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Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Elmar Unnsteinsson
Elmar Unnsteinsson*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
*
Email: elmar.geir@gmail.com
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Abstract

Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.

Keywords

ReferenceconfusionidentityMillikanGriceFrege puzzleimplicit belief
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , April 2016 , pp. 204 - 227
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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