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Non-defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michela Massimi
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Abstract

Experimental realism aims at striking a middle ground between scientific realism and anti-realism, between the success of experimental physics it would explain and the realism about scientific theories it would supplant. This middle ground reinstates the engineering idea that belief in scientific entities is justified on purely experimental grounds, without any commitment to scientific theories and laws. This paper argues that there is no defensible middle ground to be staked out when it comes to justifying physicists’ belief in colored quarks, and that experimental realism shifts, under analysis, into scientific realism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 1 , January 2004 , pp. 36 - 60
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am very grateful to Peter Lipton and Michael Redhead for insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I have much benefited from stimulating comments made by Steve Clarke, Mauro Dorato, Mary Leng, Robert Nola, and Mark Sprevak. I thank Emanuele Leonardi (CERN) for friendly help with the reference of the CDHS experiment and color confinement. The challenging and constructive criticisms of two anonymous referees helped me to clarify the ideas here exposed.

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