Asymptotic security of discrete-modulation protocols for continuous-variable quantum key distribution

Eneet Kaur, Saikat Guha, and Mark M. Wilde
Phys. Rev. A 103, 012412 – Published 15 January 2021

Abstract

We consider discrete-modulation protocols for continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) that employ a modulation constellation consisting of a finite number of coherent states and that use a homodyne- or a heterodyne-detection receiver. We establish a security proof for collective attacks in the asymptotic regime, and we provide a formula for an achievable secret-key rate. Previous works established security proofs for discrete-modulation CV-QKD protocols that use two or three coherent states. The main constituents of our approach include approximating a complex, isotropic Gaussian probability distribution by a finite-size Gauss-Hermite constellation, applying entropic continuity bounds, and leveraging previous security proofs for Gaussian-modulation protocols. As an application of our method, we calculate secret-key rates achievable over a lossy thermal bosonic channel. We show that the rates for discrete-modulation protocols approach the rates achieved by a Gaussian-modulation protocol as the constellation size is increased. For pure-loss channels, our results indicate that in the high-loss regime and for sufficiently large constellation size, the achievable key rates scale optimally, i.e., proportional to the channel's transmissivity.

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  • Received 4 August 2020
  • Accepted 15 December 2020

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.103.012412

©2021 American Physical Society

Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)

Quantum Information, Science & Technology

Authors & Affiliations

Eneet Kaur1, Saikat Guha2, and Mark M. Wilde1

  • 1Hearne Institute for Theoretical Physics, Department of Physics and Astronomy, and Center for Computation and Technology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803, USA
  • 2College of Optical Sciences and Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85719, USA

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Issue

Vol. 103, Iss. 1 — January 2021

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