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If Extremists Vote How do They Express Themselves? An Empirical Test of an Expressive Theory of Voting

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Abstract

The expressive theory of voting needs more specification of the motives for expression if it is not merely to be a theory of non-instrumental voting. Brennan and Hamlin provide such a specification. Unfortunately, using individual U.S. data from the General Social Surveys we find their predictions are contradicted. Nor if other evidence in the literature purported to be evidence of expressive voting actually implied by it. We believe that this is because the reason people express themselves in voting is to signal others.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, 13902, U.S.A

    Kenneth V. Greene & Phillip J. Nelson

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  1. Kenneth V. Greene
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  2. Phillip J. Nelson
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Greene, K.V., Nelson, P.J. If Extremists Vote How do They Express Themselves? An Empirical Test of an Expressive Theory of Voting. Public Choice 113, 425–436 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020804704536

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020804704536

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