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Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication

Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication

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© The Institution of Electrical Engineers
Published

We consider two basic versions of the challenge-response authentication protocol, and exhibit both a method of attack and a simple modification preventing such attacks. We go on to consider three variants of the basic protocols and show that one of them is completely insecure.

Inspec keywords: security of data; protocols; data communication systems

Other keywords: challenge-response entity authentication; authentication protocol; variants

Subjects: Computer communications; Computer networks and techniques

References

    1. 1)
      • ISO Peer entity authentication mechanisms using an N-bit secret key algorithm.ISO/IEC/JTCI/SC20/WG1/N153, April 1988.
    2. 2)
      • Arditti, D., Campana, M., Allegre, F., Cohen, R.: `Access control with a minimal investment', Proceedings of SECURICOM 89, 1989, p. 159–169.
    3. 3)
      • D.W. Davies , W.L. Price . (1984) , Security for computer networks.
    4. 4)
      • Beker, H.J.: `Secure access control to host applications', Proceedings of the Second IEE International Conference on Secure Communications, 1986, London, p. 20–21.
    5. 5)
      • W. Diffie . (1989) Protection of terminal to host communications by end-to-end cryptography, Proceedings of SECICOM 89.
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