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Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Matthew J. Brown
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Abstract

Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 829 - 839
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Ken Williford and the University of Texas at Arlington Philosophy Department; Martin Carrier, Don Howard, and the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) at Bielefeld Universität; and Andrea Woody and the PSA for opportunities to present these ideas, as well as the audiences at those talks for their valuable feedback. I would especially like to thank Heather Douglas, Kevin Elliott, Kristen Intemann, Dan Hicks, and Philip Kitcher for their feedback and encouragement on this article.

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