Abstract
This paper describes computational techniques for finding all equilibria in infinitely repeated games with discounting and perfect monitoring. It illustrates these techniques with a three player Cournot game. This is the first infinitely repeated three player game ever solved. The paper also presents the solution for the set of equilibria in a two country tariff war. In both games the set of equilibria is large even when the players are not patient.
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CRONSHAW, M.B. Algorithms for Finding Repeated Game Equilibria. Computational Economics 10, 139–168 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008670607684
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008670607684