Skip to main content
Log in

Abstract:

We propose a payoff function extending Minority Games (MG) that captures the competition between agents to make money. In contrast with previous MG, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting opportunistically between the minority and the majority. The emergent properties of the price dynamics and of the wealth of agents are strikingly different from those found in MG. As the memory of agents is increased, we find a phase transition between a self-sustained speculative phase in which a “stubborn majority” of agents effectively collaborate to arbitrage a market-maker for their mutual benefit and a phase where the market-maker always arbitrages the agents. A subset of agents exhibit a sustained non-equilibrium risk-return profile.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received 5 June 2002 / Received in final form 21 November 2002 Published online 27 January 2003

RID="a"

ID="a"e-mail: sornette@unice.fr

RID="b"

ID="b"CNRS UMR7536

RID="c"

ID="c"CNRS UMR6622

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Vitting Andersen, J., Sornette, D. The $-game. Eur. Phys. J. B 31, 141–145 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2003-00017-7

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2003-00017-7

Navigation