Piotr Faliszewski
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Abstract
Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules. We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and k-Approval Chamberlin--Courant as the only nontrivial rules in pairwise intersections of these classes. We provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature. We show that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of decomposable rules.
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Index Terms
- Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy
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