Abstract
In a 1994 paper, extending the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme of Sappington and Sibley, Schwermer presented a non-Bayesian incentive scheme for regulating a Cournot oligopoly industry. This note designs an oligopolistic incentive scheme for a hierarchical Stackelberg model in which firms choose outputs sequentially.
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References
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Lee, SH. A Note on Regulating Oligopolistic Industries: A Hierarchical Model. Journal of Regulatory Economics 12, 91–97 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007914004997
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007914004997