Fatemeh Shirazi
Milivoj Simeonovski
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Abstract
The Internet has undergone dramatic changes in the past 2 decades and now forms a global communication platform that billions of users rely on for their daily activities. While this transformation has brought tremendous benefits to society, it has also created new threats to online privacy, such as omnipotent governmental surveillance. As a result, public interest in systems for anonymous communication has drastically increased. In this work, we survey previous research on designing, developing, and deploying systems for anonymous communication. Our taxonomy and comparative assessment provide important insights about the differences between the existing classes of anonymous communication protocols.
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Index Terms
- A Survey on Routing in Anonymous Communication Protocols
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