Abstract
Structural Realism (SR) is meant to be a substantive philosophical position concerning what there is in the world and what can be known of it. It is realist because it asserts the existence of a mind-independent world, and it is structural because what is knowable of the world is said to be its structure only. As a slogan, the thesis is that knowledge can reach only up to the structural features of the world. This chapter unravels and criticises the metaphysical presuppositions of SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive — and viable — realist thesis.
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© 2009 Stathis Psillos
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Psillos, S. (2009). Is Structural Realism Possible?. In: Knowing the Structure of Nature. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234666_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234666_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-28301-9
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-23466-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)