Jin Zhang
ABSTRACT
With the development of cognitive radio technologies, dynamic spectrum access becomes a promising approach to increase the efficiency of spectrum utilization and solve spectrum scarcity problem. Under dynamic spectrum access, unlicensed wireless users (secondary users) can dynamically access the licensed bands from legacy spectrum holders (primary users) on an opportunistic basis. While most primary users in existing works assume secondary transmissions as negative interference and don't actively involve them into the primary transmission, in this paper, motivated by the idea of cooperative communication, we propose a cooperative cognitive radio framework, where primary users, aware of the existence of secondary users, may select some of them to be the cooperative relay, and in return lease portion of the channel access time to them for their own data transmission. Secondary users cooperating with primary transmissions have the right to decide their payment made for primary user in order to achieve a proportional access time to the wireless media. Both primary and secondary users target at maximizing their utilities in terms of their transmission rate and revenue/payment. This model is formulated as a Stackelberg game and a unique Nash Equilibrium point is achieved in analytical format. Based on the analysis we discuss the condition under which cooperation will increase the performance of the whole system. Both analytical result and numerical result show that the cooperative cognitive radio framework is a promising framework under which the utility of both primary and secondary system are maximized.
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Index Terms
- Stackelberg game for utility-based cooperative cognitiveradio networks
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