Abstract
In this paper we consider a Cournot duopoly model to examine the effects of licensing on R&D organization. When firms do cooperative R&D to share the cost of R&D, possibility of licensing can influence the decision on R&D organization. But, if the firms do cooperative R&D to avoid duplication in R&D process, possibility of licensing may influence the decision on R&D organization, provided one firm behaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market.
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Mukherjee, A., Marjit, S. R&D organization and technology transfer. Group Decision and Negotiation 13, 243–258 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:GRUP.0000031079.32373.a4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:GRUP.0000031079.32373.a4