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Dropping the Other Shoe: Obergefell and the Inevitability of the Constitutional Right to Equal Marriage

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

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After having invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the U.S. Supreme Court “dropped the other shoe” in Obergefell v. Hodges by declaring the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage at the state level unconstitutional. Written by Justice Kennedy, the majority opinion heavily relied on the dignity-bestowing character of marriage to show why this exclusion is so harmful. But this strategy comes with a cost: it inflicts a stigma even as it conveys recognition—a drawback that an equality analysis can avoid. Respondents had argued that opening marriage dangerously disconnected marriage from procreation, both the historical reason for and the essence of marriage. In finding that they had failed to provide evidence for the harmful outcomes they described, the majority not only provided the rational basis test with a new kind of “bite.” It also asserted that tradition or religious beliefs were not enough to justify exclusion. Once secular purposes define marriage and rational reasons are required to regulate access, the road to marriage equality opens wide. As the line of cases leading up to Obergefell suggests, and developments in Germany, Austria, and other jurisdictions confirm, equality works as a one-way ratchet—albeit without necessarily including polygamy and incest. Crucially, equality changes the focus: From an equality perspective, the harm lies not in the exclusion from a dignity-conferring institution, but in the suggestion that the excluded group is not worthy of participating in it and does not deserve the recognition and benefits associated with it. Instead of aspiring to achieve dignity through marriage, in this view same-sex couples claim recognition as free and equal citizens. Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation subsumes an individual under a group category whose purported characteristics are systematically devalued, thus refusing to appreciate a person as an individual. It is this denial of recognition that conveys harm to the dignity of the individual above and beyond the respective disadvantage suffered. Thus taken with equality, dignity does not have the exclusive effect it has in isolation, as struggling against degrading exclusion stresses common traits.

Type
Special Section - Same-Sex Marriage: Comparative Reflections
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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179 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 21, 2010, 126 BVerfGE 400.Google Scholar

180 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 19, 2012, 131 BVerfGE 239.Google Scholar

181 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18, 2012, 132 BVerfGE 179.Google Scholar

182 133 BVerfGE 377.Google Scholar

183 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 19, 2013, 133 BVerfGE 59.Google Scholar

184 See supra note 156.Google Scholar

185 Schalk and Kopf, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 106; references omitted.Google Scholar

186 Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] Sep. 22, 2011, Case No. B518/11 (misinterpreting the EPG).Google Scholar

187 Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 2012, Case No. G131/11 (stating “easier processing” not convincing).Google Scholar

188 Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2012, Case Nos. B125/11 and 138/11. Michael Spindelegger, then president of the National Assembly and later foreign minister, had advocated this separation: “And the fact is that at the registrar's office in the summer season people especially like to get married—that will automatically lead to a contact between heterosexual and homosexual couples. Whether that is such a good idea is anybody's guess.” Oliver Pink, Spindelegger: Josef Proll is eine geniale Figur, Die Presse (Apr. 29, 2008), http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/380504/Spindelegger_Josef-Proll-ist-eine-geniale-Figur (author's translation).Google Scholar

189 Dietz and Suttasom v. Austria, App. No. 31185/13 (May 29, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

190 Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] June 19, 2013, Case Nos. G18/13 and 19/13.Google Scholar

191 VfGH, Case Nos. B125/11 and 138/11 (Dec. 12, 2012). In an earlier decision on the same case, the Court clarified that the law did not have to require but also did not exclude two people serving as witnesses, nor the ritual of question-answer-confirmation; see VfGH G 18/13 and 19/13, paras. 15–17.Google Scholar

192 Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] Dec. 12, 2013, Case Nos. G16/13 and 44/13.Google Scholar

193 Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] Dec. 11, 2014, Case Nos. G119/14 and 120/14. On step-parent adoption for cohabiting same-sex partners, see X and others, App. No. 19010/07.Google Scholar

194 VfGH, Case Nos. G16/13 and 44/13 at para. 54.Google Scholar

195 VfGH, Case Nos. G119/4 and 120/14 at para. 48.Google Scholar

196 Id. at paras. 39, 4447.Google Scholar

197 Markard, supra note 148.Google Scholar

198 In both jurisdictions, some differences in treatment still exist. For example, the registered partner of a birth mother is not automatically her co-parent, and adoption can be burdensome. See Nora Markard, Supreme Court Strengthens Rights of Private Sperm Donors at the Expense of Lesbian Couples (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.sexualorientationlaw.eu/120-supreme-court-strengthens-rights-of-private-sperm-donors-at-the-expense-of-lesbian-couples-germany. For a full list for Austria, see Rechtskomitee Lambda, Ungleichbehandlungen zur Ehe (Stand: Mai 2015), http://www.rklambda.at/images/publikationen/2015RKL_EPG_AbweichungenvomEherecht_V9_Mai2015.pdf.Google Scholar

199 Karner v. Austria, 2003 IX Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 41; Kozak v. Poland, [2010] ECHR 280, para. 99; Vallianatos, App. Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09 at para. 85; 124 BVerfGE 199 (220); 126 BVerfGE 400 (419); 131 BVerfGE 239, para. 57; 133 BVerfGE 59, para. 104; 133 BVerfGE 377, para. 77.Google Scholar

200 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) and San Antonio Indep. Sch. District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3537 (1973)). See also id. at 2635–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

201 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), rev'd, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).Google Scholar

202 Id. Google Scholar

203 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).Google Scholar

204 But see supra note 189.Google Scholar

205 Perry, 671 F.3d at 1063–64.Google Scholar

206 Mexican Supreme Court, Amparo en revisión 704/2014, para. 169 (2015). As this is the fifth judgment on this matter, it now constitutes binding precedent, see Matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo. No existe razón de índole constitucional para no reconocerlo, Pleno de las Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Décima Época, Libro 19, Tomo I, Junio de 2015, Tesis P./J. 46/2015 (10a.), Página 534 (Mex.). Cf. José María Serna de la Garza, The Concept of Jurisprudencia in Mexican Law, 1 Mexican L. Rev. 131 (2009).Google Scholar

207 See supra section B.IV.Google Scholar

208 Yoshino, supra note 78, at 793–98. The author advocates liberty-dominated dignity claims, but does not take into account that the protection level of liberty may be below that of equality, as in the European cases discussed in the preceding section. He uses the term “pluralism anxiety” to describe “the fear that we are fracturing into fiefs that do not speak with each other.” Id. at 747.Google Scholar

209 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).Google Scholar

210 The term polygamy actually covers very different practices that can also include polyandry or even same-sex polygyny, and anthropological research suggests that power structures can be complex. See Miriam Koktvedgaard Zeitzen, Polygamy: A Cross-Cultural Analysis (2008). For a feminist perspective, see Beverly Baines, Polygamy and Feminist Constitutionalism, in Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives 452 (Beverly Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2012).Google Scholar

211 Obergefell, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 54, at 18.Google Scholar

212 Id. at 17.Google Scholar

213 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).Google Scholar

214 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1940).Google Scholar

215 Oliari, App. Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11.Google Scholar

216 A marriage may not be concluded between direct relatives and between consanguine siblings. See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 1307, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__1307.html.Google Scholar

217 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 173, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__173.html. This law criminalizes sexual intercourse (penile-vaginal only) between consanguine parents and children, and between consanguine siblings; only adults are liable. It is part of the section on Offenses Related to the Personal Status Registry, Marriage and the Family. Child abuse and sexual assault are part of the following section, Offenses Against Sexual Self-Determination.Google Scholar

218 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], Feb. 26, 2008, 120 BVerfGE 224, paras. 44-49 (Hassemer, J., dissenting) – Geschwisterinzest [Sibling Incest]. This case was later confirmed by Stübing v. Germany, App. No. 43547/08 (Apr. 13, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ (showing a large margin of appreciation on protection of morals, no consensus on sensitive issue). But see Deutscher Ethikrat, Inzestverbot Stellungnahme 40 (2014) (discussing that consensual incest is usually a result, not a source of family disruption).Google Scholar

219 The siblings came from a broken home, and the brother never knew he had a sister. They met when he was 24 years old, she sixteen, and had four children. She was later found to be slightly mentally handicapped and highly dependent on her brother, who was once convicted for acts of domestic violence against her. 120 BVerfGE 224. Note that the Court was seized with a facial challenge.Google Scholar

220 Ethikrat, Deutscher, supra note 218, at 10–13.Google Scholar

221 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (citing Stevens's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick with approval).Google Scholar

222 See, e.g., Tatjana Hörnle, Das Verbot des Geschwisterinzests—Verfassungsgerichtliche Bestätigung und verfassungsrechtliche Kritik, 61 NJW 2085 (2008); John Philipp Thurn, Eugenik und Moralschutz durch Strafrecht? Verfassungsrechtliche Anmerkungen zur Inzestverbotsentscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 42 Kritische Justiz 74 (2009); Ali Al-Zand and Jan Siebenhüner, § 173 StGB—Eine kritische Betrachtung des strafrechtlichen Inzestverbots, 89 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (KritV) 68 (2006). Deutscher Ethikrat, supra note 218, 7274.Google Scholar

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224 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

225 Id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

226 Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).Google Scholar

227 Sedgwick, Eve, The Epistemology of the Closet (1990).Google Scholar

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230 See Hillgruber, Christian, Wo bleibt die Freiheit der anderen? Es ist jedem freigestellt, wie er Homosexualität bewertet. Ein Plädoyer für den Schutz einer neuen Minderheit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/staat-und-recht/homosexualitaet-schutz-und-freiheit-einer-neuen-minderheit-12812195.html; Matthias Matussek, Ich bin wohl homophob. Und das ist auch gut so, Die Welt (Feb. 12, 2014). For a critical discussion, see Anna Katharina Mangold, Die verfolgte Unschuld vom Lande oder: Warum es keines “Grundrechts auf Diskriminierung” bedarf, Verfassungsblog (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/verfolgte-unschuld-vom-lande-oder-warum-es-keines-grundrechts-auf-diskriminierung-bedarf/. See also Ute Sacksofsky, Das Märchen vom Untergang der Ehe, 68 Merkur 143, 145 (2014).Google Scholar

231 See Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, Kentucky Clerk Defies Court on Marriage Licenses for Gay Couples, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/us/kentucky-rowan-county-same-sex-marriage-licenses-kim-davis.html?_r=0.Google Scholar

232 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).Google Scholar

233 See Hall, Margaux J., A Fiduciary Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 1729 (2014).Google Scholar

234 See Photography, Elane, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53; cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).Google Scholar

235 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.Google Scholar