Abstract
The Hooded Man Paradox of Eubulides concerns the apparent failure of the substitutivity of identicals in epistemic (and other intentional) contexts. This paper formulates a number of different versions of the paradox and shows how these may be solved using semantics for quantified epistemic logic. In particular, two semantics are given which invalidate substitution, even when rigid designators are involved.
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Priest, G. The Hooded Man. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31, 445–467 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020153327867
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020153327867