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The Brexit Referendum and the Crisis of “Extreme Centrism”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Michael Wikinson*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics [M.Wilkinson@lse.ac.uk]

Extract

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The result of the Brexit referendum sends shockwaves through the political fabric of the UK, Europe and beyond. It is the latest instance in a series of anti-systemic shocks to hit the EU, but will almost certainly not be the last, as discontent with the status quo and a disconnected elite continues unabated across the Continent (and is replicated across the Atlantic), and the European Union provides a convenient target for voters to express their anger and resentment.

Type
Brexit Special Supplement
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

References

1 See Tariq Ali, The Extreme Centre: A Warning (2015).Google Scholar

2 This include notable experts on European integration. See Bickerton, Chris, Brexit is not the Property of the Political Right. The Left is Disenchanted Too, The Guardian (June 22, 2016), available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/22/brexit-property-right-left-eu-expert.Google Scholar

3 See Verhofstadt, Guy, Europe's Rule of Law Crisis, Project Syndicate (April 11, 2016).Google Scholar

4 Joseph H. H. Weiler, Editorial: Integration Through Fear, 23 European Journal of International law 1 (2012).Google Scholar

5 Nearly half of leave campaigners (49%) gave as their single biggest reason the principle that “decisions in the UK should be taken by the UK.” See Ashcroft, Lord Michael, “How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and Why” (24 June 2016), available at http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/. The data has also been woefully misconstrued. See, e.g., Fredrik de Boer, “Everyone is Reading that Infographic Incorrectly” (26 June 2016), available at http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/06/26/everyone-is-reading-that-infographic-incorrectly/.Google Scholar

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7 See Oltermann, Philip, Jürgen Habermas's Verdict on the EU/Greece Debt Deal – Full Transcript, The Guardian (July 16, 2015), available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/16/jurgen-habermas-eu-greece-debt-deal. This class-based aspect of Eurozone politics is not often addressed. Conditionality (austerity) is what Blyth calls a “class-specific put-option.” It protects the top 70% who have assets, and hurts the bottom 30% who most depend on public services. See Blyth, M., The History of a Dangerous Idea 258 (2013).Google Scholar

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10 See Christoph Möllers, We are (afraid of) the People: Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism, in The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 87 (M. Loughlin & N. Walker eds., 2007).Google Scholar

11 Michael Wilkinson, “The Reconstitution of Postwar Europe: Lineages of Authoritarian Liberalism,” available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2745394.Google Scholar