The Link Between Domestic Political Institutions and Commitments to Tariff Reduction Agreements

Jo Jung In

doi:10.14731/kjis.2006.12.46.5.95

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한국국제정치학회
국제정치논총 학술저널
The Korean Journal of International Relations Vol.46 No.5
2006.12 95 - 113 (19page)
DOI : 10.14731/kjis.2006.12.46.5.95

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Jo Jung In

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Lately countries have concluded many free trade agreements. However, the puzzle scholars face is why so many countries have rushed to enter a free trade agreement. In this study, I ask how and whether domestic institutions of a country make a difference in committing to tariff reduction agreements. I argue that the rush to PTAs since the 1980s is linked to the domestic constraints. I claim that the propensity of signing a trade agreement increases as the survival of political leaders becomes more dependent on having a large size of winning coalition. Decision-makers have greater political motivations to enter international trade agreements as the level of democracy increases as well. This study tests key propositions drawing on a comprehensive database of international trade agreements from 1950 to 1992 with 150 countries. I find that leaders have greater political incentives to conclude international trade agreements as the size of their winning coalition grows. The results also suggest that the level of democracy is associated with a leader's political motivation to conclude international trade agreements. I also find that electoral rule and the number of veto players have an impact on interstate commercial cooperation. By highlighting this dynamic, I demonstrate that domestic institutional constraints deserve more attention in international political economy.

#tariff reduction agreements #democracy #disaggregated domestic institution types

【ABSTRACT】
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Domestic Constraints of External Trade Policy: Argument
Ⅲ. Literature Review
Ⅳ. Variations of Domestic Political Institutions and the Determination to Enter Preferential Trade Agreements
Ⅴ. Research Design and Hypotheses
Ⅵ. Empirical Estimations and Results
Ⅶ. Conclusion
REFERENCES