Abstract
This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.
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Brisset, K., Thomas, L. Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions. European Journal of Law and Economics 17, 5–19 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026329724892
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026329724892