the Field of Detention, COM (2011) 327 final (June 16, 2011).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary, Mutual Confidence. “Report and Recommendations, 2009– 2010”, http://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/mutualconfidence/mc2009-2010en.pdf. See discussion supra note 71.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ On the evolutionary nature of trust, see Flore, supra note 86, at 28; J.W. Ouwerkerk, Wederzijdse erkenning en wederzijds vertrouwen: de Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake overlevering, in Vertrouwen in de strafrechtspleging 87, 89 (R.S.T. Gaarthuis, et al. eds., 2010).Google Scholar

¹²⁶ European Commission, “Green Paper on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union”, COM (2003) 75 final (Dec. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Green Paper Report]; see also Kaufhold, supra note 87, at 116–19.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Recital 6 of Directive 2010/64/EU, supra note 118.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ See supra note 8.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ See infra Part D.IV.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ See Alegre, Susie, Mutual Trust – Lifting the mask, in La Confiance Mutuelle dans L'Espace Pénal Européen 41, 45 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005) (emphasizing that mutual trust depends also on budgetary issues—how much individual Member States are willing to pay for the quality of their justice system, for example prisons, legal aid, etc. But this can hardly be addressed on EU level.).Google Scholar

¹³¹ For a concise overview of recent developments concerning judicial cooperation, see Rolf Wagner, Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der justiziellen Zusammenarbeit in Zivilsachen, in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1796 (2015); Dominik Brodowski, Strafrechtsrelevante Entwicklungen in der Europäischen Union, in Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 79 (2015).Google Scholar

¹³² Hague Programme, supra note 90, at 11.Google Scholar

¹³³ European Commission, Assessment of the Tampere Programme, supra note 121, at 10. Apart from the Hague and Stockholm Programmes, see also Serge de Biolley, Panorama des mesures accompagnatrices de la confiance mutuelle dans l'espace européen de justice pénale, in La Confiance Mutuelle dans L'Espace Pénal Européen 175 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005); European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Mutual Confidence 2009-2010. Report and Recommendations (2010), http://www.csm1909.ro/csm/linkuri/07_01_2011__38124_ro.pdf. See also Anderson, supra note 113, at 35.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Hague Programme, supra note 90, at 11; Stockholm Programme, supra note 90, at 13. See European Commission, Building Trust in EU-Wide Justice: A New Dimension to European Judicial Training, COM (2011) 551 final (Sept. 13, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/european-judicial-training/index_en.htm. For an overview over the existing European judicial networks and professional organizations, see European Commission, European Judicial Training (last updated March 23, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/european-judicial-training/index_en.htm.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ See supra Part C.II.2. For practitioners who agree that information exchange, training, feedback and networks are pivotal for judicial cooperation, see Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, at 20–21.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ See European Commission, Assessment of the Tampere Programme, supra note 121, at 11; Hague Programme, supra note 90, at 11. For criminal justice, see Green Paper Report, supra note 126; Stockholm Programme, supra note 90, at 12; Recital 7 and 9 of Directive 2010/64/EU, supra note 118; Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, at 9–10 (explaining the “excessive” use of European arrest warrants for minor crimes and without the safeguard of the dual criminality requirement is a big problem for legal practitioners). Another reason is mentioned by Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, at 18 (“Since practitioners are only rarely involved in the process that leads to a mutual recognition instrument, results often appear too theoretical, abstract or even arbitrary to be of practical value.”).Google Scholar

¹³⁷ See Tiggelen, Vernimmen-van & Adamo, , supra note 11, at 22. For a very recent harmonization proposal see European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Certain Aspects of the Presumption of Innocence and of the Right to be Present at Trial in Criminal Proceedings, COM (2013) 821/2, as well as the other proposals in the legislative package to strengthen procedural safeguards for citizens in criminal proceedings; cf. Press Release, European Commission, The Right to … —a Fair Trial! Commission wants more safeguards for citizens in criminal proceedings (Nov. 27, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1157_en.htm. Legislative developments are tracked by http://db.eurocrim.org/db/de/sachgebiete/stpo/verfahrensrechte/, and http://db.eurocrim.org/db/de/sachgebiete/stpo/opferschutz_zeugenschutz/.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ See Majone, , supra note 61, at 4, 11–15; Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, at 10; see also Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, supra note 103, at para. 43. Consequently, recent legislative efforts in criminal law have concentrated on establishing minimum standards for specific procedural situations, for example trial in absentia, rather than attempting to fully harmonize the law, cf. Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, art. 4(a), 2009 O.J. (L 81) 24–36 (EC) (amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA et al.,); Council Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, art. 8, 2014 O.J. (L 127) 39–50 (EC); Council Directive 2014/41/EU Regarding the European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters (EIO), art. 14, 2014 O.J. (L 130) 1–36 (EC). In civil justice, the second generation instruments operate in a similar way. Here, the abolition of the exequatur regime for the enforcement of specific orders and judgments is accompanied by a series of procedural safeguards, for example minimum procedural standards for the court of origin, cf. Regulation 805/2004, Creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 15–39 (EC); Regulation 1896/2006, Creating a European order for payment procedure, 2006 O.J. (L 399) 1–32 (EC); Regulation 861/2007, Establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1–22 (EC). More detailed procedural standards are prescribed by Regulation 655/2014, Establishing a European account Preservation Order procedure, 2014 O.J. (L 189) 59–92 (EU).Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Limits for an overly extensive harmonization draws from article 67, § 1 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States.”) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ This idea is discussed by Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 422–23.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ This article cannot discuss the differences between interpretation and construction. As a critique, the ECJ's approach towards the principle of mutual trust is concerned with the translation of the semantic content of a legal text into legal rules rather than with the determination of the linguistic meaning, the term “construction” will be preferred here. Yet, the distinction itself is vague. For more details, see Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁴² Judgment in Weber, C-1/07, EU:C:2008:640, pararaph 39 (emphasis added). A sense of crisis is shared by Friedrich Schoch, Gerichtliche Verwaltungskontrollen, in 3 Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts § 50, margin numbers 378–79 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013). Potential consequences of a crisis are discussed by Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 421–23.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ See supra notes 94 and 108. Similar is the distinction between the requirement of trust on an “abstract level,” that means between the Member States, and mutual trust “in concreto,” i.e. the (neglected) trust between the courts and agencies, made by Janssens, supra note 61, at 143.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See Alegre, , supra note 130, at 43 (explaining “perceived” insofar as there exists a gap between the level of trust showed by national governments and actually present in national parliaments); Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, at 9 (calling attention to the role political rhetoric plays in judicial cooperation).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ See supra note 109; see also Anabela Miranda Rodrigues, Confiance mutuelle et contrôle juridictionnel: Une liaison nécessaire?, in La Confiance Mutuelle dans L'Espace Penal Europeen 163, 165 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005) (distinguishing between a “confiance confidante” on the political level and a “confiance méfiante” among legal practitioners).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Recital 9 of Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA, supra note 90. Similarly, Recital 4 of Directive 2010/64/EU, supra note 118.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ See Möstl, supra note 61, at 429–30; Schoch, supra note 142, at margin number 379.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ See Kaufhold, , supra note 2, at 420–21 (describing the ECJ's interpretation of the principle of mutual trust as an “obligation” to be ignorant because certain facts cannot be introduced before the courts of the country of destination).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ On the distinction between a “formal” and a “substantive” concept of trust, see Ouwerkerk, supra note 125, at 90–91. The distinction is partly misleading because “formal trust” can hardly be called trust at all due to the absence of the essential elements of trusting. See generally supra Part C.II.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Möstl, supra note 61, 429–30.Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Kaufhold, , supra note 2, 426–27. Recently, the category of “principles” has received a lot of attention in European private law. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law, Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1629 (2010); Arthur S. Hartkamp, The General Principles of EU Law and Private Law, 75 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 241 (2011). However, this discussion focuses primarily on the principles in the Dworkinian sense of “law as integrity,” see Chantal Mak, Hedgehogs in Luxembourg? A Dworkinian Reading of the CJEU's Case Law on Principles of Private Law and Some Doubts of the Fox, 20 Eur. Rev. of Priv. L. 323 (2012), rather than on the Alexian concept of principles as optimization requirements. Consequently, one of the big differences between the general principles of private law and the principles of mutual trust and of mutual recognition is that the ECJ does not use the latter “to fill normative gaps left either by the authors of the Treaties or by the EU legislature”—one of the main functions of principles in the first sense Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra at 1629; see Kaufhold, supra note 2, 428–29; Möstl, supra note 61, at 410.Google Scholar

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¹⁵³ Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Prism Investments, supra note 98, at para. 40 (“the purpose and the object”).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ Rinau, supra note 97 at para. 50; see also Povse, supra note 105, at para. 40. Kaufhold joins the ECJ in her construction of the principle of mutual trust; she defines the ECJ's core idea as “waiving all means of control irrespective of the state of harmonization.” Kaufhold, supra note 2, at 429,Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, supra note 103, at para. 41.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ For the distinction between a “formal” and a “substantive” concept of trust, see supra note 149.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ See also Stessens, Guy, The Principle of Mutual Confidence Between Judicial Authorities in the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security, in L'Espace Pénal Européen: Enjeux et Perspectives 91, 93 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2002); Henri Labayle, Les perspectives du contrôle juridictionnel de la confiance mutuelle dans l'Union européenne, in La Confiance Mutuelle dans L'Espace Pénal Européen 123, 137 (Gilles de Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005); Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, at 20 (“[M]utual confidence between Member States' judicial and prosecuting authorities. …”); Fichera, supra note 112, at 13; Kaufhold, supra note 2, 423–24.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ Recital 4 of Directive 2010/64/EU, supra note 118, at 1.Google Scholar

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¹⁶² Schmidt-Aßmann, supra, at note 77 (“vertrauensgenerierende Dogmatik”). Google Scholar

¹⁶³ Due to the complexity of any empirical assessment, a plausible correlation usually suffices. See supra Part B.II.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ See supra note 38.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ For the EU see Olivier De Schutter, The Role of Collective Learning in the Establishment of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU (2007), http://eucenter.wisc.edu/Conferences/GovNYDec06/Docs/DeSchutterApril.pdf. More generally, see Martin Eifert, Innovationen in und durch Netzwerkorganisationen: Relevanz, Regulierung und staatliche Einbindung, in Innovation und rechtliche Regulierung 88 (Martin Eifert & Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem eds., 2002).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ See supra Part C.IV.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ See supra Part B.II.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ See supra note 147.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Herlin-Karnell, supra note 14, at 81 (referring to Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Lopes Da Silva Jorge, C-42/11, EU:C:2012:151).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ See supra note 142.Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Judgment in Eurofood IFSC, C-341/04, EU:C:2006:281, paragraph 40.Google Scholar

¹⁷² Id. at para. 41.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Id. at para. 42.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ Judgment in MG Probud Gdynia, C-444/07, EU:C:2010:24, paragraphs 27–29.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Gasparini and Others, supra note 92, at paras. 92–104.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ Id. at para. 109.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ Id. at paras. 110–11.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Id. at para. 112.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ See Judgment in Kretzinger, C-288/05, EU:C:2007:441; Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in van Straaten v. Nederlanden, C-150/05, EU:C:2006:381, paragraphs 61–62, 73; Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Mantello, C-261/09, EU:C:2010:501, paragraphs 14, 34, 82, 131; Judgment in Radu, C-396/11, EU:C:2013:39, paragraphs 36– 43; Judgment in Melloni v Fiscal, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraphs 43–44, 59–63.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 012), 1–23 (EC).Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ Judgment in Apostolides, C-420/07, EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 73.Google Scholar

¹⁸² Judgment in Purrucker I, C-256/09, EU:C:2010:437, paragraph 73.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ Judgment in Purrucker II, C-296/10, EU:C:2010:665, paragraphs 81–85.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ Povse, supra note 105, at para. 59.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Judgment in Jeremy F. v Premier Ministre, C-168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 56.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ For a more detailed analysis of reform proposals for the cooperation in criminal matters, see Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, 24–59.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ Rinau, supra note 97, at para. 50; see also supra note 105.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ Judgment in B., C-306/09, EU:C:2010:626, paragraph 50.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ These very short remarks on the nature of balancing must suffice here. For balancing and the Pareto principle see generally Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality, 16 Ratio Juris 131, 135 (2003).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ See discussion supra note 63.Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ Purrucker I, supra note 182, at para. 73.Google Scholar

¹⁹² Purrucker II, supra note 183, at paras. 81–85.Google Scholar

¹⁹³ Cf. Health Service Executive, supra note 97, at paras. 100–04.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁴ In the same vein, recent secondary legislation tries to stimulate the horizontal dialogue between the Member States' courts on these issues, see Directive 2014/41/EU of 3 April 2014, supra note 138, at art. 6 § 1(a) and 3, art. 11 § 4.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ In Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 14, 2004, 111 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 307–22, the German Federal Constitutional Court decided that all German courts had to “take into account” the ECtHR's jurisprudence. On what “take into account” means: Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, ECHR and National Jurisdiction – The Görgülü Case, 11 Humboldt F. Recht 138, 145 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁶ For the nexus between fundamental rights protection and the Union's identity see Armin von Bogdandy et al., Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights Against EU Member States, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 489 (2012); Canor, supra note 6, at 383. For a recent critique of the ECJ's human rights legacy, see Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor, 105 Am. J. Int'l L. 649 (2011). For a more positive assessment, see Jeff Kenner, The Court of Justice of the European Union and Human Rights in 2010 – Entering a Post-Lisbon Age of Maturity?, Eur. Y.B. on Hum. Rts. 173 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ In the field of EU freedoms, fundamental rights can justify non-recognition. See, e.g., Judgment in Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614, paragraph 35. For the European Arrest Warrant, see Judgment in Wolzenburg, C-123/08, EU:C:2009:616; Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, supra note 188, at para. 43; Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, supra note 169, at para. 28.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁸ See Schutter, De, supra note 101, at 104 (“The respect for fundamental rights defines the limit for mutual recognition obligations.”).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, supra note 169, at para. 28.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ For a comprehensive survey of the grounds for non-recognition in European private law see Burkhard Hess & Thomas Pfeiffer, Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception as Referred to in EU Instruments of Private International and Procedural Law (2011), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/453189/IPOL-JURI_ET(2011)453189_EN.pdf. While Hess and Pfeiffer show that public policy exceptions are only rarely applied in practice, the existence of a “safety net” is still essential for trust-building, cf. Canor, supra note 6, at 411, 115. Characteristically, Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351), 1-32 (EU) (Brussels Ia-Regulation) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters did not remove the “public order” exception as initially planned (on the attempts to fully abolish the exequatur proceedings including public policy review for judgments in civil and commercial matters, see Peter Arnt Nielsen, The New Brussels I Regulation, 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 503 (2013). See also the recent Regulation 650/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201), 107–34 (EU) on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession. Differently, however, Regulation (EU) 655/2014, supra note 138. For criminal law see Vernimmen-van Tiggelen & Adamo, supra note 11, at 10; see, e.g., Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA, art. 7, 20 § 3, 2005 O.J. (L 76), 16–30 (discussing the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties); Art. 9 of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, art. 9, 2008 O.J. (L 327), 27–46 (EC) (discussing the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union).Google Scholar

²⁰¹ Council Regulation 2201/2003, supra note 105, at art. 24 (“The jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin may not be reviewed. The test of public policy referred to in Articles 22(a) and 23(a) may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction set out in Articles 3 to 14.”); see also infra notes 202 and 212. A slightly different development can be observed in criminal law. See Herlin-Karnell, supra note 14, at 82 (describing how general principles of EU law and Charter rights have slowly been implemented by the ECJ even with regard to former Third Pillar Measures, especially the European Arrest Warrant). See also the proposal for the introduction of a more specific human rights clause to the European Arrest Warrant in the Report by Rapporteur Sarah Ludford, supra note 110, at 5. A promising step in criminal matters is again Directive 2014/41/EU, supra note 138, whose Art. 11 sec. 1 lit. f states that the execution of an EIO may be refused in the executing State, if “there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the investigative measure indicated in the EIO would be incompatible with the executing State's obligations in accordance with Article 6 TEU and the Charter.”Google Scholar

²⁰² Cf. Judgment in McB. v E., C-400/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:582, paragraphs 51–52. Gabriele Britz, Justice of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, describes and criticizes the consequences of the lack of common fundamental rights standards in family law, especially with regard to the right to respect for the family. Gabriele Britz, Grundrechtsschutz in der justiziellen Zusammenarbeit – zur Titelfreizügigkeit in Familiensachen, 68 Juristenzeitung 105 (2013). On the highly controversial structure and content of Art. 51 of the Charter, see Thomas von Danwitz & Katherina Paraschas, A Fresh Start for the Charter: Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 35 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1396 (2012); Judgment in Åklagaren v Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105; Daniel Thym, Separation versus Fusion – or: How to Accommodate National Autonomy and the Charter?, 9 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 391 (2013); Johannes Masing, Einheit und Vielfalt des Europäischen Grundrechtsschutzes, 70 Juristenzeitung 477 (2015).Google Scholar

²⁰³ Whether a substantive European public policy already exists or is about to emerge is hotly debated. For an overview see Haris Meidanis, Public Policy and Ordre Public in the Private International Law of the EC/EU: Traditional Positions and Modern Trends, Eur. L. Rev. 95 (2005); Ioanna Thoma, Die Europäisierung und die Vergemeinschaftung des nationalen ordre public (2007).Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ Opinion 2/13, supra note 5, at paras. 191–95. Cf. the decision of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09 (Jan. 21, 2011), hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-103050&filename=001-103050.pdf&TID=nubefaxeep, on the implications of the European Charter of Human Rights for EU asylum law.Google Scholar

²⁰⁵ Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Radu, supra note 179, at paras. 76–85; Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Melloni, supra note 179, at para. 127. But see also the respective judgments Radu, supra note 179, at paras. 36–43; Melloni, supra note 179, at paras. 43–44, 59–63.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ See supra Part C.IV.Google Scholar

²⁰⁷ In this sense, the German Federal Constitutional Court in the European arrest warrant case has argued that Germany's participation in the new framework was justified, because the other participating Member States were bound by the European values of Art. 2 TEU. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18, 2005, 113 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 273 (299).Google Scholar

²⁰⁸ Particular emphasis on the “primacy, unity and effectiveness” place Melloni, supra note 179, at para. 60; Opinion 2/13, supra note 5, at paras. 188–89.Google Scholar

²⁰⁹ Canor, supra note 6, at 387, 392 and passim. Cf. id. at 414 (“By doing so, it [the ECJ] concerts national courts, yet again, into delegates for the application of European fundamental rights law.”).Google Scholar

²¹⁰ Cf. the proposals by von Bogdandy et al., supra note 196, and Canor, supra note 6.Google Scholar

²¹¹ For more details see De Schutter, supra note 101, at 109–21; Labayle, supra note 157, at 140–47.Google Scholar

²¹² According to Britz, supra note 202, 109–10, the ECJ's judgment in Zarraga, C-491/10 PPU, supra note 97, while not positively affirming that grave violations of fundamental rights constitute a ground for non-recognition, see id. at para. 74 (“[T]he court with jurisdiction in the Member State of enforcement cannot oppose the recognition and enforcement of that judgment.”), does not categorically preclude such an argument, see id. at para. 60 (the “Regulation … may not be contrary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights”). See also Jan-Jaap Kuipers, The (Non) Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to a Certificate for the Return of a Child, 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 397 (2012). A similar position develops in Janssens, supra note 61, 143–44, for the ne bis in idem exception in the cooperation in criminal matters.Google Scholar

²¹³ N.S., C-411/10 & C-493/10 at paras. 78–86. The ECJ first considered that the Common European Asylum System was “based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights”; this presumption, however, was “rebuttable” (para. 104) where Member States' courts “cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure … amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision” (id. at para. 106). On the implications of the N.S. decision cf. Costello, supra note 101, 89–90; Brouwer, supra note 53, 143–47; Herlin-Karnell, supra note 14, 86; Canor, supra note 6, 393–94 (holding that “the crux of the judgment” is that “each regulation's implementation is subject to an obligation not to be applied if respect of European fundamental rights by all those involved does not satisfy a certain threshold”). This even holds true for regulations “formulated in categorical terms.” In these cases, however, there exists a “strong presumption of compatibility with the protection of […] European fundamental rights” (id. at 394).Google Scholar

²¹⁴ But see Canor, , supra note 6, at 410, on Zarraga, C-491/10 PPU at para. 60.Google Scholar

²¹⁵ Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 179, at para. 76.Google Scholar

²¹⁶ Recital 5 of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, supra note 200.Google Scholar

²¹⁷ See 113 BVerfGE 273, 299.Google Scholar

²¹⁸ See supra note 142.Google Scholar

²¹⁹ See supra Part D.II. for the decisions in Eurofood IFSC, Probud and Apostolides and the opinion in Gasparini. But see cases cited supra note 179 (pointing in a very different direction).Google Scholar

²²⁰ Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 179, at para. 91.Google Scholar

²²¹ Canor, , supra note 6, at 402.Google Scholar

²²² “Let recognition be done, though the world perish.”Google Scholar