Abstract
While most studies on peaceful settlement of disputes see the substance of the proposals for a solution as the key to a successful resolution of conflict, a growing focus of attention shows that a second and equally necessary key lies in the timing of efforts for resolution.1 Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they are more likely to grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that appear attractive only now.
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© 2008 I. William Zartman
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Zartman, I.W. (2008). The Timing of Peace Initiatives:Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments. In: Darby, J., Ginty, R.M. (eds) Contemporary Peacemaking. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584556_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584556_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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