Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-cfpbc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T13:58:29.970Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Approaches for Dealing with the “Natural Person” in the Chinese Legal System: A Statutory Way and a Principled Way

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Along with numerous ethical and legal questions prompted by advancements in technology, there is a strong call for protection of “persons” in a broad sense. This Article discusses how such developments emerge in China. Chinese courts are often confronted with disputes concerning prenatal injuries, the disposition of frozen embryos, and infringements on the reputation of the deceased. After examining these cases, their underlying tensions, and the upcoming Chinese Civil Code, this Article reflects on the evolving concept of a natural person within the Chinese civil law context. The Article further asks how law deals with new problems while at the same time maintaining stability and coherence when viewed against a rapidly evolving biotechnological background.

Type
Special Issue Traditions, Myths, and Utopias of Personhood
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

References

1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则 (2009 年修订版)) [General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (2009 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987, amended Aug. 27, 2009) ch. II, § 1, art. 9, translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383941.htm [hereinafter GPCL]. China only issued the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China as general law within the civil legal system.Google Scholar

2 See Toni Selkälä & Mikko Rajavuori chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017); Lisette ten Haaf chapter in this volume, 18 German L. J. ## (2017).Google Scholar

3 Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Zongze (中华人民共和国民法总则) [General Rules on the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), translated at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=291593&lib=law [hereinafter GRCL]. The GRCL is deemed the most important and difficult part of drafting the Chinese Civil Code. China previously tried compiling a code three times, but failed to reach a general consensus. Now that the GRL has been adopted, it is promising that the first Civil Code will be issued by 2020.Google Scholar

4 GPCL, supra note 1.Google Scholar

5 See, e.g., Liang Huixing (梁彗星), Minfa Zong Lun (民法总论) [General Introduction to Civil Law] 88 (4th ed. 2011); Ma Junju & Yu Yanman (马俊驹 & 余延满), Minfa Yuan Lun (民法原论) [The Theory of Civil Law] 76 (4th ed. 2010); Wang Liming (王利明), Minfa Zong Lun (民法总论) [The General Theory Of Civil Law] 136–137 (2009); Wang Weiguo (王卫国), Minfa Xue (民法学) [Civil Law] 58 (2007).Google Scholar

6 Liu Zhaocheng (刘召成), Taier de Zhun Renge Goucheng (胎儿的准人格构成) [On the Quasi-Personality Construction of Fetus], 6 Jurist 66, 67 (2011). See also Windscheid, Bernhard, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (8 Auflage) [Textbook of Pandects (8th ed.)] 198 (1900).Google Scholar

8 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion And Euthanasia 10 (1993).Google Scholar

9 Zhaocheng, supra note 6.Google Scholar

10 See Selkälä & Rajavuori, supra note 2; ten Haaf, supra note 2.Google Scholar

11 J. Madeleine Nash, Inside the Womb, Time, Nov. 11, 2002, at 68. See generally Tsiaras, Alexander, From Conception to Birth: A Life Unfolds (2002).Google Scholar

12 Lugosi, Charles I., Respecting Human Life in 21st Century America: A Moral Perspective to Extend Civil Rights to The Unborn from Creation to Natural Death, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. 425, 435 n.61 (2004). See also Gray, Henry, The Form of the Embryo at Different Stages of Its Growth, in Anatomy of the Human Body 74 (1918), https://ia600500.us.archive.org/15/items/anatomyofhumanbo1918gray/anatomyofhumanbo1918gray_bw.pdf.Google ScholarPubMed

13 Smith, Sandra L., Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1845, 1851 (2000).Google Scholar

14 See, e.g., ten Haaf, supra note 2.Google Scholar

15 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jicheng Fa (中华人民共和国继承法) [Law of Succession of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 10, 1985, effective Oct. 1, 1985), translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383956.htm.Google Scholar

16 See, e.g., Li Yongjun (李永军), Minfa Zong Lun (民法总论) [General Theory of Civil Law] 69 (2008); Huixing, supra note 5, at 89; Liming, supra note 5, at 136–37.Google Scholar

17 GPCL, supra note 1.Google Scholar

18 Zhang Junhao (张俊浩), Minfa Xue Yuanli (民法学原理) [Principles of Civil Law] 153 (2000).Google Scholar

19 Sup. People's Ct., Wangdeqin su Yangdesheng, Luzhou Shi Qiche Er Dui Jiatong Shigu Sunhai Peichang Jiufen An (王德钦诉杨德胜、泸州市汽车二队交通事故损害赔偿纠纷案) [Wang v. Yang Desheng and the No. 2 Automobile Team of Luzhou City Traffic Accident Damage Compensation Dispute Case] (May 28, 2003), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=1970324837041987&lib=case.Google Scholar

20 GPCL, supra note 1, art. 119:Google Scholar

[A]nyone who infringes upon a citizen's person and causes him physical injury shall pay his medical expenses and his loss in income due to missed working time and shall pay him living subsidies if he is disabled; if the victim dies, the infringer shall also pay the funeral expenses, the necessary living expenses of the deceased's dependents and other such expenses.Google Scholar

In Chinese: “侵害公民身体造成伤害的,应当赔偿医疗费、因误工减少的收入、残废者生活补助费等费用;造成死亡的,并应当支付丧葬费、死者生前扶养的人必要的生活费等费用.”Google Scholar

21 Aleksander Peczenik, On law And Reason 318 (Springer 2d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

22 Id. at 319.Google Scholar

23 Jiang Fudong (姜福东), Kuozhang Jieshi Yu Xian Suo Jieshi de Fansi (扩张解释与限缩解释的反思) [A Rethinking of Extensive Interpretation & Restrictive Interpretation], in zhejiang social sciences 127 (2010).Google Scholar

24 Chenxinnan, Shaoyumei su Liujinfa, Huxingxian Jianguan, Chuzhi Quan Jiufen An—Renti Lengdong Peitai Jianguan, Chuzi Quan Guishu de Sifa Rending (沈新南、邵玉妹诉刘金法、胡杏仙监管、处置权纠纷案—人体冷冻胚胎监管、处置权归属的司法认定) [Shen Xinnan, Shao Yumei v. Liu Jinfa, Hu Xingxian Supervision, Dispute Cases—Judicial Determination of Human Embryo Supervision and Disposition of Ownership], Sept. 17, 2014, http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_1970324845293374.html?keywords=沈新南、邵玉妹诉刘金法、胡杏仙监管、处置权纠纷案&match=Exact (China) [hereinafter Shen & Shao v. Liu & Hu].Google Scholar

25 Fu Jin & Su Zhen (付金,苏振 QuanguoShou Li Lengong Peitai Quan Shu Jiufen An Luomu: Peitai de Falu Shuxing Gai “Hequhecong” (全国首例冷冻胚胎权属纠纷案落幕:胚胎的法律属性该“何去何从”) [The First Dispute concerning Frozen Embryos in China Has Finally Brought down to Curtain: What is the Legal Nature of Embryos?], People's Court Daily 1 (Sept. 23, 2014).Google Scholar

26 Chenxiuqin su Weixilin, Jin Wan Baoshe (陈秀琴诉魏锡林、今晚报社) [Chen Xiuqin v. Wei Xilin and Tonight Newspaper Office], June 21, 1989, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=1970324837041272&lib=case [hereinafter Xiugin v. Wei Xilin] (China).Google Scholar

27 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Siwang Ren de Mingyu Quan Ying Shou Falu Baohu de Han (最高人民法院关于死亡人的名誉权应受法律保护的函) [A Letter of Legal Protections of Right to Reputation], Apr. 12, 1989, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=4278&keyword=死者名誉权的法律保护&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=like. The letter provides: “吉文贞(艺名荷花女)死亡后,其名誉权应依法保护,其母陈秀琴亦有权向人民法院提起诉讼.”Google Scholar

28 Wang Liming (王利明), Renge Quan Yanjiu (人格权研究) [Study On Personality Rights] 188 (2d ed. 2012); Junju & Yanman, supra note 5, at 86.Google Scholar

29 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Oinquan Jingshen Sunhai Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Problems Regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in Civil Torts], (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 8, 2010, effective Mar. 10, 2010), art. 3 (China), translated at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=34937&lib=law. In Chinese:Google Scholar

自然人死亡后,其近亲属因下列侵权行为遭受精神痛苦,向人民法院起诉请求赔偿精神损害的,人民法院应当依法予以受理:(一)以侮辱、诽谤、贬损、丑化或者违反社会公共利益、社会公德的其他方式,侵害死者姓名、肖像、名誉、荣誉;(二)非法披露、利用死者隐私,或者以违反社会公共利益、社会公德的其他方式侵害死者隐私;(三)非法利用、损害遗体、遗骨,或者以违反社会公共利益、社会公德的其他方式侵害遗体、遗骨Google Scholar

30 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).Google Scholar

31 Dworkin, supra note 8, at 97–98.Google Scholar

32 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Pearson Commission): Report, Cmnd. 7054-1, at 71 (Gr. Brit.): It can be argued that, as a child retains full right of action against it parents in respect of any injury inflicted after birth, he should be able to suit her or both parents in respect of ante-natal injury. We believe, however, that the social argument which has impressed so many of our witness should prevail. The argument is particularly strong in the case of the mother, but the danger of disrupting family life applies also to the father. We recommend that a child should not have a right of action for damages against either parent for ante-natal injury.Google Scholar

33 Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Catt (Sarah Louise), Sept. 17, 2012, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sarah-louise-catt-sentencing-remarks-17092012.pdf (Eng.); R. v Catt (Sarah Louise), 2013 WL 3550521 (Ct. of App. 2013).Google Scholar

34 Chernaik, Beverly I., Recover for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a Child against its Mother, 10 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 582 (1976).Google Scholar

35 District Court Amsterdam Feb. 21, 2006, Bj 2007/6.Google Scholar

36 Huang Yuansheng (黄源盛), Wan Qing Minguo Xingfa Shiliao Bianzhu (晚清民国刑法史料编著) [Archives of Criminal Law in the Late Qjng Dynasty and the Republic of China] 171 (2010).Google Scholar

37 China has been carrying out its family planning policy since the 1970s in order to limit population growth. Xianfa art. 53, § 3 (China) (1978) provides that “[t]he State promotes and implements a family planning policy” [国家提倡和推行计划生育]. Article 25 of the present Constitution of the People's Republic of China (2004 Amendment) also clearly states that “[t]he State promotes the family planning policy, so that the population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development” [国家推行计划生育,使人口增长同经济和社会发展计划相适应]. Xianfa art. 25 (China) (1982), translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/05/content_1381903.htm. Similarly, Section 2 of Article 49 of the present Constitution provides that “[b]oth husband and w ife have the duty to practice family planning” [夫妻双方有实行计划生育的义务]. Xianfa art. 49, § 2 (China) (1982), translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/05/content_1381903.htm.Google Scholar

38 In fact, China's one-child policy has gradually loosened since a selective two-child policy was issued in November 2013. Article 2 of the Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Adjusting and Improving the Family Planning Policy states that “we approve the launching and implementation of the policy of allowing couples to have two children if either parent is an only child” [同意启动一方是独生子女的夫妇可生育两个孩子的政策]. Quanguo Renda Changwei Hui Guanyu Tiaozheng Wanshan Shengyu Zhengce de Jueyi (全国人大常委会关于调整完善生育政策的决议) [Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Adjusting and Improving the Family Planning Policy] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 28, 2014, effective Dec. 28, 2013), art. 2, translated at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=215349&lib=law. Starting on January 1, 2016, and although family planning policy remains a basic national policy in China, the universal two-child policy came into effect. Article 18 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Population and Family Planning (2015 Amendment) stipulates that “[t]he State advocates that one couple bear two children” [国家提倡一对夫妻生育两个子女]. Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa (2015 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法(2015修正)) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Population and Family Planning (2015 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002, amended Dec. 27, 2015), art. 18, translated at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=261790&lib=law.Google Scholar

39 It is important to note that Chinese regulations exist in a hierarchy. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (2015 Nia Xiuzheng (中华人民共和国立法法 (2015年修正)) [Legislation Law of People's Republic of China (2015 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383554.htm. The hierarchy of regulations are: (1) the Constitution of the People's Republic of China; (2) national Laws issued by the National People's Congress; (3) administrative regulations issued by the State Council; (4) local decrees issued by local People's Congresses; and (5) administrative and local rules issued by ministries or commissions of the States Council or local People's Governments.Google Scholar

40 The Rules of Preventions on Non-Medical Fetal Sex Identification and Gender Selective Termination of Pregnancy were jointly issued by the National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People's Republic of China, State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the People's Republic of China and China Food and Drug Administration. Jinzhi Fei Yixue Xuyao de Taier Xingbie Jianding He Xuanze Xingbie Rengong Zhongzhi Renshen de Guiding (禁止非医学需要的胎儿性别鉴定和选择性别人工终止妊娠的规定) [Rules of Preventions on Non-Medical Fetal Sex Identification and Gender Selective Termination of Pregnancy] (promulgated by the Nat'l Heath & Fam. Plan. Comm'n, the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., the State Food & Drug Admin., Mar. 28, 2016, effective May 1, 2016), http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=268852&keyword=禁止非医学需要的胎儿性别鉴定和选择性别人&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate [hereinafter Rules of Preventions on Non-Medical Fetal Sex Identification and Gender Selective Termination of Pregnancy].Google Scholar

41 Rules of Preventions on Non-Medical Fetal Sex Identification and Gender Selective Termination of Pregnancy, supra note 41, art. 9. Article 9 provides in Chinese:Google Scholar

符合法定生育条件,除下列情形外,不得实施选择性别人工终止妊娠:(一)胎儿患严重遗传性疾病的;(二)胎儿有严重缺陷的;(三)因患严重疾病,继续妊娠可能危及孕妇生命安全或者严重危害孕妇健康的;(四)法律法规规定的或医学上认为确有必要终止妊娠的其他情形.Google Scholar

43 Dworkin, supra note 8, at 67.Google Scholar

44 GRCL, supra note 3, art. 16. Article 16 provides in Chinese:Google Scholar

涉及遗产继承、接受赠与等胎儿利益保护的,胎儿视为具有民事权利能力。但是胎儿娩出时为死体的,其民事权利能力自始不存在。Google Scholar

45 Other examples, such as the Swiss Civil Code in Article 31, provide that an unborn child has legal capacity provided that it survives birth. Article 1.2 of the Dutch Civil Code provides as follows: “[I]f it is in the interest of the child of whom the woman is pregnant, it will be regarded as already born. If it is born dead, it is considered never to have existed at all.”Google Scholar

46 Section 844 of the German Civil Code provides that liability for damages also arises where the third party at the time of injury had been conceived, but not yet born. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 844, para. 2, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.). Comparatively, the German Civil Code in Article 1923 prescribes that a person who is not yet alive at the time of the devolution of an inheritance, but has already been conceived, is deemed to have been born before the devolution of an inheritance. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 1923, para. 2, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.). The Japanese Civil Code in Article 721 provides that to demand damages, a child in the womb is deemed to have been born. MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 721 (Japan). Article 886 and Article 965 acknowledge that the unborn child has the right of inheritance and the right of legacy respectively. MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 866, 965 (Japan).Google Scholar

47 There is another theory called the legal termination condition theory. In the opinion of scholars who support the legal termination condition theory, an unborn child does not have a capacity for civil rights. Furthermore, the capacity for civil rights of the child are retroactively effective and start at the moment when inheritance begins or the right of action for the recovery of damages is established. This capacity holds so long as the Unborn survives birth. Wang Zejian (王泽鉴), Minfa Xuexhuo Yu Panli Yanjiu (4) (民法学说与判例研究 (4)) [Civil Law Theories and Precedents Study] (4) 272 (1998).Google Scholar

48 Yan Jue'an (严厥安), Fa Yu Shijian lixing (法与实践理性) [Law and Practical Reason] 320 (2003).Google Scholar

49 Additionally, organs and tissues separated from the human body, corpses, and medical waste are ethical things as well. Yang Lixin (杨立新), Ren de Lengdong Peitai de Falu Shuxing Ji Qi Jicheng Wenti (人的冷冻胚胎的法律属性及其继承问题) [The Legal Nature of Frozen Embryo and its inheritance], 13 The People's Judicature 25 (2014).Google Scholar

50 Xu Guodong (徐国栋), Tiwai Shoujing Lengdong Peitai de Falu Diwei Yanjiu (体外受精冷冻胚胎的法律地位研究) [The Legal Position of Externally Fertilized Embryo], 5 L. & Soc. Dev. 65 (2005).Google Scholar

51 This conclusion can be drawn from propositional versions for the Civil Code Draft. There are three propositional versions for the Civil Code Draft of China: The versions written by Liang Huixing, Wang Liming, and Yang Lixin respectively. See, for example, a propositional version for the Civil Code Draft of China written by Wang Liming that provides in Article 128 that except when violating public orders and good customs, organs, blood, marrow, tissues, sperms, oocytes (or eggs) of a natural person can be considered things. Wang Liming (王利明), Minfa Zongze Caoan Zhuanjia Jianyi Gao (民法总则草案专家建议稿) [Civil Code Draft], art. 128 (China). Article 94 of a propositional version written by Liang Huixing prescribes that in limitation of not violating public orders and good customs, organs, blood, marrow, tissues, sperms, oocytes (or eggs) of a natural person can be treated as if they were objects of civil rights. Liang Huixing (梁彗星), Minfa Zongze Caoan Zhuanjia Yijian Gao (民法总则草案专家意见稿) [Civil Code Draft], art. 94 #### (China). Although both of these Articles do not refer to frozen embryos, a number of scholars believe that an in vitro fertilized embryo can be considered as a thing. These scholars reason that these Articles are quasi-rules concerned with the civil status of preimplantation embryos. Zhang Shengbin, Fan Li & Zhuang Xulong (张圣斌, 范莉, 庄绪龙), Renti Lengdong Peitai Jianguan, Chuzhi Quan Guishu de Renshi (人体冷冻胚胎监管、处置权归属的认识) [Recognition of the Right to Custody and Disposition of Human Frozen Embryo], 11 J. L. Application 44 (2014).Google Scholar

52 All three propositional versions for the Civil Code Draft are silent with regards to the thorny question of the civil status of externally fertilized embryos. Surprisingly, the propositional Version for the General Rules of Civil Code of the People's Republic of China (Draft for Comments), specifically Article 18 of Chapter 2 Natural Person, provides that the preservation and disposition of an in vitro fertilized embryo shall not violate social morality or damage public interests. Even though Article 18 does not explicitly define the nature of an in vitro fertilized embryo, the Draft for Comments nonetheless seems to give greater recognition to frozen embryos akin to a person to under the systematic interpretation.Google Scholar

53 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 1 (Xin Chunying & Wu Yuzhang trans., Chinese ed. 1998).Google Scholar

54 Article 10 of Chapter I Basic Provisions of the GRCL states that “[c]ivil disputes shall be resolved in accordance with the law; or, if the law is silent, customs may apply, but as long as they are not contrary to public order and good morals” [处理民事纠纷,应当依照法律;法律没有规定的,可以适用习惯,但是不得违背公序良俗]. GRCL, supra note 3, art. 10.Google Scholar

55 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 1, para. 1, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/(Ger.).Google Scholar

56 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 694 (2008).Google Scholar

57 David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein, The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 148 (2002).Google Scholar

58 Christian Walter, Human Dignity in German Constitutional Law, in European Commission for Democracy through Law: The Principle of Respect for Human Dignity (Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar, Montpellier July 2-6, 1998) 15, 28 (1998), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-STD(1998)026-e.Google Scholar

59 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], 1 BvR 357/05, Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2006/02/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html; see also McCrudden, supra note 57, at 692.Google Scholar

60 Donald p. Kommoers & Miller, Russell A., The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 301 (3d ed. 2012).Google Scholar

61 GRCL, supra note 3.Google Scholar

62 Jue'an, supra note 48, at 67.Google Scholar

63 Edgar Boderheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law 350–51 (rev. ed. 1981).Google Scholar

64 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).Google Scholar

65 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).Google Scholar

66 Juenger, Friedrich K., Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 33 (spec. ed. 2005).Google Scholar

67 Boderheimer, supra note 63, at 349.Google Scholar

68 Yi Jun (易军) Lun Sifa Shang Gongxuliangsu Tiaokuan de Jiben Gongneng (论司法上公序良俗条款的基本功能) [The Basic Functions of Public Order and Good Customs in Private Law], 5 J. Comp. L. 32 (2006).Google Scholar

69 Boderheimer, supra note 63, at 346.Google Scholar

70 In re Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658, 279 N.Y. 458 (N.Y. 1939). The New York Court of Appeals held that the beneficiary should lose her right to the trust fund if she entered a marriage contract without the consent of the trustees, because retaining her right in these circumstances would have run contrary to public policy.Google Scholar

71 Dai Mengyong (戴孟勇), Lun Gongxuliangsu de Panduan Biaozhun (论公序良俗的判断标准) [On the Criterion to Judge Public Order and Good Custom], 3 L. & Soc. Dev. 47 (2006).Google Scholar

72 Id. at 47.Google Scholar

73 Boderheimer, supra note 63, at 372.Google Scholar

74 ten Haaf, supra note 2; Britta van Beers, The Changing Nature of Law's Natural Person: The Impact of Emerging Technologies on the Legal Concept of Person, 18 German L.J. 559, 584 (2017). Wrongful life is a legal action in which a severely disabled child sues someone for failing to prevent the child's birth. For example, in the Baby Kelly case (see infra note 76), a Dutch girl named Kelly was born severely handicapped. The 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) provides standing to pursue a cause of action where a child's disability results from ARTs, including preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), etc. For an overview of wrongful life actions in several jurisdictions see Giesen, Ivo, The Use and Influence of Comparative Law in “Wrongful Life” Cases, 8 Utrecht L. Rev. 35 (2012) and Ronen Perry, It's a Wonderful Life, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 329 (2007).Google Scholar

75 H.R. 18 Maart 2005, NJ 2006, 606 m.nt. JBMV (Neth.) [hereinafter Baby Kelly].Google Scholar

76 Dworkin, supra note 8, at 22.Google Scholar

77 See Selkälä & Rajavuori, supra note 2.Google Scholar