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Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Carleton University, Canada

    Zhiqi Chen

  2. Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, Canada

    Thomas W. Ross & W. T. Stanbury

  3. T.D. MacDonald Chair in Industrial Economics (1996/97), Competition Bureau, Industry, Canada

    W. T. Stanbury

Authors
  1. Zhiqi Chen
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  2. Thomas W. Ross
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  3. W. T. Stanbury
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Chen, Z., Ross, T.W. & Stanbury, W.T. Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets. Review of Industrial Organization 13, 131–151 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007739221881

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