Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking toward China

Abstract

On October 17, 2005, Japanese prime minister Koizumi Junichiro embarked on his fifth visit to the Yasukuni shrine. However, it was one made in a style somewhat different from before. The prime minister turned up outside the shrine in his official car, wearing a casual suit not a traditional Japanese garment nor a mourning dress, walked up to the shrine, picked some money out of his pocket that he put in the offertory box, and without even entering the shrine walked back to his car and was on his way again. The prime minister no doubt did this with the intention of showing himself visiting the shrine just like any ordinary citizen. It was presumably the ultimate display of his concern over the response from China, South Korea, and other Asian countries, yet it bore no fruit whatsoever. On the contrary, China only voiced even stronger criticism. To be precise, the Chinese government’s reaction was relatively subdued at first, but turned sterner along with the relentless attacks that abounded in tabloid papers and on the Internet. Since then, China has maintained that abandonment of the Yasukuni visit is a condition for resuming summit meetings between Japan and China. Looking back, however, China still showed a rather open attitude toward Japan until the anti-Japanese demonstrations in April 2005.