Abstract
Remote warfare has become a ‘catch-all’ term, used to describe the so-called ‘light footprint’, ‘low-risk’, and ‘distant’ characteristics of contemporary Western warfighting. Typified by a reliance on military airpower, new weapon technologies, special operations forces, and the support of local partners, proxies, and surrogates, this form of modern warfare has allowed the USA and its Western coalition member to meet national security threats globally, yet withoutr having to endure the heavy cost to their soldier’s lives that defined Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Nevertheless, in this article, we argue that this perception of remote warfare needs reappraising. By analysing the case of Niger, we highlight how the means and mechanisms of remote warfare have now proliferated to a plethora of state actors, with varying ambitions, who combine their ‘light footprint’ to saturate distant zones of conflict and sovereign nations considered to be ‘strategic choke-points’. Although adopted as the blueprint for militarily effective and politically attuned global force deployment by a range of nations, we question the extent to which it is still politically useful, militarily effective, or indeed academically accurate to consider remote warfare as ‘light footprint’ at all.
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Notes
We recognise that ‘remote warfare’, as it is framed in contemporary academic and policy discussions, is far from a new concept. This form of ‘indirect’ warfighting (as explained in detail below) can be traced back to British colonial air power in the 1920s and 30s, the strategic thought of B. H. Liddell Hart, or indeed a long history of strategic culture within the French context. However, we argue that the contemporary iteration of remote warfare evolved to point that it is now being misdescribed. For a more detailed history see McKay, A. Watson, A, & Karlshøj-Pedersen, M. (2021). Remote Warfare: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing. Also see Biegon, R. & Watts, TFA. (2020), Remote Warfare and the Retooling of American Primacy, Geopolitics, (Early Online Publishing—https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1850442).
In military circles, this form of warfare is referred to more broadly as an ‘indirect approach’. The approach is an additional option, alongside a ‘direct approach’ to attacking enemy forces with one’s own forces. As Scott Morris has argued, such an approach ‘networks U.S. government power as a force when used in concert with allies and local partners. Global networking along with balanced precision raid…exponentially increase the utility of SOF power and position it to appropriately complement all domains to tackle twenty-first century challenges’. Today, the indirect approach has been stretched to include the Western reliance on a ‘network’ of local partner forces who absorb much of the risk to life and in return Western forces provide training, advice, equipment, and close air support for their local partners. As Scott stated, where Western intervention is needed, small detachments of highly trained covert Special Operations Forces are chosen for priority missions. Within the academic literature, but also within Western political representations of contemporary warfare, as we show later in the article, it is this approach that has come to be known as ‘remote warfare’. As we seek to influence the definitional debate on ‘remote warfare’ in academic, but also policy circle, we have chosen to prioritise the use of this term and to explicitly challenge the ‘light footprint’ perception of the use of force. See Morrison (2014), Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces (SOF) Power, and the Global Networking of SOF. Journal of Strategic Security 7, (2): 48–54.
This is not to say that remote warfare was previously ‘effective’ when the US led the way on its deployment, especially with the use of Armed military drones and pin-point precision strikes. As Amos Fox has argued, the use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) does not directly result in an increase in effectiveness. In essence, being precise, or light footprint, does not equate with being effective. As Fox has argued, the Battle of Mosul gave us the ‘Precision Paradox’, or the spidering wave of destruction that follows a precise, but ineffective PGM-driven battle. Our point here is that when all allied nations are deploying such force it only compounds these established issues. See Fox (2019). What the Mosul Study Group Missed, The Modern Warfare Institute. Retrieved from: https://mwi.usma.edu/mosul-study-group-missed/
Indeed, in the light of the withdrawal from Afghanistan (August 2021), we should not overlook the consequences of what may happen to Niger if France, and the many other nations deploying a ‘light footprint’ approach withdraw all at once. By understanding the real-world collective heavy footprint of these ‘light’ remote warfare operations, we can begin to understand the detrimental impact such a sudden withdrawal would have on the stability of the Nigerien state.
In terms of criticism, there is a growing body of scholarship that deconstructs the use of ‘remote warfare’ as a term altogether due to the lexicon reinforcing the ‘othering’ and distancing of nations where the West is engaged in ‘remote danger-zones’ (Anderson 2019; Frowd 2020). It is also important to note that within the framework of an Oxford Research Group and University of Kent 2019 joint conference (and subsequent publication Remote Warfare: Interdisciplinary Perspectives) remote warfare was placed alongside concepts such as Surrogate War (Krieg and Rickli 2019), Liquid Warfare (Demmers and Gould 2018; Mutschler 2016) and Proxy War (Mumford 2013; Rondeaux 2019), which all share some elements with the common understanding of remote warfare in the American context.
It is understood that today the US military and its Western allies are heavily investing in large-scale combat operations and multi-domain operations to face a peer competitor, such as China. Indeed, in terms of where the money is being spent for future wars, and in terms of large-scale peer on peer confrontations, it is becoming increasingly clear that Western powers are in the midst of a perceived Cold War 2.0 (Ferguson 2021). Yet, as with the last Cold War, less overt proxy actions by rival Great Powers will be used to stoke the embers of terrorism in unstable regions of Africa (and around the world) and these will be dealt with through established ‘light footprint’, distant, limited, and so-called economical ‘shaping operations’; namely remote warfare. This is especially likely as the ‘big money’ and larger Western force deployment will be reserved for ‘more important’ grander threats and large-scale military exercises. In essence, remote warfare is here to stay and it is for that reason we need to understand its changing character.
It could also be considered that ‘remote warfare’ has never actually been light footprint at all and that multi-national inclusion within previous American led deployments have long complicated and made ‘heavier’ the load of Western force deployment. One point here, however, is that the case of Niger is a perfect storm of these issues, with previous missions (such as Operation Inherent Resolve) having clearer end goals, communication channels, and leadership (although by no means perfect). As we explain, the case of Niger is one that has an increased number of actors, with a decreased clarity in aims, communication, and consistency.
This is not a provision of security material or training per se, but does have security consequences: the European ‘comprehensive approach’ rhetoric condones security interventions as long as they are accompanied by funds for development and aid.
This follows the 2002 training operation Pan Sahel Initiative.
The latter three bases were confirmed back in 2017, when mobile exercise app Strava published jogging patterns globally and showed concentrated activity around the bases.
The Joint Force has been endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Committee (PSC) and fights terrorism, cross-border organized crime and human trafficking in the G5 Sahel zone. It carried out its first operation in November 2017 with the armies of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
The AU Commission and its Peace and Security Committee, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel Secretariat have been holding meetings throughout 2020 in order to finalise the deployment, but some issues, such as financing, command structure and integration into an ongoing mission are yet to be addressed. The most relevant problem with such mission however is sustainability, as it is supposed to run for 6 months due to issues with financing.
In practical military terms, it also risks a lack of coordination with Nigerien military personnel operating in the region.
As part of the concentration of efforts in Liptako Gourma, the Madama base in Niger was put on standby. The fact that it is not a closure makes it possible to maintain the ability to increase performance and, if necessary, to intervene.
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Selina Daugalies and Dario Goxho for research support and the Center for War Studies for research feedback. Peter Viggo Jakobsen is credited with helping us hone our findings around a more concise title and structure. Thanks also go to the blind peer reviewers, large list of open peer reviewers, our interviewees, our colleagues in Niger, and the Danish Institute for Advanced Study.
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The funding was provided by Danish Institute for Advanced Study
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Rogers, J., Goxho, D. Light footprint—heavy destabilising impact in Niger: why the Western understanding of remote warfare needs to be reconsidered. Int Polit 60, 790–817 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00362-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00362-9