Abstract
Using the Nixon tapes and the documentary record of US diplomacy, this article argues that the Sino-American opening came as a shock to US allies in Europe but nevertheless was viewed generally in a positive light by transatlantic partners. These sources corroborate other scholarship that the Nixon’s surprise announcement in July 1971 of the opening to China was something of an irritant in Anglo-American relations. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s secret maneuvers stole some of the limelight from Prime Minister Edward Heath’s efforts to upgrade London’s relations with Beijing to the level of ambassador. Whereas Heath’s government had kept US Secretary of State Rogers apprised of the efforts, Rogers was out of the loop in Washington and the Nixon administration did not reciprocate to London until right before the announcement. Finally, the announced intention of establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing opened something of a floodgate toward broader recognition of the People’s Republic of China, even among traditional transatlantic partners, and disrupted Washington’s efforts at promoting dual representation of Taiwan and the PRC at the United Nations.
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Notes
National Intelligence Estimate, December 4, 1969, [54], p. 85.
Conversation between Richard Nixon and Paul McCracken, Oval Office (OVAL) Conv. No. 542-4, July 22, 1971, 10:51 am–11:36 am, National Archives and Records Administration (thereafter NARA) [32], Nixon [29]. The transcribed portion begins at 1 h:17 m:11 s. On McCracken’s background, see his obituary [55].
Nixon [37].
OVAL Conv. No. 542-4.
Nixon was referring obliquely to the role of Pakistan’s leader, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan (Yahya), in brokering the Sino-American rapprochement. Nixon’s mention of working papers for options on China may have been a reference to National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) [30], p. 124, “Next Steps Toward the People’s Republic of China,” April 19, 1971, RNPLM, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_124.pdf. Kissinger sent the NSSM to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, conveying Nixon’s “objective of furthering the improvement of relations,” after Mao Zedong extended a surprise invitation to visit China for the U.S. table tennis team that was playing a tournament in Nagoya Japan two weeks earlier. Nixon reciprocated Mao’s “Ping Pong diplomacy” at a news conference on 16 April by extending visas to Chinese table tennis players to visit the USA. On April 27, 1971, Kissinger received a message from Zhou Enlai passed via Yahya to Pakistan’s ambassador to the USA, Agha Hilaly, that the Chinese would publicly welcome President Nixon or his envoy for discussions.
OVAL Conv. No. 542-4.
OVAL Conv. No. 542-4.
The spy ring was known as the “Moorer–Radford Affair,” after the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer and a stenographer, Navy Yeoman First Class Charles E. Radford. While tracking down verbatim leaks from top-secret documents in investigative journalist Jack Anderson’s syndicated columns related to the India–Pakistan crisis and war in December 1971, the Plumbers, formally known as the White House Special Investigative Unit, discovered that Radford had purloined documents from burn bags and Kissinger’s briefcase and passed them to Admiral Moorer via the JCS-NSC liaison office, of which Radford was a part. The spy ring was first publicly exposed in congressional hearings in 1974, but was largely overshadowed at the time by Watergate. Colodny and Gettlin [5]. More recently, James Rosen, a former Fox news correspondent and the author of the biography of Nixon’s attorney general, John Mitchell, used the Nixon tapes and declassified documents to add detail and understanding to the Moorer–Radford affair. For example, see [41,42,43].
Pompeo [40].
Dallek [6], xi.
MacMillan [21], p. 338.
Tudda [46], p. 210.
Conversation between Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman, Executive Office Building (EOB) Conv. No. 317-6, January 24, 1972, 1:51–3:00 p.m, NARA, RMNPLM, WHT. In a National Security Council Senior Review Group meeting on May 15, 1969, Kissinger told the members, “History suggested to him that it is better to align yourself with the weaker, not the stronger of two antagonistic partners. It is not clear to him that you achieve better relations with the Soviets necessarily because of a hard policy toward China and vice versa.” Editorial Note, FRUS [48].
Tudda’s chapter 6, “Reassuring Allies and Pursuing the Moscow Summit,” focuses mainly on Japan, Taiwan, the Soviet Union and Nixon’s domestic, conservative allies. See: Tudda [46], pp. 104–119.
Scott [44].
Nichter [33], p. 5.
For example, see a revealing article on the relationship between Nixon and Pompidou where China is mentioned, but the opening to China is not discussed: Trachtenberg [45], pp. 4–59.
Lundestad [20].
Lundestad, 99.
Kissinger told Nixon “Well, you got three out of three, Mr. President,” after a breakthrough in negotiations with the North Vietnamese on October 11–12, 1972. Editorial Note citing EOB Conv. No. 366–6, 7:05 and 8:46 p.m., October 12, 1972, in FRUS [50], p. 123. The author worked on the transcript of the conversation while serving as a contract historian at the U.S. Department of State. The conversation was one of the most challenging to transcribe accurately because of the audio quality.
Nichter [33], p. 2.
Nixon [35].
Memorandum of Conversation [between President Nixon, General De Gaulle, Mr. Andronikov, and MG Walters], 1 March 1969, FRUS [53].
Ibid.
Barber [4].
National Intelligence Estimate, December 4, 1969, FRUS [53], p. 85.
As a speaker of Mandarin who had audiences with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the chargé d’affaires at the Dutch Embassy to the PRC, Jacobus Jerome (J. J.) Derksen, offered to serve as a channel between Washington and Beijing in February 1970. However, Derksen’s effort to establish contact between the U.S. and the PRC failed to gain any traction from the viewpoint of the Nixon administration. After several failed communications, Kissinger informed the Dutch government in December 1970 that Washington had no objections to Derksen being recalled from Beijing, “where he has been a disappointment to his government.” After Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971, Dutch Ambassador to the USA Rijnhard Van Lynden asked Kissinger if Derksen had played any role in the Sino-American rapprochement. In a message relayed via NSC Deputy Alexander Haig to Van Lynden, Kissinger declared that Derksen “had no role in matters leading to the trip to Peking, that no messages were ever received through him, and that we have not used his services for some time.” See: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, February 5, 1970, FRUS [51].
Canada officially recognized the PRC in October 1970, while Italy recognized it in November 1970.
Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State, FRUS [53], p. 620.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada, February 7, 1969, FRUS [53], pp. 381–383.
Memorandum of Conversation, September 24, 1969, FRUS [53], pp. 399–401.
OVAL Conv. No. 542-4.
Kissinger [13], p. 761.
H.R. Haldeman, Diary Entry: July 12, 1971, H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection (Haldeman Diary), RNPLM, online: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/%E2%80%9C, https://nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37-hrhd-audiocassette-ac10b-19710712-pa.pdf%22; audio also available: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/%E2%80%9C, https://nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37-hrhd-audiocassette-ac10b-19710712-pa.mp3%22. According to Kissinger, Rogers developed a scenario to start briefing allies an hour before the president’s announcement, starting with Japan. Kissinger [13], p. 758. Kissinger’s primary task was to inform Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Kissinger’s negotiating partner in a secret back channel, about the bombshell announcement. See: Moss [27].
Kissinger [13], p. 758.
Memorandum of Conversation [between Kissinger, Huang Chen, Tsao Kuei Sheng, Wei Tung, MG Vernon Walters, and Winston Lord], July 26, 1971, FRUS [51], pp. 465–468.
OVAL Conv. No. 547-6, July 27, 1971, 11:05 am–11:32 am, NARA, RMNPLM, WHT, online: http://nixontapeaudio.org/chron1/rmn_e547b.mp3. The transcribed portion starts at 0 h:25 m:29 s.
Nixon’s hand-written letter to Yahya, dated August 7, 1971, is published in [3] selected and edited by Aijazuddin. Nixon met with Ambassador Hilaly on July 29, 1971. The Nixon taping system captured the conversation, which is: OVAL Conv. No. 551-6, July 29, 1971, 11:50 am–12:20 pm, NARA, RNPLM, WHT, online: http://nixontapeaudio.org/chron1/rmn_e551b.mp3. The conversation starts at 1 h:07 m:37 s. See also: President Richard Nixon’s Daily Diary [31]: July 29, 1971, NARA, RNPLM, online: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/PDD/1971/056%20July%2016-31%201971.pdf.
Kissinger was referring to Pompidou’s providing cover for U.S. meetings in France not just with the Chinese, but also the North Vietnamese.
Nixon’s letter to Sato is published in “Letter from President Nixon to Japanese Prime Minister Sato,” August 3, 1971, FRUS [52].
OVAL Conv. No. 547-6.
OVAL Conv. No. 548-3, July 27, 1971, 2:29 pm–3:05 pm, NARA, RMNPLM, WHT, online: http://nixontapeaudio.org/chron1/rmn_e548a.mp3.
Quoted in K.A. Hamilton, “A ‘Week that Changed the Word,’” 118.
Quoted in Mark [23], p. 890.
OVAL Conv. No. 549-25, July 28, 1971, 3:05 pm–4:54 pm, NARA, RNPLM, WHT, online: http://nixontapeaudio.org/chron1/rmn_e549c.mp3. The transcription begins at 0 h:51 m:16 s.
OVAL Conv. No. 549-25, http://nixontapeaudio.org/chron1/rmn_e549c.mp3. This portion begins at 1 h:37 m:28 s. Surprisingly, OVAL Conv. 549-25 includes the meetings with Agnew and Rogers and the later meeting between Nixon and Farland (i.e., NARA does not list the two distinct meetings as separate conversation numbers).
Editorial Note references OVAL Conv. No. 599-17, October 22, 1971, FRUS [54], p. 720.
Editorial Note references White House Telephone Conv. No. 12-88, October 22, 1971, 5:40 pm–5:59 pm, FRUS [53], pp. 721–722.
United Nations [47], pp. 25, 126–133; “Resolution 2758: Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations,” United Nations General Assembly—Twenty-sixth Session, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI).
Heath indicated his concerns to Nixon about Rolls Royce going bankrupt and its delays and cost overruns with delivering jet engines to Lockheed. See: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, February 3, 1971, FRUS [53], pp. 1004–1005. Nixon’s saying the U.S. had been “screwed” may have been a reference to the dissolution of the Rolls–Royce company, the British government’s purchase of portions of the core business (as Rolls–Royce Limited), and the subsequent sale of the holdings to the British Aircraft Corporation.
OVAL Conv. No. 606-3, October 28, 1971, 5:54 pm–6:36 pm, NARA, RMNPLM, WHT, online: http://nixontapeaudio.org/chron2/rmn_e606b.mp3. The transcribed portion begins at 0 h:57 m:46 s. Possibly referring to the British, but also smaller powers that had voted to expel Taiwan, Nixon told Kissinger, “Henry, let me tell you, though, let’s—we can say all we want about the vote. We will not forget. As I told you, I want, I want that whole list looked over to reward and punish.” Kissinger responded, “I am.” Nixon replied, “I will never see one of those bastards vote against us again.” Ibid, transcription began at 0 h:59 m:48 s.
As quoted in Mark [23], p. 897.
Mark [23], p. 897.
See: Pace [39].
A month earlier, the UN General Assembly had called on the U.S. to comply with sanctions against Rhodesia that had started in 1966. The British and the USA voted against the resolution. See: Eddie Michel [28], pp. 138–161; Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, p. 103; Conversation Among President Nixon, the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), November 18, 1971, FRUS [53].
Connally came under pressure about the issue of the gold price and foreign exchange convertibility at the G-10 ministerial meeting in Rome from November 30 to December 1, 1971. See: Editorial Note, FRUS [49].
White House Telephone Conv. No. 16-37, December 7, 1971, 11:31 pm–11:41 pm, NARA, RMNPLM, WHT, online: http://nixontapes.org/hak/1971-12-07_Nixon_016-037.mp3. The transcribed portion is at 02 m:11 s.
Memorandum for the Record, December 20, 1971 [7]. Underlining in the original source.
Mark [23], p. 898.
Memorandum of Conversation [between Nixon, Pompidou, Mr. Andronikof, Major General Walters] December 13, 1971, FRUS [53], pp. 564–575.
Nixon [35].
Kissinger’s secret “Polo I” trip in July 1971 was nearly exposed before he departed from Pakistan to China. According to Winston Lord, Kissinger’s aide who accompanied him on the trip, there had been a news service reporter who thought he had seen Kissinger at the Islamabad Airport, but the reporter’s editor had killed the story [19].
Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, OVAL 529-14, June 27, 1971, 8:18 pm–9:14 pm, NARA, RMNPLM, WHT, online: http://nixontapeaudio.org/chron1/rmn_e529a.mp3. The transcription begins at 1 h:06 m:20 s.
Kissinger [13], p; 806.
Kissinger [13], p. 806.
Kissinger [13], p. 763.
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The author is grateful A.P. Dobson for the invitation to contribute to this special issue of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and also to the anonymous reviewer for the constructive and helpful feedback.
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This article includes original transcribed excerpts from the Nixon tapes, which are the author’s interpretation; others may have different interpretations of what was said. Minor omissions are denoted with ellipses (…) and larger or more substantive omissions with bracketed ellipses ([…]). Interruptions or false starts are denoted with an em-dash (—). Editorial comments and text where the transcription was less certain appear within brackets ([]). Each transcript has been reviewed multiple times. Readers are encouraged to consult the audio; time codes are included for transcribed portions that correspond to audio that is available online. The author worked with Luke Nichter and the National Security Archive to make the complete declassified digital audio available online at http://nixontapes.org/.
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Moss, R.A. Transatlantic relations and the Sino-US opening. J Transatl Stud 18, 59–79 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00036-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00036-8