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Diffuse interest groups and regulatory policy change: financial consumer protection in Turkey

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Abstract

This article examines why and how a regulation on retail banking fees, commissions, and charges emerged in Turkey after a long period of regulatory forbearance. The article shows that when regulatory forbearance caused stasis, and the “statist”, exclusionary policymaking context limited consumer groups’ access to the policymaking process, consumer groups challenged the policy regime of the banking sector and the regulator by appealing to another state actor, the Ministry of Customs and Trade. The Ministry took advantage of an opportunity structure to pass a new consumer protection law which assigned a de facto mandate on the regulatory agency to regulate fees, commissions, and charges. The article argues that the regulatory policy change was a product of a policy regime change with the Ministry emerging as a veto player, as it redefined the institutional arrangements in the policymaking process, and imposed its preferences and its stricter policy approach. As such, the article contributes to our understanding of the conditions of how diffuse interest groups can trigger regulatory policy change, but more importantly policy regime change.

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Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, author’s compilation

Fig. 3

Source: The Banks’ Association of Turkey, author’s compilation

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Notes

  1. The “statist” policy style can surely limit the degree of influence of concentrated interest groups (i.e. private sector) in the policymaking process as well (see Bakir 2015). The article focuses solely on diffuse interest groups and emphasises how the “statist” policy style limits diffuse interest group representation in the policymaking process.

  2. The Consumer Protection Law No. 6502, published in the Official Gazette on November 28, 2013.

  3. Article 4(3) of the Consumer Protection Law No. 6502.

  4. I am grateful to Tolga Bolukbasi to point out this critical point.

  5. Regulation on the Principles and Procedures to the Fees Obtained from Financial Consumers, published in the Official Gazette on October 3, 2014. Available in Turkish https://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/turkce/Mevzuat/Finansal_Tuketicinin_Korunmasina_Iliskin_Duzenlemeler/1358623_aralik_2017_degisikligi.pdf, accessed on January 20, 2018.

  6. Regulatory forbearance stems from regulators’ disregard of a policy issue in the form of non-compliance to the legal mandate of the organisation, selective implementation of the mandate, or the regulators might perceive that they lack a mandate to act upon a given policy issue. Regulatory forbearance is conditional on two factors: the identity of the agency’s political principal, and issue salience (Gordon and Hafer 2014, p. 209). While the former can affect how and whether or not the principal monitors the agency’s behaviour in the light of its performance, the second relates more to the agency’s accountability to citizens.

  7. A consumer group is a particular type of diffuse interest group (Schuck 1977, p. 133) as “…[they] pursue policy outcomes grounded in their collective material interests” (Trumbull 2012, p. 10). Consumer groups have a disorganised and network-based organisational structure, and are ad hoc groups that involve groups of individuals working through networks on a voluntary basis (Offe 1985). They operate within the market and sought state intervention to prevent harm on social/consumer welfare (King and Pearce 2010).

  8. Maloney et al. (1994) rightly point to conflation of the insider/outsider divide in the literature. Studies apply the divide either when referring to the status of an interest group in the policymaking process or to groups’ strategies. This article refers to groups strategies, but at the same time considers that the position of a group in the policymaking process enforces certain strategies.

  9. Consumer Protection Law No. 4077, published in the Official Gazette on March 8, 1995. Available in Turkish at: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22221.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22221.pdf, accessed on February 25, 2018.

  10. Law on the Changes in the Consumer Protection No. 4822, published in the Official Gazette on March 14, 2003. Available in Turkish http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home = http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/03/20030314.htm/20030314.htm&main = http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/03/20030314.htm, accessed on February 25, 2018.

  11. See note 3.

  12. See note 5.

  13. Interview, R2, BRSA, Istanbul, February 19, 2016.

  14. See his speech, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/lower-profits-may-increase-banks-fees.aspx?pageID=238&nID= 7866&NewsCatID=346, accessed on December 5, 2017.

  15. Interview, B5, T. Is Bank, Istanbul, March 1, 2016.

  16. Interview, R4, BRSA, Istanbul, March 4, 2016.

  17. Interview, C3, Consumer Associations Federation (TOFED), Istanbul, February 13, 2016.

  18. Interview, C2, Consumer Rights Association (THD), Ankara, January 27, 2016.

  19. Banking Law No 5411, published in the Official Gazette on November 19, 2005.

  20. Interview, R1, BRSA, Istanbul, March 4, 2016.

  21. Interview, B9, TEB, Istanbul, February 8, 2016.

  22. Interview, B3, T. Is Bank, Istanbul, February 24, 2016.

  23. Interview, R3, BRSA, Ankara, January 21, 2016.

  24. Interview, B3, T. Is Bank, Istanbul, February 24, 2016.

  25. Interview, R3, BRSA, Ankara, January 21, 2016.

  26. 5582 sayılı Konut Finansmanı Kanunu [Housing Finance Law No. 5582], published in the Official Gazette on March 6, 2007.

  27. Interview, C1, Consumer and Environment Foundation (TUKCEV), Ankara, January 20, 2016.

  28. Interview, C2, Consumer Rights Association (THD), Ankara, January 27, 2016.

  29. Interview, C2, Consumer Rights Association (THD), Ankara, January 27, 2016.

  30. Interview, C3, Consumer Associations Federation (TOFED), Istanbul, February 13, 2016.

  31. Interview, C3, Consumer Associations Federation (TOFED), Istanbul, February 13, 2016.

  32. Interview, R4, BRSA, Ankara, January 11, 2016.

  33. Interview, C1, Consumer and Environment Foundation (TUKCEV), Ankara, January 20, 2016.

  34. The Banks’ Association of Turkey can also handle consumer complaints, but has a passive role. The Association can only request a feedback on consumers’ complaints from a bank. If the bank opts for inaction despite the Association’s demand, the Association cannot sanction the bank.

  35. Interview, M1, Ministry, Ankara, March 28, 2016.

  36. The communiqués of the Council are available in Turkish http://www.tuketici.gov.tr/index.snet?wapp=konseykararlari_tr&open=6, accessed on January 10, 2017.

  37. Interview, B9, TEB, Istanbul, February 8, 2016.

  38. Interview, M1, Ministry, Ankara, January 14, 2016.

  39. The Minister’s speech is available in Turkish https://www.gtb.gov.tr/haberler/yazici-bankalar-60-ayri-kalemde-ucret-aliyor, accessed on October 3, 2017.

  40. The minutes of the Parliamentary Commission are available in Turkish https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.tutanaklar?pKomKod=36&pDonem=24&pYasamaYili=3, accessed on December 10, 2017.

  41. Interview, R5, BRSA, Ankara, January 11, 2016.

  42. Interview, M1, Ministry, Ankara, March 28, 2016.

  43. Interview, B3, T. Is Bank, Istanbul, February 24, 2016.

  44. Interview, B6, Finansbank, Istanbul, February 10, 2016.

  45. Interview, R3, BRSA, Ankara, January 21, 2016.

  46. See Coban (2019) on the BRSA’s subordination of the banking sector during compliance with the Basel framework despite the latter’s critical, sceptical approach on full compliance.

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Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article were presented in the 6th Biennial Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance in Tilburg and seminars at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Yasar University, Izmir, and Bilkent University, Ankara. I am grateful to the participants’ comments and suggestions on these occasions. I am grateful Ramkishen S Rajan, Kurtulus Gemici, Razeen Sally, David Levi-Faur, Lucia Quaglia, Feng Qiushi, Benjamin van Rooij, Tolga Bolukbasi, Caner Bakir, Michael Howlett, Kidjie Saguin, and Yvonne Guo for their suggestions and comments on the earlier versions of this article. I also thank the editors and three anonymous referees for their constructive, insightful, and sharp observations and suggestions. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge organisational support of GLODEM, Koc University, to host the author as a Research Associate.

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The author acknowledges the Ph.D. Academic Support Fund, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

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    Mehmet Kerem Coban

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    Mehmet Kerem Coban

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Coban, M.K. Diffuse interest groups and regulatory policy change: financial consumer protection in Turkey. Int Groups Adv 9, 220–243 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-020-00086-w

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