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BGPStream: A Software Framework for Live and Historical BGP Data Analysis

Published:14 November 2016Publication History

ABSTRACT

We present BGPStream, an open-source software framework for the analysis of both historical and real-time Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) measurement data. Although BGP is a crucial operational component of the Internet infrastructure, and is the subject of research in the areas of Internet performance, security, topology, protocols, economics, etc., there is no efficient way of processing large amounts of distributed and/or live BGP measurement data. BGPStream fills this gap, enabling efficient investigation of events, rapid prototyping, and building complex tools and large-scale monitoring applications (e.g., detection of connectivity disruptions or BGP hijacking attacks). We discuss the goals and architecture of BGPStream. We apply the components of the framework to different scenarios, and we describe the development and deployment of complex services for global Internet monitoring that we built on top of it.

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        cover image ACM Conferences
        IMC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference
        November 2016
        570 pages
        ISBN:9781450345262
        DOI:10.1145/2987443

        Copyright © 2016 ACM

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        • Published: 14 November 2016

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