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BitVisor: a thin hypervisor for enforcing i/o device security

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Published:11 March 2009Publication History

ABSTRACT

Virtual machine monitors (VMMs), including hypervisors, are a popular platform for implementing various security functionalities. However, traditional VMMs require numerous components for providing virtual hardware devices and for sharing and protecting system resources among virtual machines (VMs), enlarging the code size of and reducing the reliability of the VMMs.

This paper introduces a hypervisor architecture, called parapass-through, designed to minimize the code size of hypervisors by allowing most of the I/O access from the guest operating system (OS) to pass-through the hypervisor, while the minimum access necessary to implement security functionalities is completely mediated by the hypervisor. This architecture uses device drivers of the guest OS to handle devices, thereby reducing the size of components in the hypervisor to provide virtual devices. This architecture also allows to run only single VM on it, eliminating the components for sharing and protecting system resources among VMs.

We implemented a hypervisor called BitVisor and a parapass-through driver for enforcing storage encryption of ATA devices based on the parapass-through architecture. The experimental result reveals that the hypervisor and ATA driver require approximately 20 kilo lines of code (KLOC) and 1.4 KLOC respectively.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      VEE '09: Proceedings of the 2009 ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS international conference on Virtual execution environments
      March 2009
      148 pages
      ISBN:9781605583754
      DOI:10.1145/1508293

      Copyright © 2009 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 11 March 2009

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