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Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council

  • Sofia Amaral-Garcia EMAIL logo and Nuno Garoupa
From the journal Review of Law & Economics

Abstract

In this article, we study judicial behavior at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). British judges in general, and British high court judges in particular, are perceived to be independent and isolated from political pressure and interference. Furthermore, these judges tend to show a particularly high rate of consensus. This has led many scholars to consider that, contrarily to what holds for several other courts around the world (such as the US Supreme Court), the attitudinal model does not find support when British higher court judges are considered. In this paper we assess whether similar conclusions might be drawn from the JCPC, another British court of last resort. We create a unique dataset to study empirically decisions of the JCPC and investigate the extent to which judges exhibit different judicial behavior depending on the type of appeal being brought to the court, i. e., Commonwealth, devolution and domestic appeals. Our results indicate a higher polarization of judicial behavior in the context of devolution appeals (as measured by separate opinions). We discuss these results in the context of the comparative judicial behavior literature and the role of courts in the common law world (with particular reference to human rights).

JEL Classification: K0

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to three anonymous referees, Anthony Niblett, Jurgen Goossens, Dennis Quinn, Sung-in Jun, Ted Eisenberg, seminar participants at the Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics (Durham, 2014), Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association (Chicago, 2014), Conference of Empirical and Legal Studies (Philadelphia, 2013), ETH Zurich (Center for Law & Economics), Spanish Law and Economics Conference (Granada, June 2013), Korean Association of Law and Economics (2013), Italian Society of Law and Economics (Lugano, 2013) and European Conference of Law and Economics (Warsaw, 2013). We are particularly indebted to Andrew Le Sueur, to the Registrar of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council & The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Louise di Mambro, and to the Head of Communications of The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Ben Wilson. Sóm Datye, Daswell Davis and Joanna Yu Wang have provided valuable research assistance. Theusual disclaimer applies. Previous title: “Judicial Politics at the Privy Council: Empirical Evidence”.

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Appendix

Table 9:

Judges.

NameNational

Jurisdiction
BirthAppointmentHouse

of Lords
Justice

SCUK
MaleTotal

Votes
Total

Separate
Total

Dissenting
Total

Concurring
AuldEnglish193719950011101
BalcombeEnglish192519850012000
BeldamEnglish192519890012000
BinghamEnglish19331986101821468
BlanchardNew Zealander194219980012000
BrownEnglish19371992111331037
Browne-WilkinsonEnglish1930198310114000
CameronScottish193420000011000
CarswellNorthern Irish19341993101381028
ClarkeEnglish194319981114000
ClydeScottish1932199610149716
CoghlinNorthern Irish194520090011000
CollinsEnglish194120071112101
CookeNew Zealander1926197710121220
CosgroveScottish194620030001101
DysonEnglish194320010114101
EliasNew Zealander194919990004000
EvansEnglish193419920018000
GaultNew Zealander193819920015000
GibsonEnglish193419930012110
GlidewellEnglish192419850011000
GoffEnglish192619821015110
HaleEnglish19451999110371349
HenryEnglish193119930019000
HigginsNorthern Irish194420070011000
HobhouseEnglish1932199310173541
HoffmannEnglish19341992101102954
HopeScottish1938198911112315312
HughesEnglish194820060111000
HuttonNorthern Irish19311988101851174
JaunceyScottish192519881015000
JudgeEnglish194119961011000
KeithNew Zealander193719980019000
KennedyEnglish193519920013000
KerrNorthern Irish194820041115211
KirkwoodScottish194620001011101
LawsEnglish194519990011000
LeggattEnglish1930199000144110
LloydEnglish1929198410114220
MackayScottish1927197910116101
ManceEnglish19431999111251138
MillettEnglish1932199410178642
MustillEnglish193119851011000
NeubergerEnglish1948200411110505
NichollsEnglish19331985101721055
NolanEnglish192819911016000
NourseEnglish1932198500113000
OttonEnglish1933199500142110
ParkerEnglish193720000013101
PhillipsEnglish193819951119101
RichardsonNew Zealander193019780014000
RochEnglish193419930011000
RodgerScottish194419921119817611
RoseEnglish193719920011000
RussellEnglish1926198700116000
SavilleEnglish193619941113000
ScottEnglish19341991101781275
SladeEnglish1927198200114000
SlynnEnglish1930199210140642
StaughtonEnglish193319880015000
SteynEnglish193219921019414113
Stuart SmithEnglish192719880015000
ThomasEnglish1931199400110110
TippingNew Zealander194219980019000
WalkerEnglish1938199711162853
WilsonEnglish194520050111000
WoolfEnglish193319861012101
ZaccaJamaican193119920013000
Table 10:

Results for separate votes – std. errors clustered by author judge (excl. 2010 and 2011).

Reg 1Reg 2Reg 3Reg 4Reg 5Reg 6
Devolution5.83***6.41***6.66***6.33***6.74***7.02***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Domestic–2.40–0.96–1.03–2.73*–1.57–1.67
(0.11)(0.64)(0.62)(0.08)(0.44)(0.42)
Scottish judge–0.66**–0.56–0.56–0.86**–0.72–0.71
(0.03)(0.23)(0.23)(0.03)(0.18)(0.18)
Female judge–0.48–0.19–0.21–0.69–0.30–0.31
(0.33)(0.67)(0.63)(0.18)(0.53)(0.49)
Law Lord judge1.15**1.20*1.22*1.27**1.30*1.33*
(0.04)(0.06)(0.06)(0.04)(0.06)(0.06)
Seniority–0.02–0.01–0.01–0.02–0.01–0.01
(0.42)(0.52)(0.58)(0.52)(0.69)(0.74)
Scottish author0.260.320.210.380.330.21
(0.46)(0.36)(0.58)(0.30)(0.34)(0.55)
Sen. LL Bingham3.21***3.00***3.08***3.45***3.14***3.25***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Business law–0.64–0.59–0.65–0.68–0.60–0.65
(0.46)(0.48)(0.41)(0.46)(0.48)(0.42)
Criminal0.15–0.10–0.270.33–0.05–0.23
(0.74)(0.84)(0.55)(0.50)(0.91)(0.62)
Rights-Commonw.0.80**0.390.290.99**0.430.32
(0.03)(0.28)(0.43)(0.02)(0.24)(0.39)
Land and property–0.85–0.82–0.87–0.92–0.87–0.92
(0.19)(0.17)(0.19)(0.18)(0.15)(0.17)
Panel size0.75***0.78***0.69***0.72***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Pro-appellant–0.21–0.23–0.23–0.24
(0.59)(0.55)(0.56)(0.53)
Judge is in majority–0.06–0.060.010.01
(0.87)(0.87)(0.97)(0.97)
Same jurisd. judge/case–0.28(0.48)–0.27(0.49)–0.41(0.33)–0.40(0.35)
Same jurisd. judge/author judge0.260.250.250.23
(0.33)(0.36)(0.41)(0.45)
Same jurisd. author judge/case–0.66(0.52)–0.87(0.43)–0.52(0.60)–0.72(0.49)
Appellant individual0.050.05
(0.88)(0.89)
Respondent individual–0.54–0.59
(0.37)(0.34)
Constant–3.74***–7.32***–7.33***–4.01***–7.23***–7.27***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Observations1,1301,1301,1301,1301,1301,130
  1. Note: Robust p-values in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. All regressions include year fixed effects. Regs. 1, 2 and 3 with weights for the probability of being sampled. Regs. 4, 5 and 6 with weights for the probability

Table 11:

Results for separate votes – std. errors clustered by judge (excl. 2010 and 2011).

Reg 1Reg 2Reg 3Reg 4Reg 5Reg 6
Devolution5.83***6.41***6.66***6.33***6.74***7.02***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Domestic–2.40*–0.96–1.03–2.73*–1.57–1.67
(0.06)(0.54)(0.52)(0.08)(0.44)(0.42)
Scottish judge–0.66***–0.56***–0.56***–0.86**–0.72–0.71
(0.00)(0.01)(0.01)(0.03)(0.18)(0.18)
Female judge–0.48*–0.19–0.21–0.69–0.30–0.31
(0.07)(0.43)(0.39)(0.18)(0.53)(0.49)
Law Lord judge1.15***1.20***1.22***1.27**1.30*1.33*
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.04)(0.06)(0.06)
Seniority–0.02–0.01–0.01–0.02–0.01–0.01
(0.46)(0.59)(0.61)(0.52)(0.69)(0.74)
Scottish author0.260.320.210.380.330.21
(0.42)(0.44)(0.61)(0.30)(0.34)(0.55)
Sen. LL Bingham3.21***3.00***3.08***3.45***3.14***3.25***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Business law–0.64–0.59–0.65–0.68–0.60–0.65
(0.20)(0.20)(0.12)(0.46)(0.48)(0.42)
Criminal0.15–0.10–0.270.33–0.05–0.23
(0.75)(0.87)(0.63)(0.50)(0.91)(0.62)
Rights-Commonw.0.80**;0.390.290.99**0.430.32
(0.04)(0.29)(0.43)(0.02)(0.24)(0.39)
Land and property–0.85*–0.82*–0.87*–0.92–0.87–0.92
(0.05)(0.06)(0.07)(0.18)(0.15)(0.17)
Panel size0.75***0.78***0.69***0.72***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Pro-appellant–0.21–0.23–0.23–0.24
(0.46)(0.42)(0.56)(0.53)
Judge is in majority–0.06–0.060.010.01
(0.86)(0.86)(0.97)(0.97)
Same jurisd. judge/case–0.28(0.64)–0.27(0.64)–0.41(0.33)–0.40(0.35)
Same jurisd. author judge/case–0.66(0.18)–0.87(0.15)–0.52(0.60)–0.72(0.49)
Same jurisd. judge/author judge0.260.250.250.23
(0.36)(0.39)(0.41)(0.45)
Appellant individual0.050.05
(0.85)(0.89)
Respondent individual–0.54–0.59
(0.25)(0.34)
Constant–3.74***–7.32***–7.33***–4.01***–7.23***–7.27***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Observations1,1301,1301,1301,1301,1301,130
  1. Note: Robust p-values by judge in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. All regressions include year fixed effects. Regs. 1, 2 and 3 with weights for the probability of being sampled. Regs. 4, 5 and 6 with weights for the probability of being sampled and panel size.

Table 12:

Results for separate votes – std. errors clustered by decision (excl. 2010 and 2011).

Reg 1Reg 2Reg 3Reg 4Reg 5Reg 6
Devolution5.83***6.41***6.66***6.33***6.74***7.02***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Domestic–2.40*–0.96–1.03–2.73*–1.57–1.67
(0.08)(0.65)(0.63)(0.05)(0.46)(0.45)
Scottish judge–0.66**–0.56–0.56–0.86***–0.72*–0.71*
(0.02)(0.13)(0.13)(0.01)(0.08)(0.08)
Female judge–0.48–0.19–0.21–0.69–0.30–0.31
(0.33)(0.71)(0.67)(0.17)(0.56)(0.53)
Law Lord judge1.15**1.20**1.22**1.27***1.30**1.33**
(0.01)(0.02)(0.02)(0.01)(0.02)(0.02)
Seniority–0.02–0.01–0.01–0.02–0.01–0.01
(0.47)(0.59)(0.61)(0.53)(0.72)(0.75)
Scottish author0.260.320.210.380.330.21
(0.58)(0.53)(0.71)(0.39)(0.49)(0.67)
Sen. LL Bingham3.21***3.00***3.08***3.45***3.14***3.25***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Business law–0.64–0.59–0.65–0.68–0.60–0.65
(0.40)(0.43)(0.36)(0.38)(0.42)(0.36)
Criminal0.15–0.10–0.270.33–0.05–0.23
(0.76)(0.86)(0.64)(0.53)(0.93)(0.69)
Rights-Commonw.0.80*0.390.290.99**0.430.32
(0.07)(0.40)(0.54)(0.03)(0.35)(0.50)
Land and property–0.85–0.82–0.87–0.92–0.87–0.92
(0.20)(0.20)(0.22)(0.18)(0.18)(0.21)
Panel size0.75***0.78***0.69***0.72***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Pro-appellant–0.21–0.23–0.23–0.24
(0.56)(0.53)(0.53)(0.50)
Judge is in majority–0.06–0.060.010.01
(0.88)(0.88)(0.97)(0.97)
Same jurisd. judge/case–0.28(0.65)–0.27(0.66)–0.41(0.53)–0.40(0.54)
Same jurisd. author judge/case–0.66(0.56)–0.87(0.47)–0.52(0.64)–0.72(0.54)
Same jurisd. judge/author judge0.260.250.250.23
(0.37)(0.40)(0.43)(0.46)
Appellant individual0.050.05
(0.90)(0.91)
Respondent individual–0.54–0.59
(0.31)(0.28)
Constant–3.74***–7.32***–7.33***–4.01***–7.23***–7.27***
(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Observations1,1301,1301,1301,1301,1301,130
  1. Note: Robust p-values by decision in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. All regressions include year fixed effects. Regs. 1, 2 and 3 with weights for the probability of being sampled. Regs. 4, 5 and 6 with weights for the probability of being sampled and panel size.

Table 13:

Results for proportion of separate votes (excl. 2010 and 2011).

Reg 1Reg 2Reg 3Reg 4Reg 5Reg 6
Devolution4.23***3.76***3.77***4.23***3.76***3.77**
(0.00)(0.01)(0.01)(0.00)(0.01)(0.01)
Domestic-2.38*-3.08-3.10-2.38*-3.08-3.10
(0.05)(0.24)(0.24)(0.06)(0.29)(0.29)
Total Scottish-0.23-0.27-0.27-0.23-0.27-0.27
(0.32)(0.30)(0.31)(0.16)(0.25)(0.28)
Total female-0.13-0.22-0.23-0.13-0.22-0.23
(0.74)(0.56)(0.56)(0.77)(0.60)(0.61)
Total Law Lords0.54***0.47**0.47**0.54***0.47*0.47*
(0.00)(0.02)(0.03)(0.00)(0.05)(0.05)
Avg Sen. Years(Panel)-0.16-0.18-0.18-0.16-0.18*-0.18*
(0.23)(0.17)(0.17)(0.13)(0.06)(0.07)
Scottish author0.040.750.730.040.750.73
(0.94)(0.22)(0.24)(0.91)(0.14)(0.17)
Sen. LL Bingham2.21***2.28**2.28**2.21***2.28***2.28***
(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)
Business law-0.42-0.44-0.43-0.42-0.44-0.43
(0.48)(0.47)(0.48)(0.53)(0.52)(0.52)
Criminal-0.18-0.17-0.20-0.18-0.17-0.20
(0.67)(0.71)(0.66)(0.63)(0.67)(0.61)
Rights-Commonw.0.350.390.360.350.390.36
(0.34)(0.28)(0.34)(0.21)(0.16)(0.24)
Land and property-0.65-0.71-0.70-0.65-0.71-0.70
(0.31)(0.24)(0.27)(0.22)(0.15)(0.17)
Pro-appellant-0.14-0.14-0.14-0.14
(0.61)(0.62)(0.65)(0.64)
Total judges in majority-0.18-0.18-0.18-0.18
(0.19)(0.19)(0.17)(0.17)
Total same jurisd. judge/case0.450.460.450.46
(0.27)(0.27)(0.39)(0.38)
Total same jurisd. judge/author judge0.29* (0.06)0.29* (0.06)0.29* (0.05)0.29* (0.05)
Same jurisd. author judge/case-0.94 (0.45)-0.98 (0.43)-0.94 (0.42)-0.98 (0.40)
Appellant individual0.060.06
(0.87)(0.83)
Respondent individual-0.06-0.06
(0.88)(0.89)
Constant-2.44*-2.18*-2.23*-2.44-2.18*-2.23**
(0.06)(0.08)(0.08)(0.10)(0.07)(0.05)
Observations331331331331331331
  1. Note: Regs. 1-3 with robust standard errors; Regs. 4-6 with clustered standard errors by author judge. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

Published Online: 2017-4-21

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