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Trust but Verify: Auditing the Secure Internet of Things

Authors:
Judson Wilson

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
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,
Riad S. Wahby

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
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,
Henry Corrigan-Gibbs

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
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,
Dan Boneh

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
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,
Philip Levis

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
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,
Keith Winstein

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
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MobiSys '17: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and ServicesJune 2017Pages 464–474https://doi.org/10.1145/3081333.3081342

Published:16 June 2017Publication History

MobiSys '17: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

Pages 464–474

ABSTRACT

Internet-of-Things devices often collect and transmit sensitive information like camera footage, health monitoring data, or whether someone is home. These devices protect data in transit with end-to-end encryption, typically using TLS connections between devices and associated cloud services. But these TLS connections also prevent device owners from observing what their own devices are saying about them. Unlike in traditional Internet applications, where the end user controls one end of a connection (e.g., their web browser) and can observe its communication, Internet-of-Things vendors typically control the software in both the device and the cloud. As a result, owners have no way to audit the behavior of their own devices, leaving them little choice but to hope that these devices are transmitting only what they should.

This paper presents TLS--Rotate and Release (TLS-RaR), a system that allows device owners (e.g., consumers, security researchers, and consumer watchdogs) to authorize devices, called auditors, to decrypt and verify recent TLS traffic without compromising future traffic. Unlike prior work, TLS-RaR requires no changes to TLS's wire format or cipher suites, and it allows the device's owner to conduct a surprise inspection of recent traffic, without prior notice to the device that its communications will be audited.

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MobiSys '17: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services
June 2017
520 pages
ISBN:9781450349284
DOI:10.1145/3081333
General Chairs:
Tanzeem Choudhury
Cornell University, USA
,
Steve Ko
University at Buffalo, USA
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Program Chairs:
Andrew Campbell
Dartmouth College, USA
,
Deepak Ganesan
University of Massachusetts, USA
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Author Tags
IoT
TLS
TLS 1.3
TLS-RAR
TLS-rotate and release
auditing
decrypt
internet of things
middlebox
proxy
transport layer security
Qualifiers
- research-article
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MobiSys '17 Paper Acceptance Rate34of188submissions,18%Overall Acceptance Rate274of1,679submissions,16%
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Trust but Verify: Auditing the Secure Internet of Things

MobiSys '17: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

ABSTRACT

References

Cited By

Index Terms

Recommendations

IoTLS: understanding TLS usage in consumer IoT devices

Behind the Scenes: Uncovering TLS and Server Certificate Practice of IoT Device Vendors in the Wild

SP 800-113. Guide to SSL VPNs

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Trust but Verify: Auditing the Secure Internet of Things

MobiSys '17: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

ABSTRACT

References

Cited By

Index Terms

Recommendations

IoTLS: understanding TLS usage in consumer IoT devices

Behind the Scenes: Uncovering TLS and Server Certificate Practice of IoT Device Vendors in the Wild

SP 800-113. Guide to SSL VPNs

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