Guanhua Yan
ABSTRACT
With a long history of compromising Internet security, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have been intensively investigated and numerous countermeasures have been proposed to defend against them. In this work, we propose a non-standard game-theoretic framework that facilitates evaluation of DDoS attacks and defense. Our framework can be used to study diverse DDoS attack scenarios where multiple layers of protection are deployed and a number of uncertain factors affect the decision making of the players, and it also allows us to model different sophistication levels of reasoning by both the attacker and the defender. We conduct a variety of experiments to evaluate DDoS attack and defense scenarios where one or more layers of defense mechanisms are deployed, and demonstrate that our framework sheds light on the interplay between decision makings of both the attacker and the defender, as well as how they affect the outcomes of DDoS attack and defense games.
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Index Terms
- Towards a bayesian network game framework for evaluating DDoS attacks and defense
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